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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As the deadline for submitting my dissertation is approaching, spring 
is showing its first signs. The sun is inviting me to go outside and have that 
much yearned-for first beer in the sun with my friends. But I can't. 
I shouldn't. My "cognitive control"-system is running on an all time high, 
helping me to stay inside and focus on those millisecond effects I've been 
gathering the last three and a half years. Why is it doing that? And how does 
this work? These were the questions I wanted to address. During my time as 
a PhD student, we (my helpful colleagues and I) have been collecting data to 
address the question on how, but also why, we adapt so quickly to ever-
changing environments, and how we control all this incoming information as 
to avoid conflicting responses. For example, when starting our computer, 
our desktop presents us with a range of desktop icons to choose from. 
Although we're well aware that we should be opening our text-editor to 
finish that project we started long ago, we often find ourselves clicking on 
our web browser first, and before we know we're leaning back and watching 
funny videos of kittens on the internet. This often happens before we realize 
and therefore not always constitutes a conscious decision towards a more 
pleasing option, but rather a well-trained automatic prepotent response that, 
through learning, has been associated with immediate reinforcements 
(Skinner, 1953).  
However, we do not always follow our impulses and, especially when 
stakes are high, we can be surprisingly efficient in ignoring what is 
irrelevant, and focusing on what is important. In fact, as a product of 
evolution, we exhibit an astonishing capacity for flexible thought and 
action: we can swiftly adapt and regulate our attention to environmental 
demands, efficiently switch back and forth between multiple tasks, and 
regulate our impulses appropriately. These characteristics of human (and 
non-human) behavior are often referred to with the umbrella term cognitive 
control.  
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In this project, we mainly focused on how we deal with cognitive 
conflict. That is, when confronted with two different options, how are we 
able to override automatic action tendencies (i.e. opening our web browser) 
as to select the more appropriate action (i.e. opening our text editor) that 
guarantees successful task performance (i.e. finishing our project)? Our 
study of cognitive control will mainly revolve around this monitoring of, 
and adapting to, cognitive conflict and will often be referred to with the 
slightly more specific term conflict monitoring.  
Conflict monitoring can be seen as a manifestation or subprocess of 
"cognitive control", as has been argued by Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, 
and Cohen (2001) in their by now classic paper called "Conflict monitoring 
and cognitive control". By contrast, note that this PhD project is entitled 
"Conflict monitoring and reinforcement learning". While it is by no means 
an attempt to falsify the postulations of Botvinick and colleagues (or to 
compare the impact of their work to ours), we did aim at specifying some of 
these first notions on conflict monitoring and shed a new light on this 
research domain by examining if, and how, conflict monitoring can be 
explained by, and interacts with, reinforcement learning.  
Reinforcement learning is a very broad construct - almost a 
philosophy - dealing with concepts like reward and punishment learning, the 
formation of stimulus-response associations, reward prediction errors and 
more (for a brief introduction on reinforcement learning, see below). 
Therefore, the studies in this dissertation and their obtained results are by no 
means exhaustive, but are meant to complement and add to an expanding 
line of research that investigates the interactions between cognitive control 
and reinforcement learning. Recent neuroscientific studies (for reviews, see 
Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009; Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 2004) already 
related cognitive control to a (dopamine) learning system, and current 
models, some developed at our own department (Verguts & Notebaert, 
2008; 2009; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011), successfully captured 
conflict monitoring in terms of general reinforcement learning principles. 
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The research presented in this dissertation is motivated by these models, 
aiming to unravel the interactions between reinforcement learning and 
conflict monitoring.  
In what follows, we will describe in more detail how we typically 
investigate cognitive conflict and, more importantly, adaptations to 
cognitive conflict. Next, we will introduce reinforcement learning and why 
we believe the further theorizing on conflict monitoring could be improved 
by taking into account reinforcement learning principles. Lastly, we will 
outline some predictions on how we can investigate these conflict 
monitoring and reinforcement learning interactions and introduce our 
empirical studies that form the body of this dissertation. 
 
CONFLICT: FROM THE FIELD TO THE LAB (AND BACK TO THE FIELD) 
We described conflict monitoring as a cognitive control process, but 
what is this conflict that requires monitoring? We experience conflicts in 
our actions and perceptions on an everyday basis (Figure 1a). We have built-
in or well-trained action tendencies that often interfere with planned 
behavior or information processing. In the laboratory, the prime research 
tool for studying such conflicts are conflict tasks, where irrelevant 
information can interfere with or facilitate task performance. A great deal of 
conflict tasks have been developed over the last century, but we will restrict 
ourselves to introducing perhaps the three most well-studied conflict tasks, 
the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974), and the Simon task (Simon, 1969), also being the three conflict 
paradigms that we employed during our empirical studies. 
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Figure 1. Examples of conflict situations and tasks. A. An everyday conflict situation in 
traffic where, in the incongruent situation, you would be eager to slow down at first, but, on 
closer inspection, notice that you are allowed to make a right turn after all. B. In the Stroop 
task, participants are distracted by the word meaning that could either facilitate (congruent) or 
interfere (incongruent) with responding to the color of the word. C. In the Eriksen flanker 
task, performance is facilitated or impeded by presenting similar (congruent) or interfering 
(incongruent) irrelevant stimulus information next to the centrally presented target. D. In the 
Simon task, the conflict is determined by the spatially irrelevant location of the stimulus. 
When the task is to press right when a green stimulus appears on the computer screen, 
performance will be faster (slower) when the stimulus is also presented at the right (left) hand 
side. 
One of the oldest, most well-known, and robust conflict effects is 
probably the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935; MacLeod, 1991, Figure 1b). In the 
Stroop task, subjects are requested to name the font color of different color-
words printed in different font colors. During this task, subjects are typically 
influenced by the word meaning despite its irrelevance to the task. Reaction 
times and error rates are increased when the font color and the word 
meaning mismatch (incongruent; e.g., ‘YELLOW’ printed in blue), as 
opposed to match (congruent; e.g., ‘YELLOW’ printed in yellow).  
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In the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Figure 1c), participants 
are required to respond as fast as possible to a centrally presented target, 
such as identifying a certain letter (e.g., press left when 'S', right when 'H'). 
Irrelevant flankers presented next to the central target can impede task 
performance when they are incongruent, as when these letters are associated 
with an alternative response (e.g., 'HHSHH'), but facilitate task performance 
when congruent, as when they are the same letters as the central target (e.g., 
'SSSSS').  
Lastly, the Simon task (Simon, 1969; Lu & Proctor, 1995; Figure 1d), 
again a famous and extensively studied congruency task, has even been 
referred to as a cultural icon in experimental psychology (Proctor, 2011). It's 
a well-studied observation that people tend to prefer reacting to a laterally 
presented stimulus with the same, rather than the opposing, side of the body 
(Fitts & Seeger, 1953; Fitts & Deininger, 1954). However, Simon and 
Rudell (1967) first observed that this effect also takes place when the 
stimulus location is actually irrelevant to the task at hand. For example, 
when the instruction is to press right when the stimulus is green and left 
when red, participants respond faster and more accurate when the green 
stimulus is presented on the right side (or the red left), than when it is 
presented on the left side of the screen (or the red right). This congruency 
effect is referred to as the Simon effect (Simon, 1969).  
Over the last decennia these congruency tasks have been of 
exponentially increasing interest to cognitive psychologists and beyond, and 
led to the development of important models of cognitive control (see below). 
Conflict effects have been widely studied in computer tasks to investigate 
human, but also animal (Courtière, Hardouin, Burle, Vidal, & Hasbroucq, 
2007; Urcuioli, Vu, & Proctor, 2005), behavior. In fact, even when tested 
outside isolated lab environments, reliable influences of irrelevant 
information on more complex motor behavior (i.e. the Simon effect) have 
been observed. For example, when we confronted experienced basketball 
players with the task to shoot a ball at one of the two basketball goals placed 
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right in front of them, dependent on the pitch of a tone in their wireless 
headphone, they were better at shooting at the rightmost (leftmost) goal 
when the appropriate sound was presented in their right (left) ear, than when 
it was presented in their left (right) ear, χ² = 4.229, p < .05. Similarly, when 
requesting experienced bowlers (affiliated with the national bowling team) 
to throw over the rightmost or leftmost pin depending on the pitch of a tone, 
they threw more accurately when the location of the sound was congruent 
with the location of their aimed-for pin, χ² = 5.108, p < .05, despite the fact 
that the location of this sound was irrelevant to the task (Braem, Supply, 
Roels, & Notebaert, submitted).  
 
MONITORING AND ADAPTING TO CONFLICT 
Although conflicts can slow us down, or even lead us into making 
mistakes, we are often able to learn from, or adapt to, these conflicting 
situations. For example, one of the most prominent cognitive control effects 
is the observation that the influence of irrelevant stimulus information is 
reduced after a trial where conflict occurred. This was first observed in a 
flanker task by Gratton, Coles and Donchin (1992; Figure 3b), who reported 
a reduced congruency effect (i.e. the difference score after subtracting the 
reaction times of a congruent trial from the reaction times of an incongruent 
trial) after incongruent than after congruent trials. This effect is often 
referred to as the "conflict adaptation effect", "congruency sequence effect", 
or Gratton effect, after the first author of the original paper. We will use 
these terms interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as it will be our 
index of cognitive control in our first four empirical chapters. Soon after its 
first observation, the Gratton effect sparked a great deal of interest, and has 
been reproduced in other congruency tasks like the Simon task (Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and the Stroop task (Kerns et 
al., 2004). 
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In their influential conflict monitoring theory, Botvinick and 
colleagues (2001) offered a first explanation for the Gratton effect in terms 
of a top-down modulation of attention processes. Specifically, they proposed 
there to be a constant monitoring of conflict in information processing that 
computes a quantifiable measure of conflict, which can be used to trigger an 
adaptive mechanism that enhances task-specific processes. By assuming that 
something continuously monitors a level of conflict, a role attributed to the 
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the conflict monitoring account was "the 
first" to propose a measure as to when cognitive control has to intervene.  
Although this was, and still is, a significant step forward in the 
development of theories on cognitive control, the conflict monitoring 
account, despite being specific about the monitoring process, is rather vague 
about the subsequent adaptation processes, or how cognitive control is 
implemented. The conflict monitoring account suggested that there is a 
"conflict monitoring loop", connecting conflict monitoring to a "cognitive 
control system", ensuring that task-relevant bottom-up processes would be 
enhanced after conflict detection. For example, in a flanker task, conflict 
would then increase the processing of targets and decrease the processing of 
flankers; while in a Stroop task, the detection of conflict would enhance 
color processing and reduce word processing. Even though this sounds like 
an interesting approach, the conflict monitoring model does not specify how 
it knows which task it should pay more attention to. Although it implements 
control in a task-specific way, there is no system installed that directs 
attention more to one task than the other. This is problematic, especially 
given that adaptations to conflict indeed occur in a task-specific manner 
(Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffman, 2006; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). In fact, 
conflict control is even believed to be working in an item- and context-
specific way (Abrahamse, Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, in press; Bugg, 
Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011; Cañadas, Rodríguez-Bailón, Milliken, & 
Lupiáñez, in press; Crump, Gong, & Milliken, 2006; Crump, Vaquero, & 
Milliken, 2008; Crump & Milliken, 2009; Heinemann, Kunde, & Kiesel, 
2009; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003; King, Donkin, Korb, & Egner, 
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2012a; King, Korb, & Egner, 2012b; Leboe & Mondor, 2007). Because of 
its architecture, the conflict-monitoring model cannot account for these 
observations, akin to the idea that conflict control might rely on more 
associative forms of cognitive control than first thought.  
Secondly, although the original conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick 
et al., 2001) offered interesting insights as to when, and how (but see 
previous paragraph), cognitive control can be exerted, it remains unclear as 
to why cognitive control should be exerted (but see Botvinick, 2007). To 
some, this may seem as a trivial matter at first, but we believe it is important 
to investigate, especially from a reinforcement learning perspective, the 
drive (i.e. motivational factors) behind cognitive control, as this may further 
help us understanding its dynamics. Therefore, we argue that interactions 
with, and notions of, reinforcement learning can be a helpful tool to better 
understand how we deal with conflict. Hereafter, we will provide a brief 
overview of reinforcement learning, both as a concept and as a research 
domain, to then return to the matter of conflict monitoring and adaptation, 
and see how some of these concepts can help us in investigating the 
underlying nature of these intriguing mechanisms that define our everyday 
action, perception, and decision making. 
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REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Reinforcement learning theory dates back to the beginning of  the last 
century. Ivan Pavlov (1928, Figure 2) first introduced the term 
reinforcement to describe the strengthening of associations between a 
conditioned (e.g. a bell) and an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. food) resulting 
from their simultaneous presentation. However, although the focus of 
Pavlov's work, and his use of the term reinforcement, was mostly restricted 
to stimulus-stimulus associations, the definition was soon extended to 
response learning as well. Thorndike's famous Law of Effect (1911) can be 
seen as a first manifestation of this idea, stating that responses in a certain 
situation that are closely followed by satisfactory stimuli, will be more 
likely to re-occur, when this situation represents itself again. These 
traditional models of reinforcement learning only focused on the formation 
of associations, without focusing on the underlying internal states. In fact, 
behaviorists, being the first proponents of reinforcement learning, were 
strongly opposed to ascribing measurable behavior to internal intervening 
states (Skinner, 1963). Early studies of reinforcement learning were 
characterized by this school of thought and are still, up until today, often 
described within this (sometimes oversimplified) philosophy.   
However, the concept of reinforcement learning how we will use it 
throughout this dissertation is not just a modern recapitulation of these 
stimulus-response learning mechanisms familiar from this classical and 
instrumental conditioning literature (see also Montague et al., 2004). 
Instead, reinforcement learning covers ideas from these century-old theories 
up to modern computational models of machine learning and neuroscience.  
Scientific techniques have much progressed and we now gained insight in 
reinforcement learning rules that often describe specific neurotransmitter 
functions. As stated by B. F. Skinner himself: "The importance of 
behaviorism as a philosophy of science naturally declines as a scientific 
analysis becomes more powerful, because there is then less need to use data 
in the form of self-description" (p. 957, Skinner, 1963). Although we are 
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still far from understanding the exact working of the human brain, it are 
exactly those scientific advantages in computational models of how the 
neural system sets goals, computes values, and guides choices, that now 
motivate us in investigating the (neural) underpinnings of cognitive control 
in terms of reinforcement learning processes. 
 
 
Figure 2. Popular cartoon about Pavlov's dog. The term "reinforcement" was first introduced 
by Pavlov (1928) to describe the formation of an association between an unconditioned and 
conditioned stimulus. This was demonstrated in his by now famous experiment where he 
presented a dog with a ringing bell (conditioned stimulus) followed by food (unconditioned 
stimulus). Soon, "Pavlov's dog" started drooling (unconditioned response) whenever he heard 
the bell. Reproduced with permission of Mark Stivers© 2003. 
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Reinforcement learning in general is concerned with how an animal or 
agent takes actions in an environment as to maximize a quantitative 
"reward" signal. A reinforcement learning agent learns from the outcomes of 
his actions, rather than being explicitly taught (i.e. by a knowledgeable 
teacher or reasoning from a complete model of the environment), and selects 
its actions on the basis of past experiences (exploitation) or new choices 
(exploration) (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Woergoetter & Porr, 2008). Modern 
reinforcement learning is highly interdisciplinary; ranging from students of 
machine learning and artificial intelligence to neuroscientists investigating 
the synaptic plasticity of neurons. The former equipped us with interesting 
learning rules that soon proved their applicability for explaining 
animal/human behavior, whereas the latter mainly contributed to the 
theorizing of neuromodulations and the role of reward prediction errors 
therein. The list of developments within this research field is endless. 
Therefore, we will restrict the following discussion of reinforcement 
learning to three concepts, important for outlining our predictions: Hebbian 
learning, Reward learning and reward prediction errors, and the 
Exploration/Exploitation trade-off. 
 
Hebbian learning 
An important question is how organisms form associations between 
different stimulus features, or stimulus features and action tendencies. This 
problem has been referred to as the binding problem (Hommel, 2004; 
Treisman, 1996) and one solution may lay in a learning rule put forward by 
Donald O. Hebb (Hebb, 1949). Largely inspired by Pavlov and others 
(Brown & Milner, 2003), Hebb wrote the successful book entitled "The 
Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory" where he 
postulated that “when an axon of cell A is near enough to excite a cell B and 
repeatedly and persistently takes part in firing it, some growth process or 
metabolic change takes place in one or both cells such that A’s efficiency, 
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as one of the cells firing B, is increased”. This idea is often abbreviated with 
the more straightforward saying "what fires together, wires together" and 
represents the core message of Hebb's proposition (Hebb, 1949). 
Specifically, Hebb suggested that excited or "activated" neurons tend to 
decrease their discharge to inactive neurons, while increasing this discharge 
to active neurons, thereby forming an association between neurons that are 
simultaneously firing. Hebbian learning inspired much of our current 
understanding of neural connections (Seung, 2000) and has since been 
proven to be a largely successful tool in the computational modeling of 
human learning and learning failures (for a critical review, see McClelland, 
2006). In fact, below we will demostrate how a simple Hebbian learning 
rule, as described above, might help in explaining the context- and item-
specificity of cognitive control (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). 
 
Reward learning and reward prediction errors 
Hebbian or not, learning rules, according to reinforcement learning 
advocates, are applied and updated as a function of certain goals. These 
goals or reward signals could range from direct pleasure (e.g. eating), to an 
indirect reward (e.g. money to buy food), or even more long-term goals (e.g. 
planning a vacation trip), and are widely thought to reinforce stimulus-
response associations (i.e., the law of effect; Thorndike, 1911) and modulate 
our attention accordingly (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010; Hickey & 
van Zoest, 2012; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Rutherford, O'Brien, & 
Raymond, 2010). Insights in how (task) goals and rewards modulate 
attention has helped in further understanding the dynamics of attention 
regulation. Analogously, we believe that a proper investigation of reward 
effects on conflict adaptation, can help us to further comprehend what drives 
adaptations to conflict. 
In the modeling of Hebbian learning rules (Roelfsema & Van Ooyen, 
2005), these goals are specified by the δ-parameter, denoting the 
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reinforcement factor. This reinforcement factor typically represents a 
contrast between the current reward, or predicted reward, and an expected 
value. Specifically, according to a temporal difference learning algorithm, 
this follows a function that incorporates information about the current 
reward state, and the next prediction made by the reward-prediction system 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998; for its impact on neuroscience, see Montague et al., 
2004). Important for us, although convincingly remonstrated in reward 
learning studies (Schultz, 2002, 2004), these reward prediction errors may 
also be central to how we monitor our task performance (e.g. monitor 
conflict), even in the absence of reward deliveries (Alexander & Brown, 
2011; Silvetti et al., 2011). 
 
Exploration and Exploitation 
We exemplified how learning could occur, and how rewards and 
reward prediction errors might constitute important learning signals therein. 
However, as a last topic of interest for the current dissertation, we are also 
interested in knowing how a system decides when to focus, and when to 
start exploring (Gittins & Jones, 1974). Therefore, a central issue to 
reinforcement learning, is the investigation of the trade between exploration 
and exploitation (Kaelbling, 1993; Sutton & Barto, 1998). In order to 
maximize reward, a reinforcement learning agent will tend to prefer actions 
that were effective in producing reward (Thorndike, 1913). This calls for 
exploiting what already works. However, in order to select the most 
appropriate action, the agent first has to explore different potential options. 
Even when an optimal strategy has been learned, it does not hurt to keep an 
open mind for strategies that might work better in the future. This dilemma, 
between exploration and exploitation, is at the heart of reinforcement 
learning. In instructed, or supervised learning, this issue does not even arise 
(Sutton & Barto, 1998). As we will argue below, we can see the Gratton 
effect (enhanced task focus after conflict) as a conflict-induced form of 
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exploitation. Although this is mostly beneficial when performing single 
conflict tasks, such processes can interfere with efficient task performance 
in task-switching studies, where a more exploratory mode is often 
advantageous (see below). 
These notions of reinforcement learning equip us with a toolbox that 
can help us to further identify the processes underlying conflict monitoring 
and adaptations to conflict. In the following paragraphs, we will 
demonstrate how models of cognitive control already developed towards 
integrating reinforcement learning aspects into modeling cognitive control 
behavior, and elucidate how we can put some of the resulting predictions to 
the test. 
  
CONFLICT MONITORING AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
Looking at the conflict monitoring literature, through the glasses of a 
reinforcement learning proponent, we can postulate some first assumptions. 
First, we would argue that adaptations to conflict constitute a purely reactive 
form of behavior
1
, comprising a reaction to our environment that allows us 
to interact more efficiently with, and learn from, that environment. Second, 
                                                     
1
 This does not mean that we deny the existence of more anticipatory, sustained, 
forms of cognitive control (Braver, 2012). Manipulations in sustained forms of 
control can also influence adaptations to conflict (e.g. Duthoo, Abrahamse, Braem, 
& Notebaert, submitted; Soutschek, Strobach, & Schubert, 2012; van Steenbergen, 
Band, & Hommel, 2010; Weldon, Mushlin, Kim, & Sohn, 2013) and could be 
implemented by modifying learning parameters or connection weights, thereby 
creating a more long-term impact on behavior. However, it does mean that 
reinforcement learning postulates that every action is taken as a reaction to its 
environment, and conflict adaptation in particular, as we believe, can be considered 
as a prime example of stimulus-driven reactive control (see also Duthoo & 
Notebaert, 2012; Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010). 
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conflict adaption takes place by updating and strengthening associations, 
rather than attributing these processes to a "cognitive control system". The 
latter, we believe, should be seen as a "working title", that we, and others, 
often use to relocate, rather than resolve, the homunculus problem (i.e. 
assigning unknown processes to a little agent inside our head, Hazy et al., 
2007). Third, these conflict adaptation processes are part of a reinforcement 
learning process and, hence, in function of maximizing reward. Note that 
reward signals should not necessarily be seen as explicit reinforcement 
signals alone (i.e., money, food), but can also constitute more abstract goals 
that we often pursue (e.g., planning a career). In fact, when performing a 
simple reaction time task, "being right" could already be its own goal or 
reward (Satterthwaithe et al., 2012; see below). Finally, adaptations to 
conflict are an integral part of our constant balancing between exploration 
and exploitation. In everyday life we have more freedom than we have as a 
participant, in the sense that we can interrupt tasks and switch to tasks that 
have a higher expected outcome value. Within the reinforcement learning 
framework, task switching can be considered as exploratory behavior and 
conflict adaptation as exploitive behavior. 
We are far from the first to consider reinforcement learning dynamics 
in understanding cognitive control behavior (Alexander & Brown, 2011; 
Hazy et al., 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Ridderinkhof, van den 
Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 
2011; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). Actually, this idea, and hence this 
dissertation, is part of an exponentially growing trend that has characterized 
the past decade. In what follows, we will demonstrate how we can apply the 
above-mentioned concepts of reinforcement learning (or how some have 
already been applied) for a better understanding of conflict adaptation. We 
will discuss the appropriate frameworks and outline our predictions that will 
be tested in the empirical chapters. 
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Conflict adaptation by Hebbian Learning 
We demonstrated how the conflict monitoring account (Botvinick et 
al., 2001) cannot account for item- or context-specific findings of conflict 
control. As a reaction to this observation, Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 
2009; Figure 3a) explain the Gratton effect (Figure 3b) by a conflict-
modulated Hebbian learning rule (Hebb, 1949). Specifically, the authors 
proposed that conflict detection leads to a neuromodulatory signal that 
subsequently interacts with ongoing Hebbian learning and influences 
binding of all active representations (see also Blais, Robidoux, Risko and 
Besner, 2007; Davelaar & Stevens, 2009). In this view, cognitive control 
operates by adjusting active stimulus-response associations. Because task-
relevant representations are usually more active than task-irrelevant 
representations, task-relevant associations will tend to be more strongly 
modified. This way, despite the learning rule being very general (i.e., all 
active associations will be enhanced), its implications are very specific. It 
allows us to explain why congruency effects are typically reduced for 
relevant stimulus features that are being presented in a higher proportion of 
incongruent trials (Abrahamse, Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, in press; Bugg, 
Jacoby, & Chanani, 2011; Jacoby et al., 2003; Leboe & Mondor, 2007), or 
for items presented on locations associated with a higher proportion of 
incongruent trials (Cañadas et al., in press; Crump et al., 2006; Crump, 
Vaquero, & Milliken, 2008; Crump & Milliken, 2009; Heinemann, Kunde, 
& Kiesel, 2009). However, following the Hebbian learning rule 
implemented in the model of Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009), we can 
even go further, and hypothesize that trial-to-trial adaptations to conflict 
should be specific to task-irrelevant contexts (Chapter 4) or response 
modalities (Chapter 2) that are not predictive of a congruency proportion. 
If we extend the reasoning that task-associations are enhanced after 
conflict to task-switching studies, we can expect this conflict-induced 
strengthening of task-associations would also impact task-switching 
behavior. Indeed, it has been observed that the task-switch cost (the decrease 
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in performance associated with switching between two tasks, compared to 
repeating the same task) is enhanced after cognitive conflict (Goschke, 
2000; Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007; Figure 3c). Specifically, in a task-
switching design with two conflict tasks, participants show larger task-
switch costs after incongruent trials than after congruent trials. This suggests 
that participants benefit from task repetitions but suffer from task 
alternations following an incongruent trial, and is consistent with the view 
that the detection of conflict on incongruent trials is used to increase task-
relevant connections, thereby increasing the focus on task-relevant 
information (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). This effect, as another 
metric of adaptations to conflict, will be our measure of interest in Chapter 3 
and 7, and will interchangeably be referred to as the "conflict-modulated 
task-switch cost", the "conflict-enhanced task-switch cost", or the Goschke 
effect. 
Interestingly, although the neural signatures of the Gratton effect have 
been well investigated (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005), the associated brain 
regions with the Goschke effect have not yet been tested. Therefore, in 
Chapter 7, we simultaneously recorded brain imaging data by means of 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), allowing us to identify the 
neural underpinnings of the Goschke effect. Consistent with the conflict 
monitoring account (Botvinick et al., 2001) and adaptation by binding 
account (Verguts & Notebaert), we expected this effect to be primarily 
associated with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation, consistent with an 
enhanced re-updating of task-associations and task goals (Niendam et al., 
2012; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Macdonald et al., 
2000) on task alternations after incongruent trials. In a similar vein, Hyafil, 
Summerfield, and Koechlin (2009) already demonstrated how the dlPFC 
was most recruited on task-switches where both the current and preceding 
trial were incongruent.  
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Figure 2. A. Schematic overview of the adaptation-by-binding model by Verguts and 
Noteabert (2008, 2009) as depicted in the article from van Bochove, Van der Haegen, 
Notebaert, and Verguts (2012). The overview demonstrates how conflict is detected by the 
Medial Frontal Cortex (MFC) sending a neuromodulatory signal throughout the brain that 
strengthens all active task associations. B. Demonstration of the Gratton effect (1992), where 
the impact of incongruent trials on reaction times is reduced when the preceding trial was also 
a incongruent trials. C. Demonstration of the Goschke effect (2000), where the impact of task 
alternations on reaction times is enhanced when the preceding trial was an incongruent trial. 
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Reinforcement signals and conflict adaptation 
In our view, the model of Verguts & Notebaert (2008; 2009) offers a 
better - or at least more parsimonious - implementation of how conflict 
control can be exerted. Furthermore, it also suggests a measure that drives 
people in adapting to conflict. In their model, Verguts and Notebaert (2009) 
propose that the arousing value associated with the experience of conflict 
might be what initiates the Hebbian learning process. The authors further 
note that, therefore, a prediction emerging from their model would be that 
also "arousal-inducing but task-irrelevant stimuli should induce a stronger 
focus on task-relevant stimuli (i.e. Gratton-like effect)" (p. 255, Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009).  In contrast to this prediction, Botvinick (2007), following 
up on the conflict monitoring account (Botvinick et al., 2001), argued that 
adaptations to conflict might actually be driven by the negative value of 
cognitive conflict (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, in press; 
Lynn, Riddle, & Morsella, 2012; Schouppe, De Houwer, Ridderinkhof, & 
Notebaert, 2012), positing a valence-specific, rather than arousal-driven, 
hypothesis as to why we would learn or adapt our behavior after conflict. 
Cognitive conflict comes with a cost, in that it requires a higher amount of 
effort and attention. According to Botvinick (2007), it is this effortful aspect 
of cognitive conflict that makes it aversive (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011; 
Hull, 1943; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010).  
A better insight in the drive behind adaptations to conflict (and which 
aspect of the conflict-experience it elicits), can be best investigated by 
studying the effect of reinforcement signals. Only recently, a number of 
studies tried to address this issue (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010; Lu et 
al., 2013; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 
2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009; 2012), but the results 
remain equivocal and call for a better conceptualization and dissociation of 
reinforcement schedules (see also Chiew & Braver, 2011; Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012b). Specifically, while some studies investigated block-wise 
effects of reinforcement schedules (e.g., Locke & Braver, 2008), others have 
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investigated cue-related effects or reinforcements (e.g., Padmala & Pessoa, 
2011; Savine & Braver, 2010), randomly cueing if a trial could be 
potentially rewarded or not. Such an enhanced motivation typically leads to 
enhanced task performance, as indicated by a reduced congruency effect 
(Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). Yet another group of studies looked at the 
influence of item-specific reward on conflict processing (Krebs, Boehler, & 
Woldorff, 2010; Lu et al., 2013). Specifically, Krebs, Boehler, and Woldorff 
(2010), used a four-color Stroop task, where two colors were often rewarded 
for good performance, whereas the other two were never. Interestingly, 
Krebs and colleagues, demonstrated how reward can capture your attention, 
by showing facilitated conflict processing when the color of the word 
(relevant dimension) was rewarding, and more interference when the word 
meaning (irrelevant dimension) was related to rewarded colors (but see, Lu 
et al., 2013). Together, these studies are consistent with the notion that 
increasing motivation (i.e., increasing reward value) enhances task-
performance, commensurate with the importance of goals as stressed by 
reinforcement learning theories. However, although this impact of 
motivation is an important one to investigate, it might differ from the impact 
of the reinforcement signal itself. Specifically, in the above-mentioned 
studies, the prospect of reward was investigated by either the context (e.g., 
Locke & Braver, 2008), the cue (e.g., Padmala & Pessoa, 2011), or stimulus-
feature (e.g., Krebs et al., 2010). These features predicted reward before 
reward presentation, therefore demonstrating the effect of motivational 
significance, rather than the impact of reward signals themselves (for a 
similar reasoning, see Hickey et al., 2010). To investigate the impact of 
reinforcement signal presentation, we need a design where these signals are 
not cued and randomly distributed, therefore not predictive of potential 
reward or punishment in the subsequent trial. This way, we can investigate 
the impact of reward or punishment signals on the trial-to-trial adaptations 
in conflict tasks (i.e., how reinforcement signals interact with the Gratton 
effect). 
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To this end, van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel (2009; 2012) 
employed a flanker task, where reward signals (associated with monetary 
gains), punishment signals (associated with monetary losses), and neutral 
signals, were not cued and randomly distributed. This allowed van 
Steenbergen and colleagues to investigate the impact of reinforcement 
signals (associated with monetary gains and losses) on adaptations to 
conflict. The authors observed a Gratton effect when preceded by 
punishment and neutral trials, but not when preceded by reward trials. This 
was consistent with their hypothesis that positive affect (as induced by the 
reward signals) would counteract the aversive learning signal cognitive 
conflict entails (Botvinick, 2007). However, their reward and punishment 
signals consisted of smiley and sad faces respectively. Moreover, although 
these signals immediately followed response, and were associated with 
monetary gain or loss, they were also completely randomly distributed, 
potentially following performance errors. Therefore we believe their results 
are of important value to the investigation of affect on cognitive control, but 
must be dissociated from the effects of reinforcement signals. This is in line 
with the work from Berridge and Robinson (2003), suggesting that the 
hedonic and motivational aspect of reward may have different influences on 
cognitive control. In contrast to the findings of van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 
2012), we would expect adaptations after conflict to be enhanced after 
reward, but also after punishments, in line with the century-old idea that 
reinforcement signals help updating task-associations (Thorndike, 1911; 
Skinner, 1953; Schultz, 2002). To this end, reinforcement stimuli that are 
not confounded with affect-inducements (as administered in all above 
mentioned studies, except for van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012) should be 
preferred. Moreover, to make a clear dissociation between reward and no-
reward trials, or punishment and no-punishment trials, the simultaneous 
administering of reward, punishment, and no-feedback trials within one 
experiment should be avoided. As indicated by van Steenbergen himself, the 
inclusion of all three trial types (reward, neutral, and punishment) did not 
allow him to make a clear dissociation, making it difficult to infer to which 
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extent neutral trials were indeed perceived as "neutral" (van Steenbergen et 
al., 2012). 
Stürmer and colleagues (2011) took exactly this approach. 
Participants in their experiment performed a block were only punishment 
(and no-punishment trials) or  reward (and no-reward) trials were presented. 
Moreover, their reinforcement signals were denoted by abstract colored 
circles and were made contingent on behavior by means of an adaptive 
algorithm. In the punishment blocks, only the 25 % slowest response times 
or erroneous responses were punished, while in the reward block only the 
25 % fastest correct trials were rewarded. In line with our predictions, 
Stürmer and colleagues found an enhanced conflict adaptation effect after 
reward, as opposed to no-reward trials, but no effect of punishment on 
conflict adaptation was observed. Instead, punishment signals only slowed 
down performance on the subsequent trial. Still, although this experiment, to 
our opinion, used a more appropriate design to test the impact of 
reinforcement signals on adaptations to conflict, it still contains an 
important confound. We especially think so, because, prior to their 
publication, we ran exactly the same experiment, also including an adaptive 
algorithm. However, although our results demonstrated enhanced conflict 
adaptation effects after both reward and punishment, we had reason to 
believe these results were largely confounded with previous performance. 
Specifically, by only rewarding (or punishing) the 25 % fastest (or slowest) 
trials, we were not only looking at the effect of previous feedback, but also 
the effect of previous task-performance. Therefore, we believe that the exact 
impact of reward and punishment signals on the Gratton effect remains to be 
investigated. We took on this challenge in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
Because we were also concerned with the potential individual 
differences in reward and punishment sensitivity, we employed the 
BIS/BAS-scales (Behavioral Inhibition System, and Behavioral Approach 
System; Carver & White, 1994; Franken, Muris, & Rassin, 2005) in each of 
these Chapters. The BIS and BAS scores have proven to be a valuable 
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instrument in indexing the individual differences in punishment and reward 
sensitivity respectively, and their influence on cognitive control (Amodio, 
Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008; Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 
2006; De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono, 2010; van Steenbergen, Band, & 
Hommel, 2009). Moreover, we not only believe that these individual 
differences can help us towards a better understanding of reinforcement 
signal modulations (Chapters 3 and 4), but also to unravel information in 
data that could otherwise be overlooked (Chapter 5). 
 
Performance monitoring and the evaluation of conflict 
Recent theorizing on the role of affective variables in cognitive 
conflict has focused on the aversive nature of cognitive conflict (Botvinick, 
2007), suggesting that everyday cognitive conflicts, such as misleading 
traffic situations or ambiguous instructions, can be perceived as aversive 
(i.e., lead to frustration). Therefore, it has been postulated that we often try 
to avoid such situations (the law of least mental effort, Hull, 1943) and this 
idea was also recently put to the test (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 
2010). However, although most people will intuitively agree that cognitive 
conflicts can be frustrating and aversive, we often have no choice but to 
accept these situations and try to deal with them as efficient as possible. 
Botvinick (2007) suggests that these aversive signals play an important role 
in learning and cognitive control. By monitoring information processing and 
detecting these cognitive conflicts, we can adapt to these situations by 
choosing the less conflicting option, associated with least mental effort 
(Hull, 1943). Although Botvinick’s theory leaves us with attractive working 
hypotheses about decision making and avoidance/approach behaviour in 
free-choice task paradigms, it does not extend to forced-choice conflict 
tasks, which are often the subject of cognitive control research (Botvinick et 
al., 2001; Egner, 2008; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). Crucially, in such tasks, 
participants often have no choice but to respond to such stimuli, irrespective 
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of their difficulty, in order to proceed to the following trial. Similarly, in our 
everyday lives, we often have no choice but to overcome inconvenient 
obstacles to achieve a greater goal. Focusing and only acting upon the 
aversive nature of these situations would then seem counterproductive and 
demotivating. We believe that it is within such situations and task designs, 
that responding to more difficult tasks can actually be perceived as more 
rewarding than easier tasks. 
For example, as a jury-member of this dissertation, you have no 
choice but to read through this entire dissertation. If we had chosen a less 
fluent font than Times New Roman, making the reading process more 
effortful, we have reason to believe that you might have been more easily 
persuaded by our arguments (Hernandez & Preston, 2013), because of the 
extra effort you would have to exert during reading. This relates to the 
concept of learned industriousness (Eisenberger, 1992), stating that people 
can feel secondarily reinforced by the sensation of high effort. Eisenberger 
took his inspiration from early behaviorists like John B. Watson and B. F. 
Skinner, but also recent investigations from the animal learning literature 
(Clement, Feltus, Kaiser,& Zentall, 2000) suggested that people do 
experience successfully completing a more effortful task as more rewarding 
than an effortless task (Alessandri, Darcheville, Delevoye-Turrell, & 
Zentall, 2008; Klein, Bhatt, & Zentall, 2005; Zentall, 2010) and the 
subjective experience of engaging in more effortful activity can be 
experienced as more pleasant (Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdeh, and 
Nakamura, 2005). Therefore, we believe people can also find it more 
rewarding to complete an incongruent trial than a congruent trial. 
We outlined how reward-prediction errors can help us recognize how 
we set goals and deal with the prospect, or treatment, of rewards and 
punishments. When applying the concept of reward prediction errors to 
performance monitoring, similar conclusions can be drawn. For example, in 
their reward value and prediction model (RVPM) of the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts (2011) provided a neuro-
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computational account for the affective connotation of conflicting situations. 
They proposed that incongruent trials evoke negative prediction error 
signals (negative surprises) in the ACC due to the longer reaction times 
needed to respond to incongruent stimuli, and to the higher probability of an 
error response (see also Alexander & Brown, 2011). As a consequence of 
frequent negative prediction errors, the success (or reward) expectation 
evoked by an incongruent stimulus is lower than that evoked by a congruent 
one. Interestingly, the RVPM also predicts that once an incongruent trial is 
correctly solved, it evokes a positive prediction error signal (positive 
surprise) that is larger than on congruent trials. This model thus predicts a 
shift from a negative to a positive prediction error after conflict resolution 
(i.e., responding correctly to an incongruent stimulus), and interprets the 
conflict-related ACC activation as the conjoined effect of both negative and 
positive prediction error signals. 
In line with this idea, Satterthwaite and colleagues (2012) recently 
suggested that people experience intrinsic reinforcement during standard 
cognitive tasks, even in the absence of a reward manipulation. Using a 
working memory task, they demonstrated how the ventral striatum, known 
for its central role in motivation and reinforcement learning, responded to 
task performance as a function of task difficulty, in the sense that correct 
responses on more difficult trials resulted in higher ventral striatum 
activation. Furthermore, Molapour and Morsella (2011) observed that 
nonsense shapes that co-occurred with incongruent Stroop stimuli were 
preferred over shapes that co-occurred with congruent or neutral Stroop 
stimuli. However, the findings of Molapour and Morsella provide at best 
indirect evidence for the potentially rewarding role of conflict resolution. 
We therefore set out to examine this issue more directly in Chapter 6. 
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Conflict-induced exploitation and affect-induced exploration 
Earlier, we identified the balancing between exploitation and 
exploration, or cognitive stability and cognitive flexibility, as being a key 
aspect of reinforcement learning: In contrast to instructed learning, the agent 
in reinforcement learning has to rely solely on learning rules, task goals, and 
its environment, to know when to exploit and when to explore (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998). This balance has also been acknowledged to play a 
fundamental role in our daily decision making (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 
2007; Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & Moreno, 2009). Gittins and Jones (1974) 
developed an algorithm (the Gittins index) to model this decision making 
process and while it may be applicable to some paradigms or processes (e.g. 
Krebs, Kacelnik, & Taylor, 1978), it is far from optimal for explaining 
human cognitive control behavior (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007).  
Within this framework of exploitation versus exploration, we could 
see the Gratton effect as a manifestation of exploitation. This is 
commensurate with the adaptation by binding model of Verguts and 
Notebaert (2008, 2009) that explicitly assumes that task-associations are 
being strengthened upon conflict experience, thereby enhancing task focus 
and promoting cognitive stability (exploitation). Although of minor impact 
in single conflict tasks, this could be at the cost of cognitive flexibility 
(exploration) in double task environments. As argued above, the Goschke 
effect (Goschke, 2000) demonstrates just that. By strengthening task-
associations after cognitive conflict, participants experience more 
interference when having to switch tasks on the subsequent trial.  Therefore, 
this effect explicitly demonstrates how adaptations after conflict can be seen 
as a manifestation of enhanced cognitive stability or exploitation, and will 
be our measure of interest in Chapter 7. 
One promising research area that could help us further understand 
what drives us to exploit vs. explore comes from the emotion literature. In 
fact, there are various studies and theories suggesting that this balance is 
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modulated by affect: while positive emotions are thought to broaden 
attention and enhance cognitive flexibility (Dreisbach, 2006; Easterbrook, 
1959; Friedman and Förster, 2010; Isen, 2000), negative emotions enhance 
task focus and promote cognitive rigidity (Chajut and Algom, 2003; Öhman, 
Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). Over the course of the last half-century, this 
literature - investigating the impact of positive vs. negative affect on action, 
perception, memory and decision making - has expanded enormously. 
Therefore, we will restrict our discussion of these studies to those that 
investigated the impact on cognitive control, preferably using trial-to-trial 
modulations of affect. Most studies looking at the impact of affect on 
performance used block-wise modulations, investigating the effect of mood 
on cognitive control (e.g., Birk, Dennis, Shin, & Urry, 2011; Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004; Larson, Gray, Clayson, Jones, & Kirwan, in press; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010; Kuhbandner & Zehetleitner, 2011; 
Zwosta, Hommel, Goschke, & Fischer, in press) and consistently observed 
positive affect promoting cognitive flexibility and/or negative affect 
promoting cognitive stability. However, Gable & Harmon-Jones (2011) 
argued that this observation is presumably restricted to mood-inductions or 
post-goal affect. The latter, they reasoned, signals that task goals have been 
met successfully, loosening task focus toward a more exploratory mode 
(Carver, 2003; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011, van Steenbergen et al., 2009). 
Post-goal negative affect, on the other hand, has been argued to promote the 
need for stabilizing the present task-set, directing attention towards the task 
(e.g., van Steenbergen et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, studies that looked at trial-to-trial affect modulations by 
means of performance-unrelated affective stimuli seem to have reached 
different conclusions. For example, using affective pictures as non-
performance-related "inter-trial-cues", Gable & Harmon-Jones (2008) 
demonstrated how positive pictures induced a local focus, rather than a 
global focus (see also Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009). Similarly, Padmala, 
Bauer, & Pessoa (2011) showed how non-performance-related negative 
pictures actually counteracted, rather than enhanced, task-focus (see also 
40     CHAPTER 1 
Hart, Green, Casp, & Belger, 2010; Dennis, Chen, & McCandliss, 2008; 
Melcher, Born, & Gruber, 2011).  
Although the difference in results between Padmala et al. (2011) and 
van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2010) already suggests that conflict-induced 
cognitive stability (i.e., the Gratton effect) is promoted after performance-
related negative affect, and counteracted after performance-unrelated 
negative affect, we believe a better measure of conflict-promoted stability is 
desirable. Moreover, because we cannot know with certainty if the affect 
signals in the study of van Steenbergen and colleagues were perceived as 
performance-contingent or not (see above), a more systematic manipulation 
of performance-contingency is required. Therefore, we will study this, on 
both a neural and behavioral level, by investigating the affective 
modulations of the Goschke effect, dependent on performance contingency, 
in Chapter 7. 
 
THE PRESENT DISSERTATION 
By now, we hope to have familiarized the reader with the research 
domains of "conflict monitoring" and "reinforcement learning", and why we 
believe notions from the latter might help form a better picture of the 
former. We outlined some predictions by taking into account reinforcement 
learning concepts such as Hebbian learning, reward learning, reward 
prediction errors, and the exploitation/exploration trade/off. In our empirical 
chapters 2 to 7, we will put those predictions to the test.  
Specifically, we argued how the Gratton effect can be seen as a 
manifestation of conflict-induced Hebbian learning. Verguts and Notebaert 
(2008, 2009) argued that upon conflict experience, a learning signal, or 
"now print" signal, is sent throughout the brain strengthening all active 
associations. This mechanism can explain how adaptations to conflict occur 
in a task- (Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffman, 2006; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008), 
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item- (Abrahamse, Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, in press; Bugg, Jacoby, & 
Chanani, 2011; Jacoby et al., 2003; Leboe & Mondor, 2007), and context- 
(Cañadas, Rodríguez-Bailón, Milliken, & Lupiáñez, 2012; Crump et al., 
2006; Crump, Vaquero, & Milliken, 2008; Crump & Milliken, 2009; 
Heinemann, Kunde, & Kiesel, 2009; King et al., 2012a, 2012b) specific 
manner. However, we wanted to go one step further, and see if also response 
modality (Chapter 2), or task-irrelevant salient contexts (Chapter 4), can 
determine adaptations to conflict. To this end, we employed an effector-
switching study (Chapter 2), where a conflict task was randomly assigned to 
feet responses or hand responses, on a trial-to-trial basis. This way, we could 
investigate if conflict, detected when performing the task using hands (or 
feet), would strengthen associations specific to that effector, or generalize 
across all task-relevant stimulus features. In a second study (Chapter 4), we 
set out to investigate if task-irrelevant color variations in a visual search 
context would modulate trial-to-trial adaptations or not. 
A second major research question was to see if conflict-induced 
strengthening of associations could be enhanced by randomly reinforcing 
successful performance. This would be in line with the century-old idea that 
reward helps strengthening stimulus-response associations that led to this 
reward (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 1953; Schultz, 2002). We argued that 
previous studies looking into this endeavor, used reward and punishment 
signals that where either confounded with affect modulations (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012) or confounded with task performance 
(Stürmer et al, 2011). Therefore, we administered the following 
reinforcement schedule. We told participants that they could be rewarded 
(Chapter 3) or punished (Chapter 5) in only 25 % of the trials (this to keep 
the reward or punishment expectancy similar across participants). Truly, 
only 25 % of the trials, randomly assigned, were followed by a 
reinforcement signal. However, whenever participants responded too slow 
or incorrect, they did not receive their reward. Similarly, when participants 
responded very fast and correct, they were relieved from receiving 
punishment. These respective response-deadlines in both experiments were 
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set so that participants only missed out on their rewards, or could escape the 
punishments, on 10% of the feedback trials. This way, reinforcement signals 
were still performance-contingent, yet randomly distributed, assuring that 
we could investigate the effects reinforcement signals themselves on 
adaptations to conflict. In Chapter 3, we investigated the effects of reward 
on both the Gratton and Goschke effect, and in Chapter 5, we tested the 
effects of punishments on the Gratton effect.  
In Chapter 4, we tested the effects of reward on the Gratton effect, 
depending on task-context. Specifically, we took an integrative approach by 
testing both our context-specificity hypothesis (Chapter 2) and reward 
manipulation (Chapter 3) within one experiment. To this end, we used a 
hybrid visual search/flanker task, largely inspired on a paradigm of Hickey 
and colleagues (2010). The reward procedure was much the same as the 
procedure for Chapter 3, but slightly differed in that now on 50% of the 
trials, instead of 25% of the trials, a high reward could be obtained. On the 
other 50% of the trials, correct performance was always followed by low 
reward. Although the details of this experiment will be explained in Chapter 
4, the motivation for this study was to see if reward enhances adaptations to 
conflict in a conflict-specific manner. If reward, much like conflict, 
enhances associations selectively, we can expect an enhanced Gratton effect 
after high reward on context repetitions, but not on context alternations.  
Not only did we expect that the Gratton effect would be enhanced after high 
rewards on context repetitions only, we also predicted a reversed pattern 
after low reward. In line with the studies of Hickey et al. (2010) and Della 
Libera and Chelazzi (2009), demonstrating enhanced focus to distractor 
features after low reward, we expected that the Gratton effect after low 
reward would be enhanced on context alternations, relative to context 
repetitions. This is also consistent with a more general literature on win-stay 
lose-shift mechanisms in decision making (Bussey, Wise, & Murray, 2001; 
Evenden, & Robbins, 1984; Genovesio, Brasted, & Mitz, 2005; Melis, Hare, 
& Tomasello, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Posch, 1999). 
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In investigating the influence of reinforcement signals in Chapters 3, 
4, and 5, we were also interested in the effects of individual differences in 
reward and punishment sensitivity thereon. This was indexed by 
administering the BIS/BAS-scales, measuring punishment and reward 
sensitivity respectively. While we expected to see that reward-sensitivity 
would help enhancing the beneficial effects of reward on (context-sensitive) 
adaptations to conflict, we predicted a reversed pattern for punishment 
sensitivity. This is motivated by the idea that punishment signals are 
generally experienced as more salient than reward signals. Consistently, 
Gomez and McLaren (1997) and Tranel (1983) demonstrated how 
punishment schedules (as opposed to reward schedules) induced higher 
overall arousal levels, as measured by the skin conductance response. We 
believe this might help explain why Stürmer and colleagues observed an 
overall slowing, rather than enhanced Gratton effect, after punishment, and 
will illustrate how punishment sensitivity could play an important role 
therein. 
As a third research hypothesis, we suggested that trough the process 
of reward prediction errors, people may perceive successfully overcoming a 
conflict trial as more rewarding than successfully responding to a congruent 
trial. This is motivated by the idea that upon stimulus presentation, people 
are being cued about their outcome expectancy (congruent trials have a 
higher chance of being correctly responded to than incongruent trials), as 
indicated by the experience of more negative affect upon perceiving 
incongruent stimuli (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, in 
press). However, when having correctly responded to these stimuli, the 
RVPM (Silvetti et al., 2011) predicts that the positive prediction error will 
be greater for incongruent, than congruent, stimuli, suggesting that 
following correct responses, incongruent trials are being perceived as more 
"positive".  
Consistent with this idea, we described a series of studies in animal 
cognition conducted by the group of Thomas Zentall, all demonstrating a 
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bigger preference for rewards following more effortful tasks in pigeons, 
primates and humans. Using the stimuli-set from Klein and colleagues 
(2005), we ran a four colour Stroop task (n=33) where each Stroop trial was 
followed by a picture discrimination task. Zentall’s studies showed how 
these pictures were preferred as a function of the effort needed to obtain 
them. Similarly, in a test phase, we examined if pictures associated with 
“correctly responding to incongruent trials” were more preferred to pictures 
associated with “correctly responding to congruent trials”, in both a picture 
choice task and a picture rating scale. However, choice rates in the picture 
choice task did not reveal any significant effects: our hypothesis was not 
confirmed (although the picture rating scale showed a trend towards a bigger 
preference for incongruent correct items, this trend did not reach 
significance). Still, it could be that this paradigm was unfit to test our main 
idea. We assumed that, in line with the work of Thomas Zentall, the picture 
preference would tell us something about the rewarding aspect of the 
associated task, but this assumption might be wrong. Alternatively, this 
measurement could be considered too subtle and indirect. In resolving this 
issue we took a different, more direct, approach by using an affective 
priming paradigm (see also Aarts, De Houwer, & Pourtois, 2012; Dreisbach 
& Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, in press). This paradigm, and its 
results are described in Chapter 6. This complete study was a joint 
collaboration with my colleague PhD student Nathalie Schouppe, who is 
interested and specialized in studying the affective qualities of cognitive 
conflict. 
Lastly, Chapter 7 was set up to investigate the influence of positive 
versus negative affect on conflict-induced cognitive stability, depending on 
the performance-contingency of the affect signals. We argued that 
performance contingency might play a crucial role in the effects of affect on 
cognitive control (see also Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011; Kanske, 2012). 
This was especially motivated by the fact that the only two studies having 
investigated the effect of trial-to-trial variations in affect (Padmala et al., 
2011; van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012) obtained contradictory results. 
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Moreover, the performance-contingency in the studies of van Steenbergen 
and colleagues has been put into question (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012b). 
Therefore, by systematically manipulating performance contingency, we 
investigated its influence on the affective modulation of the Goschke effect. 
Also, because neurophysiologic models of affective modulations of 
cognitive control (Aarts, Custers, & Veltkamp, 2008; Ashby, Isen, & 
Turken, 1999; Gray, 2001; Pessoa, 2008, 2009; Shackman et al. 2011; for a 
review, see Chiew & Braver, 2011) do not take into account the role of task-
relevance or performance-contingency, it remains to be investigated to 
which extent task-relevant and -irrelevant affective modulations of cognitive 
control rely on the same neurophysiologic pathways and brain structures, 
and where they might diverge. Therefore, by paring this task-switching 
experiment with fMRI, we will be able to identify the brain regions 
associated with the Goschke effect, and which regions are differentially 
employed as a function of our affective manipulations. 
Please note that all these chapters are written as independent studies. 
Therefore, in our last chapter, Chapter 8, we will try to integrate and discuss 
the findings brought forward in these studies in a "General discussion", by 
linking back to the general framework of this dissertation as outlined in this 
introduction. In this discussion, we will devote special attention to the 
divergent effects of affect and reinforcement signals, but also why, although 
introduced as separate entities, there is often a thin line between both. 
Moreover, we will speculate how neuromodulatory systems might have 
helped in bringing about the hereafter discussed results and what other 
measures or paradigms might be desirable for future research.  
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 CHAPTER 2 
CONFLICT ADAPTATION 
BY MEANS OF ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING
1
 
Cognitive control is responsible for adapting information processing 
in order to carry out tasks more efficiently. Contrasting global versus local 
control accounts, it has recently been proposed that control operates in an 
associative fashion, that is, by binding stimulus–response associations after 
detection of conflict (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Here, this prediction is 
explicitly tested for the first time. In a task-switching study where both tasks 
use the same relevant information, we previously reported conflict 
adaptation over tasks (Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). In the current 
experiment, we demonstrate that this is restricted to conditions where both 
tasks use the same effectors, thereby supporting the associative control 
account. 
                                                     
1
 Braem, S., Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2011). Conflict adaptation by means of 
associative learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 64, 1662-1666. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In everyday life, we frequently need to control the incoming 
information to avoid conflicting responses. For example, cognitive control 
directs our attention to the instructions of a traffic agent, when traffic lights 
tell differently. In the laboratory, one of the most prominent control effects 
is the observation that the influence of irrelevant stimulus information is 
reduced after a trial where conflict occurred. This effect (the Gratton effect) 
was originally observed by Gratton, Coles and Donchin (1992) reporting a 
smaller flanker effect after incongruent (> < >) than after congruent trials 
(> > >). The Gratton effect has been reproduced in other congruency tasks 
like the Simon (Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002; 
Notebaert & Verguts, in press) and the Stroop task (Kerns et al., 2004). 
An open question is to what extent cognitive control generalizes 
across tasks and settings. Regarding the implementation of control, different 
positions can be distinguished. First, cognitive resources may be elevated 
when conflict is detected. Kahneman (1973) suggested that when 
encountering a response conflict, a state of generalized alertness is induced. 
This state consists of a combination of inhibition and increased arousal. This 
recruitment of cognitive resources is not specific to the current task or 
setting, but instead generalizes across different tasks and task settings.  
In contrast, recent theoretical accounts introduced a more local 
implementation of conflict adaptation. For example, in their conflict 
monitoring theory, Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter and Cohen (2001) 
propose that response conflict triggers an adaptive mechanism that enhances 
task-specific processes. In a flanker task, conflict increases the processing of 
targets and decreases the processing of flankers; in a Stroop task, conflict 
enhances colour processing and reduces word processing. Note that not all 
cognitive control processes should be task-specific to belong to the local 
control category; for example, conflict monitoring theory explicitly assumes 
that conflict detection extends across tasks. However, because the 
implementation of control occurs at the (local) level of the task-relevant 
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dimension (increasing attention to that dimension), we categorize conflict 
monitoring theory as a local control model. 
 Local control can be implemented in different ways. Recently, it was 
proposed that the conflict adaptation effect might arise from modulation of 
task-relevant associations (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; 
Davelaar & Stevens, 2009; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009; see also 
Spapé & Hommel, 2008). For example, Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009) 
argued that response conflict leads to arousal, which itself leads to binding 
active representations more strongly.  Since task-relevant representations are 
usually more active than task-irrelevant representations, task-relevant 
associations will tend to be more strongly modified, providing an 
implementation of local control.   
In earlier work, we already refuted global control and demonstrated 
that control is more local (Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). In the study of 
Notebaert and Verguts (2008), two tasks were intermixed. In one condition, 
the relevant information was the same for the two tasks, while in the other 
condition, the relevant information was different for the two tasks. We 
found conflict adaptation across tasks when the relevant information was the 
same, whereas no conflict adaptation was found when the relevant 
information differed, supporting the idea of local control. 
Here, we further investigate the implementation of local control by 
focusing on the role of task-relevant associations. For that purpose, we 
developed a design in which conflict adaptation can be investigated across 
different stimulus-response associations. Previously, we focused on the 
locality of conflict adaptation by distinguishing tasks with shared versus 
different relevant stimulus dimensions (Notebaert & Verguts, 2008); in the 
current paper, we distinguished tasks with the same relevant information by 
assigning different effectors to the two tasks. Instead of the SNARC and 
Simon task as in Notebaert and Verguts (2008), two variations of the Simon 
task were used, so the two tasks had the same relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus characteristics. If local control is implemented by assigning more 
attention to the task-relevant stimulus dimension, a Gratton effect should be 
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obtained within as well as across effectors. In contrast, if local control 
operates at the level of stimulus-response associations, a Gratton effect 
should be obtained within tasks but not across tasks.  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 AND 2 
Our design is represented in Figure 1 (a) and (b). We used a vertical 
and horizontal Simon task. The two tasks shared relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus dimensions. Participants responded to the orientation of the stimuli. 
Stimuli were presented on the left or right side and above or below the 
fixation cross. The Simon effect is the observation that responses are faster 
when stimulus and response locations correspond spatially, although the 
stimulus location is irrelevant (Simon, 1969). In Experiment 1 different 
effectors were assigned to the horizontal and the vertical Simon task. 
Experiment 2 served as a control experiment to verify that conflict 
adaptation can be obtained from a horizontal to a vertical Simon task (or 
vice versa) when the same effectors are used for the two tasks. 
 
Method 
Participants          
38 students took part for a small fee of 6€, 19 subjects per experiment 
(Experiment 1: range = 19-24 years, 16 female, 16 right-handed; Experiment 
2: range = 18-24 years, 17 female, all right-handed). 
Stimuli 
For both experiments, the stimuli consisted of the character ‘X’ 
printed in yellow or red. The ‘X’ was always presented below or above and 
left or right from the fixation cross, corresponding to the four corners of an 
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imaginary square surrounding the fixation point. The stimuli were presented 
upright or in italic (tilted 20° to the right). In total, there are 16 different 
stimuli (2  2  2  2): X, below or above and left or right from the fixation 
point, presented upright or in italic, in yellow or red. The stimuli were 
approximately 0.5 cm high and 0.5 cm wide (visual angle 0.6°  0.6°) and 
always presented 1.2 cm above/below and 1.2 cm to the right/left of the 
fixation cross. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to respond to the orientation of the stimuli, 
whereas stimulus colour served as an indicator for the appropriate response 
mapping. In Experiment 1, one fourth of the participants had to respond with 
the upper hand when the yellow ‘X’ was in italic and with the lower hand 
when the yellow ‘X’ was presented upright. They had to press the right foot 
when the red ‘X’ was in italic and left foot when the red ‘X’ was presented 
upright. In a second condition this response mapping was reversed. The 
third and fourth conditions were the same except that the stimulus colours 
were interchanged (e.g., in condition 3, right foot for italic yellow ‘X’ and 
upper hand for italic red ‘X’). Half of the participants had to use their right 
hand as upper hand, and left hand as lower hand. For the other half, this 
hand placement was reversed. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the eight conditions (hand placement  response mapping). In Experiment 2, 
participants had to use the keys ‘1’, ‘3’, ‘7’ and ‘9’ on the number pad of a 
keyboard to respond. One fourth of the participants had to respond with the 
upper keys (‘7’ and ‘9’) when the yellow ‘X’ was in italic and with the 
lower keys (‘1’ and ‘3’) when the yellow ‘X’ was presented upright. They 
had to press the rightmost keys (‘9’ and ‘3’) when the red ‘X’ was in italic 
and the leftmost keys (‘7’ and ‘1’) when the red ‘X’ was presented upright. 
In a second condition this response mapping was reversed. The third and 
fourth conditions were the same except that stimulus colours were 
interchanged (e.g., in condition 3, rightmost keys for italic yellow ‘X’ and 
upper keys for italic red ‘X’). The two keys had to be pressed 
simultaneously with a maximum delay of 200 milliseconds between the two 
presses. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. 
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In each Experiment, a block contained 160 trials. The trials were presented 
in a random order without replacement, meaning all 16 stimuli were 
presented 10 times. Five blocks were presented. The response-stimulus 
interval (RSI) was 800 milliseconds. During the RSI, a fixation cross was 
presented. Stimuli remained on the screen until the participant responded. 
The maximum response time (RT) was 5000 milliseconds.  
The stimuli were presented on a Pentium, with the use of Tscope 
software (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006). In 
Experiment 1, a keyboard and a foot response box were used.  On the 
keyboard, numbers ‘2’ and ‘8’ functioned as the lower and upper button. For 
the foot responses, participants were asked to take off their shoes. Before the 
actual experiment took place, they received some practice with the response 
box in an unrelated discrimination task. In Experiment 2, only a keyboard 
was used. 
 
Results 
Experiment 1 
Three participants were excluded from the analysis because of a 
misunderstanding of the response mapping (7, 45 and 49% accuracy). The 
remaining 16 participants obtained much higher accuracy rates (M = 91%; 
SD = 0.03). Because subjects needed some time to get used to the setup, the 
first block was treated as a practice block and thus excluded from the 
analyses. Trials following an error and the first trial of each block were also 
removed from further analyses. For the RT analyses, errors were also 
excluded (8.9%). From the remaining trials, RT outliers (± 2 SD) were 
removed (another 4.1%).  
We carried out an ANOVA with four within-subject factors 
(congruency, previous congruency, task sequence (repetition or alternation 
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from trial n-1 to n) and orientation sequence (repetition or alternation from 
trial n-1 to n) on RTs and error rates. The variable orientation sequence was 
included to investigate the influence of repetitions on the Gratton effect 
(Hommel, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Nieuwenhuis, 2006). Overall, 
there was a significant congruency effect (F(1, 15) = 9.857, p < 0.01) and a 
task switch effect (F(1, 15) = 47.405, p < 0.001). This effect did not interact 
with previous congruency (F(1, 15) < 1, ns.). Importantly, there was a three-
way interaction between task sequence, congruency and previous trial 
congruency, F(1, 15) = 12.012, p < 0.01. As depicted in Figure 1 (c), this 
indicates that the Gratton effect is only observed for task repetitions (t(15) = 
3.204, p < 0.01), whereas for task alternations, a reversed Gratton effect was 
observed (t(15) = 2.359, p < 0.05). 
The four-way interaction between orientation sequence, task 
sequence, congruency and previous trial congruency was not significant 
(F(1, 15) = 2.798, p > 0.1), indicating no moderating effects of orientation 
repetitions. Hence, our results cannot be explained by means of mere 
stimulus/response repetition across trials (Mayr et al., 2003). Taken 
together, these analyses indicate that conflict adaptation was only observed 
when the task was the same in the two consecutive trials.  
The error rates analyses showed no interaction between task 
sequence, congruency and previous trial congruency (F(1, 15) = 1.511, p > 
0.1), nor an overall Gratton effect (F(1, 15) = 1.801, p > 0.1).  
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Figure 1. (a) The design of Experiment 1 in which vertical and horizontal Simon trials are 
assigned to different effectors (hands and feet, respectively). (b) The design of Experiment 2 
in which vertical and horizontal Simon trials are assigned to the same effectors. In the lower 
half of the figure are the reaction times for Experiment 1 (c) and Experiment 2 (d). Dotted 
lines indicate congruent trials and full lines indicate incongruent trials. The error bars are ± 1 
standard error. 
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Experiment 2  
In this second experiment, we aimed at replicating the results of 
Notebaert and Verguts (2008) where conflict adaptation across tasks was 
observed when the tasks shared relevant stimulus information and effectors. 
The only difference is that here we used a horizontal and vertical Simon 
task, as in Experiment 1. Two participants were excluded from the analysis 
because of a misunderstanding of the response mapping (0 and 51% 
accuracy). The remaining 17 participants showed much higher accuracy 
rates (M = 89%; SD = 0.05). Again, the first block was treated as a practice 
block and thus excluded from the analyses. Trials following an error and the 
first trial of each block were also removed from further analyses. For the RT 
analyses, errors were also excluded (11.3%). From the remaining trials, RT 
outliers (± 2 SD) were removed (another 4.3%).  
We carried out the same ANOVA as for Experiment 1 on both RTs 
(the time between the stimulus onset and the second response) and error 
rates. Again, a significant congruency effect was observed (F(1, 16) = 
25.320, p < 0.001), as wells as a task switch effect (F(1, 16) = 123.105, p < 
0.001). There was an overall Gratton effect (F(1, 16) = 28.413, p < 0.001), 
which  did not interact with task sequence (F(1, 16) = 2.783, p > 0.1). As 
depicted in Figure 1 (d), this indicates that a Gratton effect is observed for 
both task repetitions (t(16) = 6.151, p < 0.001) and task alternations (t(16) = 
2.040, p = 0.058). The four-way interaction between orientation sequence, 
task sequence, congruency and previous trial congruency was not significant 
(F(1, 16) = 1.244, p > 0.1). 
The error rates analyses showed an overall Gratton effect (F(1, 16) = 
8.001, p < 0.05), but no interaction between task sequence, congruency and 
previous trial congruency (F(1, 16) < 1, ns.).  
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Experiment 1 vs. 2  
In order to investigate the differences in Gratton effects across 
experiments, ANOVAs were conducted for both task repetitions and task 
alternations separately, with experiment as a between-subjects factor (cf. 
Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). For task repetitions, there was a significant 
overall Gratton effect (F(1, 31) = 39.502, p < 0.001), but there were no 
differences in Gratton effect between the two experiments (three-way 
interaction of experiment, congruency and previous trial congruency, F(1, 
31) = 1.187, p > 0.1), nor was there a four-way interaction between 
experiment, congruency, previous trial congruency and orientation sequence 
(F(1, 31) < 1, ns.). Crucially, however, for task alternations, experiment did 
interact with congruency and previous trial congruency F(1, 31) = 9.326, p < 
0.01), indicating a significant difference in conflict adaptation for task 
alternations in Experiment 1 (reversed Gratton effect) versus Experiment 2 
(Gratton effect). Again no four-way interaction between experiment, 
congruency, previous trial congruency and orientation sequence was 
observed (F(1, 31) < 1, ns.). 
The error rates analyses showed an overall significant Gratton effect 
(F(1, 31) = 11.810, p < 0.05) for task repetitions, but no other significant 
interaction of interest (all p > 0.25).  
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DISCUSSION 
By assigning different effectors to different stimuli, the current study 
examined the level at which conflict adaptation takes place. The results 
indicate a substantial difference between effector repetitions and 
alternations; in fact, a reversed Gratton effect was observed for effector 
alternations. Furthermore, we did observe conflict adaptation across tasks 
when both tasks shared effectors (Experiment 2) indicating that the reverse 
Gratton effect in Experiment 1 can be attributed solely to the different 
effectors for the two tasks. This study is consistent with a number of recent 
findings illustrating the contextual modulation of cognitive control (Crump, 
Gong, & Milliken, 2006; Crump & Milliken, 2009; Jacoby, Lindsay, & 
Hessels, 2003; Spapé and Hommel, 2008). The current paper provides steps 
towards unravelling its underlying mechanism by demonstrating the 
importance of stimulus-response associations. 
These results challenge global control models, but also local control 
models that emphasize the input from task representations to the stimulus 
input layer (e.g., Botvinick et al. 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008). They 
are however, consistent with the more general adaptation by binding 
framework (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009) which posits the importance of 
interactions between conflict processing and task-relevant (including 
stimulus-response) associations for the implementation of cognitive control.  
It may be argued that also Egner & Hirsch’ (2005) cortical 
amplification hypothesis can be challenged by our results. Following 
conflict, Egner and Hirsch observed increased cortical activity in the area 
responsible for processing task relevant information. Their hypothesis 
assumes increased processing of task-relevant information after conflict, 
irrespective of the effectors used. However, as argued in Egner (2008), this 
hypothesis is specific to tasks where conflict originates from overlapping 
stimulus dimensions (e.g., Stroop task, flanker task). It is therefore an 
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interesting question for future research whether the same results as reported 
here can be obtained in Stroop or flanker tasks. 
In both experiments, a considerable task-switch cost was observed. As 
noted by Egner (2008), such task switch costs might interact with conflict 
adaptation effects. However, the possible “task set reconfiguration” 
occurring at such a switch trial cannot account for the observation that the 
Gratton effects for task alternations differed significantly between 
Experiment 1 (reversed Gratton) and Experimen 2 (Gratton). This reversed 
Gratton effect in Experiment 1 can however be explained in terms of 
adaptation by means of associative learning. Assuming there is competition 
between the two effectors, stimulus-response associations for one effector 
will be weakened when stimulus-response associations for the other effector 
are strengthened. For a similar reason, Verguts and Notebaert (2008) 
obtained a reverse Gratton effect in their computational model when the 
relevant input dimensions were different in previous and current trial (see 
also Notebaert & Verguts, 2008). However, this explanation for the reversed 
Gratton effect needs further empirical investigation. 
Other experiments resemble our setup in the sense that different 
effectors were used to respond to the same relevant information (Experiment 
3, Freitas et al., 2007; Experiment 1, Akçay & Hazeltine, 2008) or different 
relevant information (Experiment 2, Freitas et al., 2007). These authors did 
find conflict adaptation across response mappings. There is an important 
difference with our Experiment 1 however: our subjects switched between 
hand and foot responses, while their subjects switched between left and 
right hand responses (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2008), different directions in their 
responses with a joystick (Experiment 3, Freitas et al., 2007) or different 
vocal responses (Experiment 2, Freitas et al., 2007). Hence, the response 
sets were much more similar across the two tasks in these studies. From an 
associative point of view, one would indeed predict more generalization 
across tasks when the tasks exhibit more overlap. To settle this issue, 
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however, more studies are needed in which the amount of similarity between 
tasks is parametrically manipulated.  
One may wonder whether associative control can really be considered 
as an instantiation of cognitive control. Associations have the connotation of 
being fast and effortless; exactly the opposite of cognitive control, which is 
typically thought to be slow and effortful. However, cognitive control is 
needed to optimize task performance, and whether this optimization process 
is fast or slow is not relevant for its definition. In fact, it might be argued 
that cognitive control is more efficient when it takes place fast and without 
effort. Riding on the back of associative learning processes would then seem 
to be an excellent option with the benefit of control being relatively specific: 
After all, there is no reason in putting on gloves, when only your feet are 
cold.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
REWARD MODULATES ADAPTATIONS TO CONFLICT
1
 
Both cognitive conflict (e.g. Verguts & Notebaert, 2009) and reward 
signals (e.g. Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 2009) have been proposed to enhance 
task-relevant associations. Bringing these two notions together, we 
predicted that reward modulates conflict-based sequential adaptations in 
cognitive control. This was tested combining either a single flanker task 
(Experiment 1) or a task-switch paradigm (Experiment 2) with performance-
related rewards. Both experiments confirmed that adaptations after conflict 
were modulated by reward. In the flanker task, this resulted in increased 
conflict adaptation after rewarded trials. In the task-switching experiment, 
reward increased the conflict-modulated switch cost. Interestingly, both 
adaptations to conflict disappeared after no-reward trials. Moreover, 
individual differences in participants’ sensitivity to reward predicted these 
reward modulations of trial-to-trial adaptations. These findings shed new 
light on the exact role of cognitive conflict in shaping subsequent behaviour. 
                                                     
1
 Braem, S., Verguts, T., Roggeman, C. & Notebaert, W. (2012). Reward modulates 
adaptations to conflict. Cognition, 125, 324-332. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Daily routines are repeatedly interrupted by conflicts. Efficiently 
dealing with these conflicts is referred to as cognitive control. For instance, 
the sound of booing fans can interfere with a sports player's actions, but 
subsequent adaptations to such interruptions assist us in maintaining our 
goals (i.e., winning the game). When it comes to reaching such goals, 
reward is a great motivator (Skinner, 1953); receiving a trophy will 
encourage us to efficiently repeat effective actions later. In this study, we 
investigate this influence of reward on cognitive control. 
Cognitive control is typically studied with conflict tasks where 
irrelevant information slows down processing of relevant stimulus 
information. In the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), where the central 
target is presented with either congruent (> > >) or incongruent (> < >) 
flankers, participants respond faster on congruent trials, as compared to 
incongruent trials. Importantly, participants adapt their performance based 
on these incongruent trials. Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) observed 
that there was a smaller flanker effect after incongruent than after congruent 
trials. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that cognitive conflict enhances 
the task-switch cost (Brown, Reynolds, & Braver, 2007; Goschke, 2000), the 
decrease in performance associated with switching between two tasks, 
compared to repeating the same task. Participants showed larger task-switch 
costs after incongruent than after congruent trials.  
According to the adaptation-by-binding model of Verguts and 
Notebaert (2008; 2009), both effects can be conceptualized as strengthening 
of associations due to conflict. In this model, conflict detection on 
incongruent trials increases task-relevant connections, increasing the focus 
on task-relevant information. By binding these associations after conflict, a 
smaller congruency effect will occur on the following trial. Likewise, 
increased connections improve task performance when a task is repeated but 
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hinder task performance when the task changes, causing the modulation of 
the switch cost. 
Although the hypothesis that conflict enhances associations is fairly 
recent, it has been long known that reward strengthens task-relevant 
associations. Thorndike’s (1911) Law of Effect stated that stimulus-
response episodes are more likely to re-occur when followed by reward. 
Therefore, Skinner (1953) suggested that reward strengthens preceding or 
ongoing associations. In line with this half-century-old idea, two recent 
experiments demonstrated how reward increased both short- (Colzato, van 
Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007) and long-term (Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 2009) 
binding effects. By presenting positive pictures after correct responses, they 
demonstrated how rewarded stimulus-response associations can facilitate 
future task performance. 
Since cognitive conflict and reward may act in a similar fashion, we 
decided to investigate the interactions between conflict-based and reward-
based adaptations. We delivered performance-related reward in cognitive 
control tasks and hypothesized that conflict-based adaptations would be 
modulated by reward. Since we were planning to investigate the after-effects 
of reward signals, we expected that the effect of reward would depend on 
subjects’ reward sensitivity as measured by the BAS Reward 
Responsiveness Subscale questionnaire (Carver & White, 1994). This scale 
measures the impact of rewards on a subject’s feelings and motivations; for 
example, a typical question in this subscale is “When I get something I want, 
I feel excited and energized”. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
To test whether reward modulates the adaptation to conflict in 
congruency effects, we combined a four-choice colour flanker experiment 
with reward signals in 25% of the trials. Participants did not receive reward 
when the response was too slow or incorrect. This way, reward signals were 
both randomly distributed and performance-related. A second group of 
subjects was assigned to a control condition to ensure that the observed 
modulations were due to the rewarding aspect of the learning signal, not just 
its frequency (Notebaert et al., 2009). 
 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four students took part in return for credits or 6€ (range = 17-22 
years, 35 female, 41 right-handed, 22 participants per condition). 
Stimuli 
Stimuli consisted of three squares: horizontally aligned, centrally 
presented and printed in one of the four possible colors (green, yellow, blue 
or red). Both flankers had either the same or a different color than the 
central square.  
Procedure 
The participants responded to the color of the centre square by 
pressing one of four horizontally aligned response buttons using their index 
and middle fingers. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
response mappings, which were created by shifting the response mapping. 
Each block contained 48 trials. An equal number of congruent and 
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incongruent trials were presented randomly: 25% of the trials were reward 
trials, which were randomized for the congruent and incongruent trials 
separately. After practice, participants performed 14 experimental blocks. 
Between blocks was a self-paced break in which the participants could see 
their updated score. Every ten participants, the subject with the best score 
received a store coupon worth 10€. All subjects were truthfully instructed 
about the reinforcement schedule; they were aware that rewards could only 
be gained on one out of four trials and that these reward trials were 
randomly distributed and not cued. Participants also knew that a winner 
would be selected per group of ten subjects, in order to control for global 
reward expectancies about the total number of subjects. 
A fixation cross was presented, after which stimuli remained on the 
screen until the participant responded. The maximum response time (RT) 
was 1000 milliseconds. On reward trials, the participant was given feedback 
in the form of “+1” presented centrally on the screen for 500 milliseconds, 
unless he or she did not respond correct or within the maximum response 
time. In the latter case, or after a “no-reward” trial, a blank screen was 
presented for 500 milliseconds. Participants knew that only when “+1” was 
presented, they scored an extra point. Finally, a blank screen was presented 
for 1000 milliseconds. The between-subjects control condition was identical 
to the original experiment, except for the removal of the reward schedule, 
and the reward signal now being replaced by a meaningless stimulus (“@”). 
Questionnaires 
Six months after the experiment, participants from the experimental 
condition were contacted with the request to fill in an online version of the 
Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS) 
Scales (Carver & White, 1994): 15 out of 22 participants responded to this 
request. 
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Figure 1. Response times for Experiment 1, reward feedback condition (a); and neutral 
feedback condition (b). The figure demonstrates how reward modulated the conflict-
modulated congruency effect. Below, the scatter plot shows the correlation between 
individual scores on the BAS-Reward Responsiveness scale and the difference scores for the 
conflict-modulated congruency effects (c). The error bars are ± 1 standard error. 
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Results and Discussion 
In each feedback condition (reward and neutral “feedback”), a 
participant was excluded because accuracy was two standard deviations 
below the group average (group averages: M=0.90; SD=0.07 and M=0.85; 
SD=0.10). Trials following errors and the first trial of each block were 
removed. For RT analyses, errors were also excluded. From the remaining 
trials, RT outliers (±2SD) were removed (3.3%). We carried out an ANOVA 
with three within-subject factors (congruency, previous-congruency and 
previous-feedback) and the between-subjects factor feedback condition, on 
RTs and error rates.  
There was a significant congruency effect, F(1,40)=430.429, p<.001, 
which interacted with previous-congruency, F(1,40)=18.027, p<.001, 
indicating a significant conflict adaptation effect. A four-way interaction 
between feedback condition, previous-feedback, congruency and previous-
congruency pointed at diverging effects of the different “feedback” stimuli, 
F(1,40)=4.713, p<.05. In the reward condition, there was a conflict 
adaptation effect, F(1,20)=13.620, p<.01, which interacted with previous-
feedback, F(1,20)=4.953, p<.05. As can be seen in Figure 1a, the conflict-
modulated congruency effect is larger after reward trials (subtracting the 
congruency effect after incongruent from the congruency effect after 
congruent trials: 28ms), than after no-reward trials (4ms). There was no 
main effect of previous-reward, nor an overall larger congruency effect after 
reward (both F(1,20)<1 ). In the neutral condition, a significant conflict 
adaptation effect was observed, F(1,20)=6.016, p<.05, which was not 
modulated by the irrelevant stimulus (F(1,20)<1, Figure 1b, 10ms after “@” 
and 16ms after blank screen). Error rates only revealed a significant 
congruency effect, F(1,40)=27.535, p<.001.  
As predicted, the differences in conflict adaptation effects (conflict-
modulated congruency effect after reward minus after no-reward) correlated 
with the BAS-Reward-Responsiveness subscale (r=.553, p<.05, Spearman's 
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ρ=.460, p=.090, Figure 1c). Moreover, the differences in these effects 
correlated with the other BAS subscales (BAS-Drive, r=.490, p=.075, 
ρ=.499, p=.069; BAS-Fun-Seeking, r=.541, p<.05, ρ=.482, p=.081). No 
correlations were observed with the BIS-scale (all p>.1). 
To rule out the effects of feature repetition and/or integration effects 
(e.g., Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004) in explaining the reward modulation of 
adaptations to conflict, we reanalyzed our data by means of multiple 
regression (Notebaert & Verguts, 2007). To account for between-subjects 
variance, a multiple regression analysis is performed for each participant 
separately. Subsequently, the average of each coefficient across participants 
is tested with a one-sample t test (Lorch & Myers, 1990). In this way, we 
can test if our crucial interaction between previous reward, previous 
congruency, and congruency (in the reward condition), remains after 
controlling for feature repetition and/or integration effects. Along with our 
previously reported variables of interest, we added five binary (0 or 1) 
bottom-up factors (see Notebaert & Verguts, 2007), to our multiple 
regression analysis with reaction time as the dependent variable. The first 
factor was the repetition of the target, and the second repetition of the 
flanker. The third factor, called feature integration, codes for complete 
repetitions and alternations (1) versus partial repetitions (0). The last two 
factors were respectively negative priming (distractor–becomes-target 
repetition) and target–becomes-distractor repetition. On top of those factors, 
we also chose to control for the interactions between previous reward and 
each of those factors. The analyses show that our main interaction of 
interest, between previous reward, previous congruency and congruency, 
can still be observed, t(20)=1.874, p=.076. This, after controlling for all the 
effects of feature repetition and their interaction with previous reward. The 
main effects of feature integration, target repetition, flanker repetition, and 
negative priming, all reached significance (all p<.05). Additionally, there 
was a significant interaction between target repetition and previous reward, 
t(20)=3.564, p<.05, indicating a stronger target repetition effect, when the 
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previous trial was rewarded (see also Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 
2010a). 
These results demonstrate how the conflict adaptation effect is 
modulated by reward. This modulation of the congruency effect after reward 
seems to be primarily driven by a modulation of the congruent trials (cf. 
Akcay & Hazeltine, 2007; Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008; Ullsperger, 
Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). Compared to after incongruent no-reward 
trials, congruent trials are processed slower after incongruent rewarded 
trials, t(20) = 2.3, p < .05, suggesting a more cautious response strategy after 
conflict. Similarly, congruent trials are processed faster after congruent 
rewarded trials, compared to after congruent no-reward trials, t(20) = 3.0, p 
< .01. In explaining this pattern of the conflict adaptation effect, where 
conflict trials do not seem to modulate subsequent conflict trials, 
Schlaghecken and Martini (2012) recently stressed the importance of 
context, rather than conflict. The authors suggest that both congruent and 
incongruent trials modulate behavior and thereby nuance current theories of 
cognitive control that focus on the role of incongruent (conflicting) trials. 
Nevertheless, the relative cost of incongruent trials (as compared to 
congruent trials) was significantly reduced after conflict, indicating 
increased task focus. Importantly, if the enhancement of the conflict 
adaptation effect after reward is indeed the result of increased task focus, we 
can expect a similar modulation of the conflict-modulated task switch cost. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2  
Here, we tested whether reward modulates the adaptation to conflict 
in task-switch costs. We used a task-switching design with an arrow flanker 
task and a Simon task (Simon, 1969), with reward signals. The Simon effect 
is the observation that responses are faster when stimulus and response 
locations correspond, despite the stimulus location being irrelevant (Simon, 
1969). Contrary to the original bivalent-stimulus designs by Goschke (2000) 
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and Brown et al. (2007), where conflict results from cross-task interference, 
we used two independent conflict tasks where conflict originates from 
competing responses within a task. To our knowledge, a conflict-modulated 
task switch cost has not been demonstrated in such a design, but it is 
predicted by cognitive control theories (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Our 
control condition, without reward manipulation, can therefore be considered 
as a test of this prediction. 
  
Method 
Participants  
Forty-four students took part in exchange for credits (range = 17-22 
years, 42 female, 37 right-handed, 20 per condition).  
Stimuli  
For the Simon task the stimuli consisted of the character ‘X’ in blue 
or red, presented on the left or right side of the screen. In the flanker task, 
the stimuli were centrally presented arrows pointing left or right, flanked by 
congruent or incongruent arrows on each side.  
Procedure  
Participants performed a flanker or Simon task, depending on the 
presented stimulus. In the flanker task, participants pressed right (left) when 
the middle arrow pointed to the right (left). In the Simon task, subjects 
pressed right (left) when the letter ‘X’ was blue (red). The assignment of 
stimulus colour to response was counterbalanced across participants. 25% of 
the trials were reward trials, randomized for tasks and congruency 
conditions separately. The same reward schedule, block/trial procedure, 
apparatus and control condition were used as in Experiment 1. The 
maximum RT was set to 750 milliseconds.  
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Questionnaires  
All 22 participants from the reward condition filled in the BIS/BAS-
Scales, immediately after the experiment.  
 
Results and Discussion 
In each condition (reward and neutral feedback), one participant was 
excluded because of an accuracy two standard deviations below the group 
mean (group averages: M=0.90; SD=0.05 and M=0.88; SD=0.11). Trials 
following an error and the first trial of each block were removed. For the RT 
analyses, errors were also excluded. From the remaining trials, RT outliers 
(±2SD) were removed (3.7%). We carried out an ANOVA with three within-
subject factors (task sequence, previous-congruency and previous-feedback) 
and the between-subjects factor feedback condition on RTs and error rates. 
There was a significant task-switch cost, F(1,40)=342.393, p<.001, 
which interacted with previous-congruency, F(1,40)=7.575, p<.01, 
indicating a significant conflict-modulated task switch cost. A four-way 
interaction between feedback condition, task sequence, previous-
congruency, and previous-feedback hinted at different effects of the 
“feedback” stimuli, F(1,40)=3.000, p=.09. Crucially, in the experimental 
condition, there was a significant three-way interaction between task 
sequence, previous-congruency, and previous-feedback, F(1,20)=5.704, 
p<.05. As can be seen in Figure 2a, the modulation of the task switch cost is 
only observed after reward trials, F(1,20)=4.819, p<.05 (subtracting the 
task-switch cost after congruent from the task-switch cost after incongruent 
trials: 12ms), but not after no-reward trials (-2ms). There was neither a main 
effect of previous-reward, nor a task-switch cost by previous-reward 
interaction (both p>.1). Similar to Experiment 1, there was only a conflict-
modulated task switch cost after reward. In the control condition, a 
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significant modulation of the task switch cost was observed, F(1,20)=4.630, 
p<.05, which was not modulated by the irrelevant stimulus presentation 
(F(1,20)<1, Figure 2b, 8ms after “@” and 8ms after blank screen).  
Error rates only showed a significant task-switch cost 
F(1,40)=53.526, p<.001.  
As predicted, the questionnaires revealed a positive correlation 
between the difference in the conflict-modulated task switch cost 
(modulation of the task switch cost after reward minus after no-reward) and 
the BAS-Reward-Responsiveness subscale (r=.617, p<.005, Spearman's 
ρ=.581, p<.01, Figure 2c). The difference in the task switch cost 
modulations did not correlate with other scales (all p>.1).  
As in Experiment 1, to rule out the effects of stimulus or response 
repetitions (e.g., Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004), we reanalyzed our data 
from the reward condition by means of multiple regression. Along with our 
previously reported variables of interest, we added two binary (0 or 1) 
bottom-up factors (see Notebaert & Verguts, 2007), to our multiple 
regression analysis with reaction time as the dependent variable: The first 
factor was target repetition, and the second factor response repetition. 
Moreover, we also controlled for the interactions between previous reward 
and each of those factors. Similar to Experiment 1, the analyses show that 
our main interaction of interest (task sequence, previous-congruency, and 
previous-feedback) can still be observed, t(20)=2.366, p<.05, after 
controlling for the significant main effects of target repetition and response 
repetition (both p<.001). 
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Figure 2. Response times for Experiment 2, reward feedback condition (a); and neutral 
feedback condition (b). The figure demonstrates how reward modulated the conflict-
modulated task switch cost. Below, the scatter plot shows the correlation between individual 
scores on the BAS-Reward Responsiveness scale and the difference scores for the 
modulations of the tasks switch cost (c). The error bars are ± 1 standard error. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The experiments demonstrated how cognitive adaptations after 
incongruent trials can be modulated by reward. More specifically, reward 
feedback modulated conflict adaptation (measured by congruency effect and 
task-switch cost in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively), and these reward 
modulations were subject to individual differences in reward 
responsiveness, as measured by the BAS-Reward-Responsiveness subscale.  
The current study extends earlier findings suggesting that rewarding 
events reinforce binding (Colzato et al., 2007; Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 
2009), but also a more generally growing literature pointing to the 
influential role of reward in cognitive control. For instance, by rewarding 
two colours in a four-choice Stroop task, Krebs, Boehler, and Woldorff 
(2010) observed that reward strengthens specific stimulus-response 
bindings, thereby reducing the congruency effect for rewarded stimuli only. 
Similarly, these results add to the findings of Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, and 
Sommer (2011) which showed an enhanced conflict adaptation effect in a 
Simon task after reward, when rewarding the top fastest responses. On a 
perceptual level, Hickey, Chelazzi, and Theeuwes (2010a) demonstrated 
how processing reward-associated visual features was facilitated, even when 
resulting in suboptimal performance. Furthermore, they demonstrated how 
these effects of reward are limited to task-relevant target selection, but not 
distracter suppression (Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2011). Interestingly, 
the latter two studies also demonstrated how reward acts as a context 
changer. In their studies, normally observed priming effects were only 
observed after high reward, not after low reward. Similarly, we only 
observed conflict adaptation after reward. These results demonstrate that no-
reward trials are not just a neutral and constant baseline. Instead, by 
introducing reward signals, we gave both reward and no-reward trials an 
informative value. Possibly, the absence of reward may have devaluated the 
learning value of the conflict signal (see below). Alternatively, our results 
could be interpreted in terms of punishment in that participants could feel 
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punished after no-reward trials. However, since participants were truthfully 
informed on the reward schedule and knew to expect no-reward trials on 75 
percent of the trials, we believe that they did not perceive no-reward trials as 
punishing. Furthermore, our correlation with BAS Reward Responsiveness 
(and no correlation with BIS) suggests that a reward, rather than 
punishment,  modulation explains our current effects. 
The individual differences in BAS Reward Responsiveness predicted 
the modulations of reward on adaptations to conflict in both experiments. 
This is consistent with earlier reports demonstrating the important role of 
BAS Reward Responsiveness (Boksem, Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 
2006, De Pascalis, Varriale, & Antuono, 2010), and BAS overall (Amodio, 
Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008), in explaining individual differences in 
cognitive control. However, it must be noted that earlier studies looking at 
the after-effects of reward signals in cognitive control often also found 
correlations with BAS Drive, rather than BAS Reward Responsiveness 
(Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b, Van Steenbergen, Band, & 
Hommel, 2009). Similarly, our modulation in Experiment 1, but not 
Experiment 2, correlated with BAS Drive. Yet, it has been suggested, that 
BAS Drive and BAS Reward Responsiveness may as well tap a similar 
construct (Franken & Muris, 2006; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999), both 
measuring reward sensitivity. Hence, differential modulation of the BAS 
Drive and BAS Reward Responsiveness subscales has to be treated with 
caution. 
We believe that our findings can be parsimoniously explained by 
associative models of cognitive control. Literature suggests that reward 
signals modulate binding processes and the theoretical framework of 
Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009) describes how adaptations after conflict 
can be understood in terms of adaptation by binding. Therefore, we reasoned 
that, by strengthening task-relevant associations, rewards should modulate 
the effects of cognitive conflicts. We demonstrated this in two different 
adaptations to conflict. Importantly, to our knowledge, our conflict-
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modulated task-switch cost (Goschke, 2000) is the first one observed in a 
task-switching study with two independent conflict tasks (Experiment 2), as 
predicted by the model of Verguts and Notebaert (2009). Lastly, Verguts 
and Notebaert (2009) also suggested that the strengthening of associations 
after conflict is mainly triggered by conflict-induced arousal. This idea, that 
arousal helps strengthening associations, is consistent with our finding that 
people who feel more energized or aroused after reward (as measured by 
BAS Reward Responsiveness) show a greater modulation of their adaptation 
to conflict. 
Alternatively, the feature integration account (Hommel, Proctor, & 
Vu, 2004) explains these sequential effects in terms of stimulus-response 
repetitions. In this view, the observed modulation of these sequential effects 
by reward could be due to the enhancement of stimulus-response 
associations by reward. The adaptation-by-binding account (Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009) relates to this theoretical framework, in that both use 
binding to explain these cognitive adaptations. However, the adaptation-by-
binding model holds that conflict enhances all active task-relevant 
associations (including, but not only, repeating stimulus-response 
associations). Therefore, by means of multiple regression (Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2007), we demonstrated how reward modulations of adaptations to 
conflict can still be observed after controlling for feature integration effects 
and their interactions with reward (see Results). This indicates that the 
effect of reward goes beyond strengthening stimulus-response associations 
and reflects the modulation of conflict-based adaptations.  
The influential conflict monitoring theory of Botvinick et al. (2001) 
explains these adaptations to conflict by enhanced task attention after 
conflict. This model implements cognitive control on a different level than 
the adaptation-by-binding account (see Braem, Verguts, & Notebaert, 2011). 
Yet, the conflict monitoring theory could also explain our main findings, 
albeit with the additional assumption that reward enhances top-down 
attention (e.g., Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006; Locke & Braver, 2008). 
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However, it is important to note that the conflict monitoring theory has led 
to opposite predictions as well. Van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel (2009) 
hypothesized, on the basis of conflict monitoring, that people relax their 
control system when receiving reward. The authors suggested that, if the 
aversive quality of conflict (Botvinick, 2007) signals the need for 
adjustment, it should be possible to counteract control operations when 
presenting positive reward signals. This was tested by combining a standard 
flanker task with punishment and reward signals, similar to our Experiment 
1. Interestingly, however, van Steenbergen et al. (2009) observed a conflict-
modulated congruency effect in a flanker task after neutral and punishment 
trials (neutral and sad faces, respectively), but not after rewarded trials 
(happy face). However, rewards were not contingent on the response 
accuracy, whereas in our study, reward signals only followed correct 
responses and participants were explicitly informed about this. Therefore, 
van Steenbergen et al. may have observed the modulating effects of the 
more affective effects of reward, as induced by the faces, rather than the 
motivational effects of reward. This would be in line with the results of 
Dreisbach and Goschke (2004), who found increased distractibility 
following positive affect inducing pictures independent of response 
accuracy. We believe that the modulation of this conflict adaptation effect 
by short-term (van Steenbergen et al., 2009) or long-term (van Steenbergen, 
Band, & Hommel, 2010) affect inductions should be distinguished from the 
motivational aspect of reward. This relates to the neurobiological theory of 
Berridge and Robinson (2003), conceptualizing the different motivational, 
learning, and affective components of reward. In their view, our results 
could be a manifestation of the motivational and learning effects of reward, 
whereas the study of Van Steenbergen et al. (2009) demonstrated effects of 
the affective component of reward. The need for a differentiation between 
these effects of motivation and positive valence was also recently stressed in 
a review by Chiew & Braver (2011) and calls for further research. 
When focusing on the affective value of reward, it might seem 
surprising that reward enhances the cognitive adjustments triggered by 
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conflict. Cognitive conflict has been suggested to be aversive (Botvinick, 
2007; Dreisbach & Fisher, 2012) or at best arousing (Verguts & Notebaert, 
2009). However, when focusing on the motivational aspect, successfully 
responding to a more difficult task can be associated with increased intrinsic 
reinforcement signals (Satterthwaite et al., 2012). Hence, participants can 
find it more motivationally significant to complete an incongruent trial than 
a congruent trial. In this way, while conflict may be experienced as negative 
(Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012), conflict resolution can be perceived as 
positive. Consistently, a recent computational model demonstrates how 
correctly responding to incongruent trials can generate larger positive 
prediction errors (as compared to congruent trials) in anterior cingulate 
cortex (Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011).  
Carrying this reasoning one step further, this motivating aspect of 
conflict resolution, rather than conflict itself, may be what steers typically 
observed cognitive adaptations. This intrinsic reward would then be what 
motivates a person to enhance the task-relevant associations that drove 
him/her to that response. In line with this, patients with Parkinson’s disease, 
who exhibit a reduced sensitivity to reward (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 
2004), typically do not show a conflict adaptation effect (e.g., Fielding, 
Georgiou-Karistianis, Bradshaw, Millist, & White, 2005; Praamstra & Flat, 
2001). Possibly, patients with Parkinson’s disease are not susceptible to the 
motivating aspect of incongruent trials. In fact, this idea also fits our data: 
incongruent trials reduced the congruency effect (Experiment 1) and 
enhanced the task-switch cost (Experiment 2) only after reward. In our 
experiment, the external reward may have superseded the intrinsic reward 
signal, so that people no longer learn from conflict, in the absence of their 
hoped-for reward.  
 
REWARD MODULATES ADAPTATIONS TO CONFLICT     97 
REFERENCES 
Akçay, Ç., & Hazeltine, E. (2007). Conflict monitoring and feature overlap: 
Two sources of sequential modulations. Psychonomic Bulletin and 
Review, 14, 742-748. 
Amodio, D.M., Master, S.L., Yee, C.M., & Taylor, S.E. (2008). 
Neurocognitive components of the behavioral psychophysiology 
inhibition and activation systems: implications for theories of self-
regulation. Psychophysiology, 45, 11–19. 
Berridge, K.C., & Robinson, T.E. (2003). Parsing reward. Trends in 
Neuroscience, 26, 507–513. 
Boksem, M. A. S., Tops, M., Wester, A.E., Meijman, T.F., & Lorist, M.M. 
(2006). Error-related ERP components and individual differences in 
punishment and reward sensitivity. Brain Research, 1101, 92–101. 
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict monitoring and decision making: 
Reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulated function. 
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 7, 356-366. 
Botvinick M. M., Braver T. S., Barch D. M., Carter C. S., Cohen J. D. 
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological 
Review, 108, 624–652.  
Braem, S., Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2011). Conflict adaptation by 
means of associative learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception & Performance, 37, 1662-1666. 
Brown., J. W., Reynolds, J. R., & Braver, T. S. (2007). A computational 
model of fractioned conflict-control mechanisms in task-switching. 
Cognitive Psychology, 55, 37-85. 
98     CHAPTER 3 
Carver, C. S., & White, T. L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral 
activation, and affective responses to impending reward and 
punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 67, 319-333. 
Chiew, K.S., & Braver, T.S. (2011). Positive affect versus reward: 
emotional and motivational influences on cognitive control. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 2, 279. 
Colzato, L.S., van Wouwe, N. C., & Hommel, B. (2007). Feature binding 
and affect: emotional modulation of visuo-motor integration. 
Neuropsychologia, 45, 440–446. 
De Pascalis, V., Varriale, V., & D'Antuono, L. (2010). Event-related 
components of the punishment and reward sensitivity. Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 121, 60-76. 
Della Libera, C., & Chelazzi, L. (2006). Visual Selective Attention and the 
Effects of Monetary Rewards. Psychological Science, 17, 222-227. 
Dreisbach, G., & Goschke, T. (2004). How positive affect modulates 
cognitive control: reduced perseveration at the cost of increased 
distractibility. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, & Cognition, 30, 343-353. 
Eriksen, B.A., & Eriksen, C.W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon 
identification of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 16, 143–149. 
Fernandez-Duque, D., & Knight, MB. (2008). Cognitive Control: Dynamic, 
Sustained, and Voluntary Influences. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 34, 340-355. 
REWARD MODULATES ADAPTATIONS TO CONFLICT     99 
Fielding, J., Georgiou-Karistianis, N., Bradshaw, J., Millist, L., & White, O. 
(2005). No sequence dependent modulation of the Simon effect in 
Parkinson’s disease. Cognitive Brain Research, 25, 251-260. 
Frank, M. J., Seeberger, L. C., & O’Reilly, R. C. (2004). By Carrot or by 
Stick: Cognitive Reinforcement Learning in Parkinsonism. Science, 
306, 1940-1943. 
Franken, I. H. A., & Muris, P. (2006). Gray's impulsivity dimension: A 
distinction between Reward Sensitivity and Rash Impulsiveness. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 40, 1337-1347. 
Goschke, T. (2000). Intentional reconfiguration and involuntary persistence 
in task set switching. In Attention and Performance 18: Control of 
Cognitive Processes (Monsell, S. and Driver, J., eds), 331–355, MIT 
Press. 
Gratton, G., Coles, M. G., & Donchin, E. (1992). Optimizing the use of 
information: Strategic control of activation of responses. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology General, 121, 480-506. 
Gray, J. A. (1989). Fundamental systems of emotion in the mammalian 
brain. In Coping with Uncertainty: Behavioral and Developmental 
Perspectives (Palermo, D. S., eds), 173–195, Hillsdale, N.J.: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L, & Theeuwes, J. (2010a). Reward changes salience 
in human vision via the anterior cingulate. Journal of Neuroscience, 
30, 11096-11103. 
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L, & Theeuwes, J. (2010b). Reward guides vision 
when it’s your thing: Trait Reward-Seeking in Reward-Mediated 
Visual Priming. PLoS ONE, 5, e14087. 
100     CHAPTER 3 
Hickey, C., Chelazzi, L, & Theeuwes, J. (2011). Reward has a residual 
impact on target selection in visual search, but not on the suppression 
of distracters. Visual Cognition, 19, 117-184. 
Hommel, B., Proctor, R. W., & Vu, K.-P. L. (2004). A feature-integration 
account of sequential effects in the Simon task. Psychological 
Research, 68, 1-17. 
Krebs, R. M., Boehler, C. N., & Woldorff, M. G. (2010). The influence of 
reward associations on conflict processing in the Stroop task. 
Cognition, 117, 341-347. 
Locke, H. S., & Braver, T. S. (2008). Motivational influences on cognitive 
control: Behavior, brain activation, and individual differences. 
Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 8, 99–112. 
Lorch, R. F., Jr., & Myers, J. L. (1990). Regression analyses of repeated 
measures data in cognition research. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 16, 149–157. 
Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Van Opstal, F., Gevers, W., Fias, W., & 
Verguts, T. (2009). Post-error slowing: an orienting account. 
Cognition, 111, 275-279. 
Notebaert, W., & Verguts, T. (2007). Dissociating conflict adaptation from 
feature integration: a multiple regression account. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33, 
1256-1260. 
Praamstra, P., & Flat, F. M. (2001). Failed Suppression of Direct 
Visuomotor Activation in Parkinson’s Disease. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 13, 31-43. 
Satterthwaite, T.D., Ruparel, K., Loughead, J., Elliott, M.A., Gerraty, R.T., 
Calkins, M.E., Hakonarson, H., Gur, R.C., Gur, R.E., & Wolf, D.H. 
REWARD MODULATES ADAPTATIONS TO CONFLICT     101 
(2012). Being right is its own reward: Load and performance related 
ventral striatum activation to correct responses during a working 
memory task in youth. NeuroImage, 61, 723-729. 
Schlaghecken, F., & Martini, P. (2012). Context, Not Conflict, Drives 
Cognitive Control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 38, 272-278. 
Silvetti, M., Seurinck, R., & Verguts, T. (2011). Value and prediction error 
in medial frontal cortex: integrating the single-unit and systems levels 
of analysis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, 75. 
Simon, J. R. (1969). Reactions toward the source of stimulation. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 81, 1974-1976. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. 
Stürmer, B., Nigbur, R., Schacht, A., & Sommer, W. (2011). Reward and 
Punishment Effects on Error Processing and Conflict Control. 
Frontiers in Psychology, 2, 335. 
Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence. New York: Macmillan. 
Ullsperger, M., Bylsma, L. M., & Botvinick, M. M. (2005). The conflict 
adaptation effect: It's not just priming. Cognitive, Affective, and 
Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 467-472. 
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P. H., & Hommel, B. (2009). Reward 
Counteracts Conflict Adaptation: Evidence for a Role of Affect in 
Executive Control. Psychological Science, 20, 1473-1477. 
van Steenbergen, H., Band, G. P. H., & Hommel, B. (2010). In the Mood for 
Adaptation: How Affect Regulates Conflict-Driven Control. 
Psychological Science, 21, 1629-1634. 
102     CHAPTER 3 
Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2008). Hebbian learning of cognitive control: 
Dealing with specific and nonspecific adaptation. Psychological 
Review, 115, 518-525. 
Verguts, T., & Notebaert, W. (2009). Adaptation by binding: A learning 
account of cognitive control. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13, 252-
257. 
Waszak, F. & Pholulamdeth, V. (2009). Episodic S-R bindings and emotion: 
about the influence of positive and negative action effects on 
stimulus-response associations. Experimental Brain Research, 194, 
489-494. 
Zelenski, J.M., & Larsen, R. J. (1999). Susceptibility to affect: a comparison 
of three personality taxonomies. Journal of Personality, 67, 761–791. 
 
 CHAPTER 4 
REWARD MODULATES CONTEXT-SENSITIVE 
COGNITIVE CONTROL
1
 
Reward is thought to enhance cognitive control processes in various 
ways (e.g., Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Noteabaert, 2012; Krebs, 
Boehler, & Woldorff,  2010), but the impact of reward on the context-
sensitivity of cognitive control (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009) remains 
unclear. Evidence from perception and attention studies suggests that good 
outcome acts to increase saliency for attended visual features, whereas sub-
optimal outcome results in the devaluation of these features (e.g. Hickey, 
Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010a). Here we investigated the possibility that this 
interplay between reward and contextual visual features can impact higher 
cognitive control processes, such as conflict monitoring. By combining a 
visual search paradigm with a letter flanker task we demonstrated that the 
congruency sequence effect is strong after high reward when irrelevant task 
features repeat, but also strong after low reward when those features 
alternate. These modulations of trial-to-trial adaptations to conflict are 
predicted by individual differences in reward responsiveness. The results 
suggest a role for reward in context-modulated cognitive control and are 
discussed in light of a win-stay / lose-shift strategy. 
                                                     
1
 Braem, S., Hickey, C., Duthoo, W., & Notebaert, W. (under revision). Reward 
modulates context-sensitive cognitive control: A win-stay / lose-shift account.. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to achieve our goals we must monitor our environment and 
adapt to ever-changing contexts. Feedback regarding action outcomes is 
well known to play a role in guiding this type of cognitive control. In spite 
of this, there are relatively few direct investigations of the manner in which 
explicit reward feedback impacts cognitive control processes (e.g., Braem, 
Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & 
Sommer, 2011; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). Recent empirical 
evidence has demonstrated how trial-to-trial cognitive adaptations processes 
can be tied to specific stimulus- (Spapé & Hommel, 2008) or response- 
(Braem, Verguts, & Notebaert, 2011) features, arguing for the context-
sensitivity of cognitive control (Blais, Robidoux, Risko, & Besner, 2007; 
Davelaar & Stevens, 2009; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). In the present 
study, we investigated how contextual task  features play a role in 
determining the impact of reward on cognitive control. 
Generally, cognitive control is investigated through the use of 
conflicts tasks like the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), 
Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) or Simon task (Simon, 1969). In all these tasks, 
irrelevant, conflicting stimulus information impedes the processing of 
relevant stimulus information. For example, in a standard flanker task 
participants are required to respond as fast as possible to a centrally 
presented target, such as identifying a certain letter (e.g., press left when 'S', 
right when 'H'). Irrelevant flankers presented next to the central target 
impede task performance when they are incongruent, as when these letters 
are associated with an alternative response (e.g., 'HHSHH'), but facilitate 
task performance when congruent, as when they are the same letters as the 
central target (e.g., 'SSSSS'). Resulting differences in reaction time (RT) and 
accuracy are referred to as the congruency effect.  
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The congruency effect observed in the flanker task is typically found 
to be smaller after incongruent trials than after congruent trials (as first 
observed by Gratton, Coles & Donchin, 1992). This congruency sequence 
effect has been replicated in different congruency tasks (Kerns et al., 2004; 
Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 2002) and offers an index 
of how people increase task focus in reaction to cognitive conflict. The 
congruency sequence effect appears to be context-specific, restricted to 
circumstances where perceptual context repeats between experimental trials. 
Spapé and Hommel (2008), for example, demonstrated how the congruency 
sequence effect could only be observed when the voice in which the 
stimulus was presented repeated between trials. In a similar vein, Braem, 
Verguts, and Notebaert (2011) found that the congruency sequence effect 
only occurs within response effectors (feet or hand), but not across. This is 
in line with recent associative models of cognitive control (Blais, Robidoux, 
Risko, & Besner, 2007; Davelaar & Stevens, 2009; Verguts & Notebaert, 
2008; 2009) that stress the importance of modulating task associations after 
conflict. For example, Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009) proposed that 
cognitive conflict leads to arousal, which has the effect of binding active 
representations together. Task-relevant associations will be more strongly 
modified, resulting in a smaller congruency effect on the next trial. By 
explaining the congruency sequence effect in terms of strengthening specific 
stimulus-response associations (in contrast to, for example, enhancing 
overall task focus; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), this 
model provides a context-sensitive implementation of cognitive control. 
Inherent to this mechanism (i.e. strengthening and associating all active 
stimulus features and task representations after conflict), subsequent 
adaptations are predicted to be highly sensitive to what is active or salient at 
the time. Interestingly, given that reward is known to modulate the saliency 
or relative activation of stimulus features, we expect reward signals to play a 
major role in determining the context-specificity of cognitive control.  
For over a century psychologists have been discussing and 
investigating the effects of reward on behaviour (Thorndike, 1911; Skinner, 
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1953; Schultz, 2002). Reward signals are widely thought to reinforce 
stimulus-response associations (i.e., the law of effect; Thorndike, 1911). 
Neurophysiological data suggest that this effect relies on dopaminergic 
signalling in the midbrain (Robbins & Everitt, 1996; Schultz, 2002; Kelley, 
2004; Schultz, 2004). For example, reward has been found to stimulate the 
potentiation of connections between striatum and cortex in rats, with the 
strength of this physiological effect predicting the animal's subsequent 
ability to learn a new task (Reynolds, Hyland, & Wickens, 2001). Similar 
behavioural effects have been observed in humans, with reward - in the form 
of positive valence inducing pictures - increasing both short- (Colzato, van 
Wouwe, & Hommel, 2007) and long-term (Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 2009) 
stimulus-response associations.  
In recent years reward has also become a focus for researchers 
investigating selective attention (Anderson et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2012; 
Anderson & Yantis, 2012; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2006, 2009; Hickey & 
Peelen, under review; Hickey et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011; Hickey & van 
Zoest, 2012; Raymond & O’Brien, 2009; Rutherford, O'Brien, & Raymond, 
2010). For example, Hickey, Chelazzi, and Theeuwes (2010a) demonstrated 
that selective attention is automatically biased towards stimuli with reward-
associated visual features. These authors had human participants search for 
a uniquely-shaped target presented among a number of homogenous 
distractors. Response was based on the orientation of a small line presented 
within the target shape. In some trials, all the shapes were of the same 
colour, but more often one of the distractor shapes had a different colour. 
This type of irrelevant colour singleton is known to draw attention during 
visual search for the unique shape (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991; Hickey, 
McDonald, & Theeuwes, 2006). The colours of the target could vary from 
trial to trial such that the distractor could be red, with all other stimuli 
including the target green, or vice versa. Therefore, the colours could either 
alternate or repeat between trials, with the colour of the target (distractor) 
becoming that of the distractor (target), or could remain the same. 
Participants randomly received either high- or low-magnitude monetary 
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reward after each correct trial. Results showed that when high reward was 
received, attention was biased towards stimuli with the same colour in the 
next trial. Even though colour was task irrelevant, task performance thus 
improved when target colour repeated, but suffered when target colour 
alternated and the salient distractor acquired the reinforced colour.  
Interestingly, in the study of Hickey et al. (2010a) low reward was 
found to create the reverse pattern of high reward: response was slow when 
the colours of the target and salient distractor were repeated after low 
reward, but performance improved when these colours swapped. This 
pattern suggests that low reward resulted in a relative deactivation of the 
attentional template for the target in that trial, and a corresponding increase 
in perceptual sensitivity for features characterizing the distractor. As a 
result, target processing was facilitated in the next trial when the target was 
characterized by visual features that had defined the distractor in the 
preceding trial. Similarly, in a study of the long-term effects of reward 
learning, Della Libera & Chelazzi (2009) demonstrated that distractors that 
have been associated with low reward are easier to detect when they 
reappear as targets than are target items that have been associated with low 
reward. 
We have demonstrated how adaptations to conflict can be determined 
by task (ir)relevant contextual features, and this opens the possibility that 
reward modulations of the saliency of such features might determine the 
impact of reward signals on cognitive control. In order to investigate this 
impact of reward on a context-sensitive conflict task we integrated a visual 
search paradigm with a flanker task paradigm. More specifically, we used 
the visual search paradigm of Hickey et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2011), in which 
participants look for an object with a unique shape and respond based on the 
orientation of a small line segment in this object. In our modification of this 
paradigm each item in the visual search array contained a small flanker 
sequence and response was based on the identity of the central letter in the 
sequence presented within the uniquely-shaped target. This design allowed 
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us to investigate the influence of reward signals and contextual features on 
the congruency sequence effect. The combined notion of the context 
sensitivity of adaptations after conflict (i.e., adaptation by binding, Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008; 2009) and the role of reward in modulating contextual 
features (Hickey et al., 2010a, 2010b, 2011) motivates four experimental 
predictions in this hybrid task: the congruency sequence effect will increase 
when (a) contextual features (i.e., target and distractor colours) repeat after 
high reward and (b) when these alternate after low reward, but will decrease 
when (c) context alternates after high reward and (d) when context is 
repeated after low reward. Moreover, we expect that individual variability in 
the effect of reward will be related to trait reward sensitivity, as has been 
demonstrated in visual search (Beaver et al., 2006; Hickey, Chelazzi, & 
Theeuwes, 2010b; Hickey & Peelen, under review) and cognitive control 
tasks (Braem et al., 2012; van Steenbergen et al., 2009). Therefore, 
participants completed a personality index - the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & 
White, 1994) - after having completed the experiment. Experiment 1 was 
designed to determine if the known context sensitivity of conflict adaptation 
could be detected in a visual search paradigm in the absence of a reward 
manipulation. Experiment 2 and 3 employed much the same paradigm, but 
included a variable reward feedback that was provided at the end of each 
trial.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants  
Fifteen students (range = 18-23 years, 10 female, all right-handed) 
took part in return for course credits.  
Stimuli and procedure 
The trial procedure is visualized in Figure 1. The visual search arrays 
contained six object outlines (line thickness of 0.3° visual angle), each 
presented equidistant (9.1°) from a central fixation point and from each 
other. Objects could be diamonds (4.2° x 4.2°) or circles (3.4° diameter), 
with each display containing only one uniquely shaped item. This shape 
singleton could be a diamond with all other stimuli circles or vice versa. In 
80% of trials, one of the homogenously shaped non-target items was of 
unique colour, either red with all other objects green or vice versa.  
Each of the six object outlines contained a sequence of five characters 
aligned horizontally. Participants responded based on the central character: 
half of participants pressed the left response button when this letter was an 
‘S’ and the right button it was an ‘H’ with the response map swapped for the 
remainder. Non-target characters could have the same identity, rendering the 
target flanker congruent (e.g., SSSSS), or could have the alternative identity, 
rendering the target incongruent (e.g., HHSHH). Per block, target shape 
(circle or diamond), target colour (green or red), flanker task congruency 
(congruent or incongruent), and distractor presence (80 % present and 20 % 
absent), were randomized in a balanced manner. Per congruency condition, 
half of the target shapes were in green, the other half in blue.  
The onset of the visual search array was preceded by a fixation cross 
for a random duration of 400–1400 milliseconds. Responses were registered 
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with a standard response box. Errors were indicated with the Dutch word 
'fout' (mistake) in black text for 500 ms. No feedback was provided for 
correct responses but the fixation cross sustained for an additional 500 ms in 
these trials.  
 
 
Figure 1. General paradigm and trial procedure for Experiment 1 and 2. The target shape and 
salient distractor are denoted. Participants had to identify the unique (target) shape, while 
ignoring the salient distractor, and respond to the central letter in the target shape (Flanker 
task). In Experiment 2, correct performance was rewarded with either 1 or 10 points. There 
was no reward schedule in Experiment 1. 
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Stimuli were presented on a CRT monitor located 60 cm away from 
the eyes using Tscope software (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & 
Vandierendonk, 2006). Participants completed 14 blocks of 40 trials for a 
total of 560 trials, which took approximately 40 minutes. A self-paced break 
was provided between blocks. All participants were given detailed 
instructions regarding the experimental task.  
 
Results 
Mean accuracy was high (M = 96%, SD = 0.04). Inter-trial analyses 
are based on correct colour-distractor-present trials where the trial was 
preceded by a correct colour-distractor-present trial in the same block. Of 
these trials, 4.6 % were RT outliers (± 2 SD) and were discarded from 
further analysis. RT and accuracy results were statistically assessed in 
repeated-measures analyses of variance (rANOVA) with within-subject 
factors for flanker congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), previous flanker 
congruency (previous congruent vs. previous incongruent), colour sequence 
(colour repetition vs. colour alternation), and shape sequence (shape 
repetition vs. shape alternation).  
Overall, there was a significant flanker congruency effect, F(1, 14) = 
27.114, p < .001, which did not interact with previous flanker congruency, 
F(1, 14) = 1, p > .1. A significant effect of shape sequence was also 
revealed, F(1, 14) = 17.141, p < .01, driven by faster reaction times on shape 
repetitions relative to shape alternations. The three-way interaction between 
colour sequence, congruency and previous trial congruency was significant, 
F(1, 14) = 5.433, p < 0.05. As depicted in Figure 2a, this indicates that the 
congruency sequence effect was only observed for colour repetitions, t(14) = 
2.432, p < 0.05, with no congruency sequence effect observed for colour 
alternations t(14) < 1, ns. In addition, we observed a significant interaction 
between congruency and shape sequence (F(1, 14) = 5.906, p < .05), 
indicating a reduced congruency effect (60 ms) after shape alternations 
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relative to shape repetitions (108 ms). No other interactions reached 
significance (all p > 0.1). 
The error rates analyses only showed a marginally significant main 
effect of congruency, F(1, 15) = 3.182, p = 0.096, and an interaction 
between congruency and shape sequence, F(1, 15) = 4.591, p = 0.05, 
indicating a congruency effect on shape repetitions (2.8%), but not on shape 
alternations (-0.4%). No other interactions reached significance (all p > 0.1). 
 
Discussion 
This first experiment is in line with earlier observations suggesting 
that the congruency sequence effect is sensitive to changes of stimuli 
characteristics or response modality (Braem et al., 2011; Spapé & Hommel, 
2008). Here, we demonstrate that this effect can also be bound to the context 
(surrounding colour) in which task stimuli are presented, and suggest that 
context repetitions in visual search facilitate not only target detection and 
localization, but also the operation of subsequent mechanisms involved in 
conflict adaptation.  
We conducted a second experiment in order to determine the role of 
reward in modulating this effect of context on the congruency sequence 
effect . Experiment 2 relied on the same general paradigm as employed in 
Experiment 1, but with the addition of high and low reward feedback at the 
end of each trial.  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants  
Fourteen students took part for credit (range = 18-19 years, 12 female, 
2 left-handed).  
Stimuli and procedure  
The trial procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with the following 
modifications (see Figure 1): the shape singleton was always a circle and 
distractor-shapes were always diamonds, and correct responses to the search 
target were immediately followed by the replacement of the central fixation 
cross with reward feedback in black text, either ‘+10’, denoting the receipt 
of 10 points, or ‘+1’, denoting the receipt of 1 point. Per block, reward 
feedback (low or high reward), target colour (green or red), flanker task 
congruency (congruent or incongruent), and distractor presence (80 % 
present and 20 % absent), were randomized in a balanced manner. The 
search array and flanker stimuli remained onscreen during the 1000 ms 
presentation of feedback. Incorrect responses resulted in the removal of 10 
points, denoted by ‘-10’, and for every 10 participants that completed the 
experiment the top-scorer received a 25€ store coupon.  
Questionnaires  
All 14 participants completed a Dutch version (Franken, Muris, & 
Rassin, 2005) of the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & White, 1994) immediately 
after the experiment. In the BIS/BAS scale participants rate their agreement 
with a series of 20 statements on a 4-point scale (eg. ‘I go out of my way to 
get things I want.’).  
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Results 
As in Experiment 1, mean accuracy was high (M = 98%, SD = 0.02), 
inter-trial analyses are based on correct colour-distractor-present trials 
where the trial was preceded by a correct colour-distractor-present trial in 
the same block, and RT outliers were discarded from analysis (± 2 SD; 
4.4 %). RT and accuracy results were statistically assessed in a rANOVA 
with within-subject factors for flanker congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent), previous flanker congruency (previous congruent vs. previous 
incongruent), colour sequence (repetition or alternation), and previous 
reward (high vs. low magnitude). Analysis of RT revealed a significant 
congruency effect, F(1, 13) = 101.417, p < .001, which interacted with 
previous congruency, F(1, 13) = 15.155, p < .01, indicating an overall 
congruency sequence effect. Also, there was a marginally significant effect 
of colour sequence, F(1, 13) = 4.449, p = .055, indicating shorter reaction 
times on colour repetitions relative to colour alternations. We did not 
replicate the interaction between colour sequence and previous feedback, as 
found by Hickey et al. (2010a, 2010b, 2011), F(1, 13) = 1.549, p > .1. 
However, we believe that, due to the more complex double task procedure 
(visual search and conflict task) in our design, this originally observed two-
way interaction may have been overridden by the variation induced by the 
flanker task. Critically, the interaction between congruency, previous 
congruency, previous feedback and colour sequence was significant, F(1, 
13) = 4.792, p < .05, demonstrating the context-dependent impact of reward 
on the congruency sequence effect. No other interactions reached 
significance (all p > 0.1).  
As depicted in Figure 2b, the four-way interaction in RT is reflected 
in the presence of a congruency effect (as calculated by subtracting the 
congruency effect after incongruent trials from the congruency effect after 
congruent trials) after high reward when context (target and distractor 
colour) repeated (102 ms, t(1, 13) = 3.070, p < .01) and after low reward 
when the context alternated (94 ms, t(1, 13) = 3.171, p < .01) on the one 
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hand, and the nonsignificance of a congruency sequence effect after high 
reward when the context alternated (38 ms, t(1, 13) = 1.463, p > .1) and after 
low reward when the context repeated (26 ms, t(1, 13) < 1, n.s.) on the other.  
Analysis of error rates garnered no significant results (all p > 0.1). 
 
 
Figure 2. Depicted are the reaction times for Experiment 1 (a) and Experiment 2 (b). Dotted 
lines indicate congruent trials and full lines indicate incongruent trials. The results 
demonstrate how conflict adaptation is normally observed for context repetitions only 
(Experiment 1). When implementing a reward schedule, conflict adaptation is observed for 
context repetitions after high reward, but on context alternations after low reward 
(Experiment 2). The error bars are ± 1 standard error. 
 
Analysis of the distractor effect: a manipulation check. 
The analysis described above (in Experiment 1 and 2) are based on 
trials where the colour-distractor was present, and extant results suggest that 
this colour-distractor will draw attention during search (e.g. Theeuwes, 
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1991; Hickey, McDonald & Theeuwes, 2006). To verify this effect in the 
current dataset we conducted an additional analysis contrasting colour-
distractor present and colour-distractor absent conditions. This took the form 
of a rANOVA with a within-subject factor for colour-distractor presence 
(present vs. absent) and between-subject factor for experiment (Experiment 
1 vs. 2). This revealed a main effect of experiment, F(1, 27) = 17.014, p < 
.001, a main effect of colour-distractor presence, F(1, 27) = 71.480, p < 
.001, and a significant interaction between both factors, F(1, 27) = 19.914, p 
< .001. Participants were thus slower to respond in colour-distractor-present 
trials but this effect was reduced in Experiment 2 (130 ms vs. 40 ms), 
presumably reflecting the motivational impact of the possibility of explicit 
reward.  Error rates indicated a similar trend but did not reach significance 
(all p's > .1).  
 
Discussion 
In this second experiment, we investigated the role of reward in 
modulating the effect of context on the congruency sequence effect. We 
used the paradigm used in Experiment 1 and added low and high reward at 
the end of each trial. The results demonstrate how the congruency sequence 
effect is enhanced after high reward on context repetitions and after low 
reward on context alternations, but diminished following high reward on 
context alternations and after low reward on context repetitions. The results 
are in line with our predictions on reward modulations of context-sensitive 
cognitive control.  
However, some aspects of our design could have coloured our results. 
Specifically, our design did not allow us to detect false positives. That is, 
flanker task stimuli were randomly presented in the non-target shapes. 
Whenever a participant responded to the flanker target in the colour-
distractor shape, and this flanker target happened to be the same as in the 
target shape, the response was (wrongfully) coded as a correct response. The 
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error rate in Experiment 1 and 2 was very low, rendering the idea that false-
positives would shape our effects rather unlikely. However, to ensure false-
positives would be excluded from our RT analyses, we employed a flanker 
task with four, as opposed to two, response options in a third experiment, 
Experiment 3. This way, we could program that neither the flankers, nor the 
target, where the same in the colour-distractor and target shape. Secondly, 
the number of data points per condition, after excluding previous and 
current no-colour-distractor trials, was relatively low in Experiment 2 (mean 
= 20, ranging from 9 to 35). Therefore,  having established that a colour 
singleton distracts attention in our (see manipulation check in Results 
section) as well as previous studies (eg. Theeuwes, 1991; Hickey, 
McDonald & Theeuwes, 2006), we excluded all no-distractor trials from the 
design of Experiment 3 (each trial had a unique colour distractor shape). 
Furthermore, we added two more blocks to the experimental procedure. This 
way, Experiment 3 ensured a potential average of 39 trials per condition, as 
opposed to 21.8 trials in Experiment 2 (not taking into account previous and 
current error trials). Lastly, Experiment 3 is also of theoretical relevance. By 
employing a four-option response mapping, we can take into account the 
impact of feature integration effects (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004) and 
how these may, or may not, mediate the effect of reward on context-
sensitive cognitive control. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
Method 
Participants  
Eighteen students took part for credit (range = 18-21 years, 15 female, 
1 left-handed).  
Stimuli and procedure  
The trial procedure was similar to Experiment 2 with the following 
modifications. All trials had a uniquely coloured distractor, excluding all no-
distractor trials by design. As in the previous two experiments, each of the 
six object outlines contained a sequence of five characters aligned 
horizontally and participants responded based on the central character. 
However, we employed a number, instead of letter, flanker task. All 
participants were required to press the D-key on the keyboard when the 
central target was number 1, the F-key when number 2, the J-key when 
number 3, and the K-key when number 4. This stimulus to response 
assignment (left to right, 1 to 4) was not counterbalanced across 
participants, because the order of this response mapping ensured the most 
efficient task performance (reducing the additional RT cost). Non-target 
characters could have the same identity, rendering the target flanker 
congruent (e.g., 11111), or could have an alternative identity, rendering the 
target incongruent (e.g., 44144). To guarantee a balanced number target-
flanker combinations per congruency condition (see Mordkoff, 2012), we 
used a fixed selection of four incongruent trial types. Specifically, on 
incongruent trials target 1 was always flanked by 4 (i.e., 44144), 2 by 3, 3 by 
1, and 4 by 2.  The randomisation, trial procedure, and reward schedule was 
the same as in Experiment 2, but participants completed sixteen, instead of 
fourteen, blocks of 40 trials for a total of 640 trials, which took 
approximately 45 minutes.  
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Questionnaires 
Similar to Experiment 2, all 18 participants completed a Dutch 
version (Franken, Muris, & Rassin, 2005) of the BIS/BAS scale (Carver & 
White, 1994) immediately after the experiment. 
 
Results 
Again, mean accuracy was high (M = 98%, SD = 0.01). Previous and 
current error trials, and first trials of each block were excluded from 
analysis, where after RT outliers were discarded from analysis (± 2 SD; 
3.9 %).  RT and accuracy results were statistically assessed in a rANOVA 
with within-subject factors for flanker congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent), previous flanker congruency (previous congruent vs. previous 
incongruent), colour sequence (repetition or alternation), and previous 
reward (high vs. low magnitude). Analysis of RT revealed a significant 
congruency effect, F(1, 17) = 207.624, p < .001, which interacted with 
previous congruency, F(1, 17) = 11.844, p < .01, indicating an overall 
congruency sequence effect. Also, there was a significant effect of colour 
sequence, F(1, 17) = 16.938, p < .01, indicating shorter reaction times on 
colour repetitions relative to colour alternations. Critically, the interaction 
between congruency, previous congruency, previous feedback and colour 
sequence was significant, F(1, 17) = 9.746, p < .01, demonstrating a context-
dependent impact of reward on conflict adaptation. No other interactions 
reached significance (all p > 0.1).  
As depicted in Figure 3, the four-way interaction in RT is reflected in 
the presence of a congruency sequence effect after high reward when 
context (target and distractor colour) repeated (65 ms, t(1, 17) = 3.035, p < 
.01) and after low reward when the context alternated (36 ms, t(1, 17) = 
2.577, p < .05) on the one hand, and the nonsignificance of a congruency 
sequence effect after high reward when the context alternated (-32 ms, t(1, 
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17) = -1.232, p > .1) and after low reward when the context repeated (35 ms, 
t(1, 17) = 1.331, p > .1) on the other.  
Analysis of error rates garnered no significant results (all p > 0.1). 
 
 
Figure 3. Depicted are the reaction times for Experiment 3. Dotted lines indicate congruent 
trials and full lines indicate incongruent trials. The congruency sequence effect only reached 
significance on context repetitions after high reward, and on context alternations after low 
reward. The error bars are ± 1 standard error. 
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In Experiment 3, we worked with four, instead of two (as in 
Experiment 2), response options. This allowed us to rule out effects of 
feature repetition and/or integration effects (e.g., Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 
2004) in explaining our reward modulation of contex-sensitive congruency 
sequence effects. Therefore, we reanalyzed our data by means of multiple 
regression (Braem et al., 2012; Notebaert & Verguts, 2007). To account for 
between-subjects variance, a multiple regression analysis is performed for 
each participant separately. Subsequently, the average of each coefficient 
across participants is tested with a one-sample t test (Lorch & Myers, 1990). 
This way, we can test if our crucial interaction between previous reward, 
context-sequence, previous congruency, and congruency (in the reward 
condition), remains after controlling for feature repetition and/or integration 
effects. Along with our previously reported variables of interest, we added 
five binary (0 or 1) bottom-up factors (see Notebaert & Verguts, 2007), to 
our multiple regression analysis with reaction time as the dependent 
variable. The first factor was the repetition of the target, and the second 
repetition of the flanker. The third factor, called feature integration, codes 
for complete repetitions and alternations (1) versus partial repetitions (0). 
The last two factors were respectively negative priming (distractor - 
becomes - target repetition) and target - becomes - distractor repetition. On 
top of those factors, we also chose to control for the interactions between 
previous reward, congruency sequence, and each of those factors. The 
analyses show that our main interaction of interest, between previous 
reward, context sequence, previous congruency and congruency, can still be 
observed, t(17) = 2.330, p < .05. This, after controlling for all the effects of 
feature repetition and their interaction with previous reward. The main 
effects of feature integration, target repetition, and flanker repetition, all 
reached significance (all p < .01), and negative priming showed a marginally 
significant effect, t(17) = 2.006, p = .061. There were no significant 
interactions between feature integration, or repetition effects, and previous-
reward by congruency sequence (all p > .1). 
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Correlation analyses across Experiment 2 and 3  
For these analyses, we took a measure of each congruency sequence 
effect separately (by subtracting the congruency effect after incongruent 
trials from the congruency effect after congruent trials, for each context 
sequence and previous reward condition separately). Next, the condition-
specific congruency sequence effects were standardized per condition and 
per experiment. This allowed us to evaluate the impact of BIS/BAS scales 
on these respective congruency sequence effects across experiments, 
without contaminating the analyses with potential overall differences 
between Experiment 2 and 3. All correlations were evaluated by using fisher 
transformed rank-ordered Spearman's rho analyses, to ensure that 
correlations were not driven by outliers. As predicted, the questionnaires 
revealed a positive correlation between the congruency sequence effect 
following high reward on context repetitions and the BAS reward 
responsiveness subscale (Spearman’s rho, ρ = .392, t(30) = 2.340, p < .05) 
and a negative correlation between the BAS reward responsiveness subscale 
and the congruency sequence effect following low reward on context 
repetitions (Spearman’s rho, ρ = .392, t(30) = 2.340, p < .05), but not with 
the congruency sequence effects context alternations (both p's > .3). Both 
correlations are consistent with those observed in Braem et al. (2012) and 
van Steenbergen et al. (2009). No corresponding correlations with other 
BIS/BAS subscales were detected (all p's > .1).  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In this study we have demonstrated an impact of reward feedback on 
the congruency sequence effect that is dependent on visual context. We had 
participants complete a hybrid conflict / visual search task in which a 
response-relevant flanker sequence was contained within the uniquely-
shaped visual search target. The target was often joined in the visual search 
display by a uniquely-coloured, task-irrelevant distractor. Results show a 
large and reliable congruency sequence effect - evidence that conflict 
resolution was facilitated - when a trial was preceded by high reward and the 
colours characterizing the target and distractor were the same as those in the 
previous trial. There was no corresponding congruency sequence effect after 
high reward when the target and distractor colours swapped. Strikingly, 
when low reward was received the opposite pattern emerged: conflict 
resolution was facilitated when context alternated but this effect was absent 
when context repeated.  
These findings demonstrate how reward, by modulating contextual 
features, can have a direct impact on cognitive control. This type of direct 
influence is consistent with theoretical models of conflict monitoring such 
as the adaptation-by-binding account of Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 
2009). According to this account, adaptations to conflict occur after 
response execution (but can initiate earlier, see e.g. Scherbaum, 
Dshemuchadse, Ruge, & Goschke, 2012), making them sensitive to 
feedback presentation and the environmental context present at that time. 
After high reward, the saliency of target contextual features is increased (or 
distractor contextual features after low reward). The Hebbian learning rule 
by which all active associations are enhanced after a conflict trial, as 
implemented in the model of Verguts & Notebaert (2008, 2009), can then be 
applied to explain context- and reward-sensitive adaptations to conflict, 
because it takes into account all active representations. The impact of 
reward on conflict adaptation identified in our results furthermore provides 
support for the idea that conflict adaptation is enhanced after a rewarding 
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outcome (Braem et al., 2012; Sturmer et al., 2011). This general pattern has 
been interpreted as evidence that high reward may enhance the learning 
value of the conflict signal, creating a larger conflict adaptation effect. Low 
reward, in contrast, appears to devalue this learning signal and ultimately 
counteracts conflict adaptation. The current results also further corroborate 
studies demonstrating the general contextual selectivity of conflict 
adaptation (Braem et al., 2011; Spapé & Hommel, 2008; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008, 2009).  
Although we believe that these results are most parsimoniously 
explained by the adaptation-by-binding model (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 
2009), this experiment cannot - and was not set up to - differentiate between 
other models of cognitive control. The model of Botvinick et al. (2001) 
proposes that task focus is enhanced upon the detection of conflict. This 
model cannot explain the context-sensitivity of adaptations to conflict (our 
Experiment 1, see also Braem et al., 2011; Spapé & Hommel, 2008; Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008, 2009). However, a relatively simple adjustment to the 
model can incorporate context or stimulus sensitivity (e.g., Blais et al., 
2007). Note that the adaptation-by-binding model has a similar architecture 
as these models; it only specifies how the system retrieves information about 
which connections need to be strengthened (i.e., the most active ones). This 
information is not available in the original conflict monitoring model, nor in 
the model by Blais et al. (2007). These models, however, could assume that 
contexts that receive more attention by means of a reward manipulation 
show increased conflict adaptation. The adaptation-by-binding model 
assumes that conflict adaptation depends on levels of activation, and 
therefore explains the specific effect of rewarded/unrewarded contexts 
without additional assumptions. Note, that in this regard, the model bears 
some similarities to the feature binding account (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 
2004). Both accounts assume that active features are bound, but the 
adaptation-by-binding account assumes that this binding is sensitive to 
conflict, in the sense that stronger binding occurs when conflict was 
detected. The feature-integration account, on the other hand, argues that the 
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congruency sequence effect emerges from the mere repetition or alternations 
of stimulus features. However, our multiple regression analysis pointed out 
that these repetition effects could not explain, nor mediate, the influence of 
reward on context-sensitive congruency sequence effects. 
On a more general level, we can interpret our findings in terms of a 
win-stay / lose-shift mechanism: good outcomes reinforce the current 
context while bad outcomes cause activation of the alternative context. Win-
stay / lose-shift mechanisms have been suggested in other psychological and 
neuroscientific contexts to account for decision making (Nowak & Sigmund, 
1993; Posch, 1999), animal behaviour (e.g., Evenden, & Robbins, 1984; 
Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006), evolution psychology (e.g., Nowak, 
2006), and prefrontal cortex activity (Bussey, Wise, & Murray, 2001; 
Genovesio, Brasted, & Mitz, 2005). Moreover, some theoretical work 
suggests that brain regions involved in stimulus-reward associations and 
win-stay / lose-shift strategies could participate in the attentional control of 
sensory information (Rossi, Pessoa, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2009). 
However, to our knowledge, results from the study of attention and conflict 
monitoring have never before been interpreted within this framework. The 
current results suggest that the win-stay / lose-shift framework characterizes 
not only relatively high-level judgements and learning strategies, but also 
mechanisms that operate during low-level perceptual processing and conflict 
adaptation. When selection of a stimulus results in sub-optimal outcome, 
attentional templates appear to be changed such that perception is biased in 
favour of alternative stimuli and contexts. On the one hand, this ‘reward 
boost’ sets the stage for conflict adaptation to take place following context 
repetitions. On the other hand, the drive to reweight attentional templates 
after sub-optimal outcome creates a situation where performance is more 
efficient following context alternations, promoting adaptations to conflict 
under these circumstances. As noted by Hickey et al. (2010a), this type of 
mechanism has a clear evolutionary benefit, acting to bias perceptual and 
attentional processes in favour of stimuli and environments that have 
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garnered good outcome and away from those that have garnered sub-optimal 
outcome. 
It is important to point out that the current results, like those reported 
by Braem et al. (2012) and Stürmer et al. (2011), are strikingly at odds with 
those observed by Van Steenbergen et al. (2009; 2012). There the opposite 
pattern was found: conflict adaptation was evident after neutral and 
punishment trials, but absent after reward. This marked difference likely 
stems from some important differences in experimental design. In Van 
Steenbergen (2009; 2012) feedback took the form of a smiling or frowning 
schematic face, which indicated the receipt or loss of monetary value. 
Reward feedback thus had an affective and social importance that is absent 
in our design. Stimuli that induce positive affect have been found to cause 
increased task distractibility (Dreisbach & Goschke , 2004), and theoretical 
work on the motivation of adaptive behaviour has suggested fundamental 
differences in the impact of affective vs. reward feedback (Berridge & 
Robinson, 2003; Chiew & Braver, 2011). This raises the possibility that 
results from van Steenbergen et al. (2009; 2012) index the effect of 
emotional content rather than the motivational effect of reward, and 
highlights the need for further research investigating the precise influence of 
affective and reward feedback in conflict tasks.  
In the current results the magnitude of the contextual impact of 
reward on cognitive control was partially predicted by the participant’s 
score on the BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale of the BIS/BAS 
personality assessment. The BIS/BAS scale requires participants to indicate 
the degree to which they agree with a number of short statements, and the 
reward responsiveness subscale loads heavily on statements that index a 
person’s affective response to reward feedback (eg. “When good things 
happen to me, it affects me strongly.”). The fact that contextual modulation 
of reward on cognitive control covaries with people's reward sensitivity 
provides clear support for the idea that reward impacts contextual effects in 
conflict monitoring. Conversely, we can also see this correlation as support 
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for the idea that the effect of motivational and affective variables on 
cognitive control is still highly susceptible to individual differences, as has 
recently been stressed by Kanske (2012). Generally, the correlation 
identified in our study replicates results from Braem et al. (2012) and is 
consistent with earlier reports demonstrating a relationship between BAS 
subscales and the impact of reward on cognitive control and attentional 
selection (Hickey & Peelen, under review; Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 
2010b; Van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). 
In conclusion, we demonstrate that reward has an impact on conflict 
monitoring that is sensitive to visual context. We believe that this reflects an 
underlying role for reward in the control of attentional selection, directly 
influencing conflict adaptation processes. The type of win-stay / lose-shift 
mechanism identified in these results has a clear evolutionary benefit, 
guiding cognitive processing in favour of approaches and mechanisms that 
have garnered good outcome in the past. Reward - and its absence - clearly 
plays an important role in determining perception, attention, and cognitive 
control. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
PUNISHMENT SENSITIVITY PREDICTS THE IMPACT 
OF PUNISHMENT ON COGNITIVE CONTROL 
1
 
Cognitive control theories predict enhanced conflict adaptation after 
punishment, either on the basis of the negative valence (Botvinick, 2007) or 
on the basis of increased arousal (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). However, no 
such effect was found in previous work (Stürmer et al., 2011). In the present 
study, we demonstrate in a flanker task how behavioural adjustments 
following punishment signals are highly dependent on punishment 
sensitivity (as measured by the Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) scale): 
Whereas low punishment-sensitive participants do show increased conflict 
adaptation after punishment, high punishment-sensitive participants show 
no such modulation. Interestingly, participants with a high punishment-
sensitivity did show an overall reaction time increase after punishments. 
Our results stress the role of individual differences in explaining 
motivational modulations of cognitive control.  
                                                     
1
 Braem, S., Duthoo, W., & Notebaert, W. (revision submitted). Punishment predicts 
the impact of punishment on cognitive control. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The subject of cognitive control, the ability to monitor our 
environment and adapt to ever-changing contexts, has been of increasing 
interest to psychologists over the past decades. However, the interactions 
between cognitive-control mechanisms and motivational variables are not 
well understood. Previous studies have demonstrated how overall conflict 
processing (Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010), as well as adaptations to 
conflict (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Stürmer, Nigbur, 
Schacht, & Sommer, 2011), can be enhanced after reward. While we have 
these first notions on the role of reward in modulating cognitive control, the 
influence of punishment on conflict adaptation remains unclear. However, 
we encounter negative feedback all the time (e.g., annoying computer beeps 
indicating wrong key presses) and it is important to understand how these 
signals interact with cognitive processes. In the present study, we set out to 
investigate if, how, and when, punishment can modulate trial-to-trial 
adaptations to cognitive conflict. 
In research on cognitive control, conflict tasks are typically used. In 
the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), for example, in which the central 
target is presented together with either congruent (> > >) or incongruent (> 
< >) flankers, participants respond faster and more accurately on congruent 
trials compared to incongruent trials (i.e., the flanker effect). Interestingly, 
Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) observed that there was a smaller 
flanker effect after incongruent than after congruent trials (termed the 
conflict adaptation or Gratton effect). There are a number of different 
frameworks dealing with this Gratton effect and we will discuss three of the 
most prominent theoretical models. These models all differ in describing the 
exact mechanics for explaining the Gratton effect, and the role of 
motivational variables there-in. Interestingly, however, all three models 
predict a similar modulation by punishment.   
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According to the Conflict Monitoring Theory (CMT, Botvinick, 2007; 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), conflict, as an aversive 
signal (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012a; Fritz & Dreisbach, in press; Schouppe, 
De Houwer, Ridderinkhof, & Notebaert, 2012), is detected by the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC) which triggers subsequent behavioural adaptation by 
enhancing focus to task-relevant information, implemented by the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. The CMT suggests that the aversiveness of 
cognitive conflict is what drives conflict adaptation (Botvinick, 2007). In 
support of this view, stressing the importance of negative valence in 
bringing about adaptations to conflict, van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel 
(2009, 2010, 2012) demonstrated how positive affect can counteract the 
Gratton effect. Therefore, a similar but aversive teaching signal would add 
to this signal (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010, 2012) and thereby 
enhance conflict adaptation, resulting in a more pronounced Gratton effect.  
As an alternative account of cognitive control, the adaptation-by-
binding account (ABBA) of Verguts and Notebaert (2009) suggests that 
conflict strengthens currently active connections. In this model, an arousal 
signal is sent throughout the brain upon the detection of cognitive conflict 
(Compton, Arnstein, Freedman, Dainer-Best, & Liss, 2010), which 
strengthens, through Hebbian learning, all active task-relevant connections. 
By binding these associations after conflict, a smaller congruency effect will 
occur on the following trial, reflected in the Gratton effect (Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008, 2009). The ABBA predicts that arousing stimuli, 
irrespective of their valence, would help to increase adaptations following 
conflict (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Therefore, this account also 
hypothesizes that punishment signals would enhance the Gratton effect.  
While both the CMT and ABBA focus on reactive control (adjusting 
information processing after the detection of conflict), Braver, Gray and 
Burgess (2007) make a distinction between proactive and reactive modes of 
cognitive control (Dual Mechanisms of Control or DMC, see also Braver, 
2012). Whereas proactive control refers to a more anticipatory mode of 
138     CHAPTER 5 
cognitive control, where priorities are set before the occurrence of the 
cognitive conflict, reactive control refers to the mode of control driven by 
situational events, for example, the trial-by-trial adaptations to cognitive 
conflict as described above. This dissociation is important, because the 
DMC predicts that the proactive and reactive modes of cognitive control are 
differentially affected by motivational variables. Specifically, the DMC 
framework predicts that rewards promote proactive control, while 
punishments enhance reactive control (Braver, 2012; Braver, Paxton, Locke, 
& Barch, 2009; Locke & Braver, 2008). Therefore, conceptualizing the 
Gratton effect as a manifestation of reactive control, we can again predict 
that punishments will enhance adaptations to conflict. 
However, although all three models seem to predict a similar 
modulation by punishment, a first study investigating the modulation of the 
Gratton effect by punishment signals (Stürmer et al., 2011) showed no 
modulation, whereas reward signals effectively enhanced the Gratton effect 
(see also Braem et al., 2012). Interestingly, Stürmer et al. (2011) observed 
an overall reaction time increase after punishments, rather than increased 
conflict adaptation. This suggests that punishment distracted participants 
from the task, similar to what happens after participants make an error 
(Houtman, Núñez Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012; Notebaert et al., 2009). 
Consequently, it is possible that punishments are perceived as too salient, 
slowing down subsequent performance rather than increasing task focus.  
As a first test of this hypothesis, we take individual differences in 
sensitivity to punishment into account. As recently stressed in a review on 
the influence of emotion and motivation on cognitive conflict (Kanske, 
2012), individual differences in sensitivity to emotional or motivational 
stimuli have a major impact on how such signals modulate conflict 
processing. Therefore, we hypothesized that the influence of punishment on 
performance should vary as a function of punishment sensitivity. In order to 
assess punishment sensitivity in the present study, we administered the BIS- 
(Behavioural Inhibition System) and BAS-scales (Behavioural Activation 
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System; Carver & White, 1994), which have proven to be valuable tools in 
predicting how individual differences in punishment or reward sensitivity 
can modulate motivational effects on cognition (e.g., Amodio, Master, Yee, 
& Taylor, 2008; Boksem, Tops, Kostermans, & De Cremer, 2008; Boksem, 
Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Braem et al., 2012; Cavanagh, 
Frank, & Allen, 2010; De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono, 2010; Hickey, 
Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b; van Steenbergen et al., 2009). Specifically, 
we predicted that increased cognitive control following punishment would 
be restricted to participants that are not highly sensitive to punishment, 
while participants that are scoring high on BIS will probably not benefit or 
learn from punishments, and, if anything, show a decrease in task 
performance.  
To this end, we opted to use exactly the same design as in our reward 
study (Braem et al., 2012), in which a four-choice colour flanker experiment 
was combined with reward signals on 25 % of the trials. Yet, instead of 
these rewards, we now presented punishments. Participants were informed 
that 25 % of the trials could be punished. This was to keep punishment 
expectations similar across participants. Yet, when participants responded 
very fast and accurate, a punishment could be avoided. This implementation 
of punishments ensures that punishment signals are randomly distributed, 
but still performance-contingent. In our opinion, this schedule is preferable 
to a punishment schedule where the 25% slowest responses are punished (as 
used in Stürmer et al., 2012) where it can be difficult to disentangle the 
direct effects of punishment presentation versus the impact of previous task 
performance.  
Furthermore, we chose to present punishment signals without an 
inherent affective value (we presented "-1", denoting the loss of a point in 
the participants’ score). This was to ensure that we were investigating the 
modulation of cognitive control by punishment, rather than negative affect 
(i.e., by presenting a negative smiley as a punishment signal, our effect of 
punishment could be confounded with an effect of negative affect that is not 
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punishment-induced). As argued in our previous reward study (Braem et al., 
2012), affective and reinforcement signal modulations of cognitive control 
should be distinguished from one another (see also Berridge and Robinson, 
2003; Chiew and Braver, 2011). For example, where we observed an 
enhancement of the Gratton effect after reward, the studies of van 
Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2012) demonstrated a reduced Gratton effect after 
positive affect (for a review on this differential impact of affective and 
reinforcement signals on conflict adaptation, see Dreisbach & Fischer, 
2012b).  
In sum, we administered a flanker task with performance-contingent 
punishment signals and verified whether punishment sensitivity, as 
measured by the BIS-scale, modulated punishment-induced modulations of 
cognitive control. 
 
METHOD 
Participants  
Twenty-six students took part in return for credits or 6€ (range = 18-
21 years, 22 female, 22 right-handed) based on their written informed 
consent with approval of the local ethical committee and according to the 
Declaration of Helsinki.  
 
Stimuli and Material  
The flanker stimuli consisted of three horizontally aligned, centrally 
presented squares that were printed in one of the four possible colours 
(green, yellow, blue or red). Both flankers had either the same (congruent: 
e.g., red-red-red) or a different (incongruent: e.g., blue-red-blue) colour than 
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the central square. The stimuli were presented on a Pentium, with the use of 
Tscope software (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 
2006). A hand response box was used to register the responses. 
 
Procedure and Design 
Participants were asked to respond to the colour of the central square 
by pressing one of the four horizontally aligned response buttons, using their 
index and middle fingers. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of four 
response mappings, which were created by shifting the colour-to-button 
assignment. After a practice block of 48 trials, participants performed 14 
experimental blocks of 48 trials. For each experimental block, an equal 
number of congruent and incongruent trials were presented in a random 
order: 25% of the trials were punishment trials, which were randomized for 
the congruent and incongruent trials separately. Between blocks, 
participants were allowed a self-paced break during which they could see 
their updated score. For every ten participants, the participant with the best 
score received a store coupon worth 10€. Each subject started with a score 
of 300 points and could only lose points on punishment trials, as indicated 
by feedback presentation in the form of "-1". Hence, whenever seeing "-1" 
participants knew that they just lowered their chances of winning a store 
coupon. There was no option to gain points. All participants were truthfully 
instructed about this reinforcement schedule.  
First, a fixation cross was presented for 500 milliseconds, after which 
the target and flanker stimuli were presented and remained on the screen 
until the participant responded. The maximum response time was 1000 
milliseconds. On punishment trials, the participant was given feedback in 
the form of “-1” centrally presented on the screen for 500 milliseconds, 
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unless he or she responded correctly faster than 350 milliseconds
2
. In the 
latter case, or after a “no-punishment” trial, a blank screen was presented for 
500 milliseconds. Finally, a blank screen was presented for 1000 
milliseconds, whereupon the next trial started.  
 
Questionnaires 
Immediately after the experiment, participants completed the 
Behavioural Inhibition System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS) 
Scales (Carver & White, 1994). This took the form of 20 questions, such as 
"I feel worried when I think I have done poorly at something important" and 
"When I get something I want, I feel excited and energized", respectively 
examining punishment and reward sensitivity. Seven items score 
punishment sensitivity, averaged into a BIS-score, for which higher values 
indicate higher punishment sensitivity. The thirteen remaining items all 
score reward sensitivity (BAS-score), sometimes divided into its three 
subscales: BAS Reward Responsiveness (5 items), BAS Drive (4 items), and 
BAS Fun (4 items). A higher value on these scales indicates a higher form 
of reward sensitivity. 
                                                     
2
 Although participants knew from the instructions that the punishment signals were 
performance-contingent, we wanted to ensure that participants also experienced 
those as such. In the reward version of this experiment (Braem et al., 2012), people 
missed out on their reward on 10 % of the potential rewarding trials. We believe that 
this 10 % is enough for participants to feel that their reinforcement signals are 
performance-contingent. Therefore, we aimed at enabling participants to escape their 
punishments in 10 % of the trials. In this light, the 350 milliseconds deadline was 
chosen, because earlier versions of this experiment (Braem et al., 2012) showed that 
only 10% of the responses were faster than 350 milliseconds. Indeed, also in the 
present experiment, participants were faster than 350 milliseconds on only 10.8% of 
the trials. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
One participant was excluded from the analysis because of a mean 
accuracy (= 0.45) two standard deviations below the group average (M = 
0.76; SD = 0.12). Trials following an error and the first trial of each block 
were removed from further analyses (24.5% of the trials). Also, trials 
following a trial where the response time (RT) was faster than 350 
milliseconds were also excluded (another 8.4% of the remaining trials) to 
ensure that the effect of previous feedback was not confounded with 
previous RT (trials faster than 350 milliseconds were never punished). For 
the RT analyses, errors were also excluded  (13.2% of the remaining trials) 
and from these remaining trials, RT outliers (± 2SD of the mean reaction 
time calculated per subject) were removed (2.2%). This means that a total of 
48.3% of the trials were excluded for the RT analyses, primarily due to the 
relatively high error rate (24%) in this experiment. This observed error rate 
is clearly higher than the reward version of our experiment (10%, Braem et 
al. 2012). Conversely, reaction times were substantially faster (480 ms) in 
our punishment experiment, as compared to the reward experiment (530 
ms). We believe that this main difference in task performance represents an 
important dissociation in response strategy elicited by the different reward 
and punishment conditions (see also, Gomez & Mclaren, 1997; Locke & 
Braver, 2008). However, excluding this high number of trials did not 
influence our main findings (removing the two participants with less than 
ten data points in one condition from the analyses did not change the 
significance of our main correlation).  
Next, we carried out an ANOVA with three within-subject factors 
(congruency, previous congruency and previous feedback), with RTs and 
error rates as dependent variables. We observed a significant congruency 
effect, F(1,24) = 72.706, p < .001, which interacted with previous 
congruency, F(1,24) = 26.053, p < .001, indicating a significant overall 
Gratton effect of 17 ms (as calculated by subtracting the congruency effect 
after incongruent trials from the congruency effect after congruent trials). 
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Although the Gratton effect after punishments was numerically larger than 
the Gratton effect after no-punishment trials (23 vs. 12 ms, respectively), 
this modulation did not reach significance, F(1,24) = 1.682, p > .1. The error 
rates only showed a significant congruency effect, F(1,24) = 14.698, p < .01. 
It could be argued that the feedback presentation on punishment trials 
(versus blank screen on no-punishment trials) in our experiment might have 
counteracted an overall modulation of the Gratton effect. However, our 
findings are in line with the study of Stürmer et al. (2011), who did present 
feedback after neutral trials. Furthermore, in our previous study (Braem et 
al., 2012), we ran two control studies that demonstrated how infrequent 
irrelevant stimulus presentations (vs. no visual stimulation) during the inter-
trial interval did not modulate adaptations to conflict.  
Next, we wanted to investigate how individual differences in 
punishment sensitivity (as measured by the BIS-scale) modulate the effect of 
punishment on conflict adaptation. To this end, we included the three 
covariates BIS-score, BAS-score, and mean (correct) reaction time, in our 
overall ANOVA. While the BIS- and BAS-scores were included to 
investigate the influence of punishment and reward sensitivity, respectively, 
the inclusion of mean reaction time as a covariate was mainly to control for 
individual differences in sensory-motor variability. As predicted, the 
analysis demonstrated a significant interaction with previous feedback, 
previous congruency, current congruency and the covariate BIS, F(1,21) = 
5.833, p < .05, but not with BAS, nor mean reaction time (both F's < 1), 
suggesting that our main result of interest could not be explained by 
differences in reward sensitivity or overall response speed between 
participants. The relation between BIS and cognitive control is depicted in 
Figure 1, where the correlation between the modulation of the Gratton effect 
(as calculated by subtracting the Gratton effect after no-punishment trials 
from the Gratton effect after punishment trials) and participants' punishment 
sensitivity (ρ = -.410, p < .05) is plotted. No Spearman’s rho correlations 
were observed with the BAS-scale, any of its subscales, or mean reaction 
time (all p > .1). Both the correlation with BIS and the Gratton effect after 
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punishment, ρ = -.310, p = .131 as well as the correlation with BIS and the 
Gratton effect after no-punishment trials, ρ = .327, p = .110, did not reach 
significance, suggesting that punishment sensitivity specifically correlated 
with the difference in behavioural modulation following punishment and no-
punishment trials. 
 
 
Figure 1. The scatter plot shows the correlation between individual scores on the BIS scale 
and the difference in Gratton effects. 
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To further investigate the role of punishment sensitivity in the 
modulation of the Gratton effect, we decided to split up our subjects in a 
low and high punishment-sensitive group by means of a median-split 
analysis on participants' BIS-score: participants with a BIS-score lower than 
24 were assigned to the low punishment-sensitive group and participants 
with a BIS-score of 24 or higher were assigned to the high punishment-
sensitive group. Note that the mean BIS-score (20.2) for the low 
punishment-sensitive group is actually similar to the average BIS-scores 
collected from large community samples, which are typically between 19 
and 22 (Johnson, Turner, & Iwata, 2003; Jorm et al., 1998). The mean BIS-
score (25) for the high punishment-sensitive group on the other hand, can be 
considered relatively high. Next, we re-analysed our data with punishment 
sensitivity as a between-subjects factor. 
In line with the observed correlation, we found a four-way interaction 
between congruency, previous congruency, previous feedback, and 
punishment sensitivity in reaction times, F(1,23) = 5.991, p < .05. 
Interestingly, the error rates showed a similar trend, F(1,23) = 3.253, p = 
.084. Moreover, a marginally significant effect hinted at a second 
modulation of punishment sensitivity on the main effect of previous 
feedback, F(1,23) = 3.571, p = .071, indicating slowing after punishment in 
the high punishment-sensitive group, but not in the low punishment-
sensitive group. No other effects of punishment sensitivity were observed 
(all ps > .1).  
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Figure 2. The reaction times for each punishment-sensitive group separately. The figure 
demonstrates how punishment helps in adapting to conflict, for low punishment-sensitive 
people, while people high in punishment sensitivity slow down after punishment. The error 
bars are ± 1 standard error. 
In order to gain further insight in these behavioural differences 
between both punishment sensitivity groups, we conducted ANOVAs for 
each punishment sensitivity group separately. As depicted in Figure 2, the 
low punishment-sensitive group showed a modulation of the Gratton effect, 
F(1,11) = 5.159, p < .05: the Gratton effect after punishment trials (33 ms) 
was more pronounced than the Gratton effect after no-punishment trials 
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(2 ms; this absence of a Gratton effect after no-punishment trials will be 
discussed in the general discussion). The high punishment-sensitive group, 
on the contrary, showed an overall significant Gratton effect, F(1,12) = 
11.305, p < .01, that was not modulated by previous feedback, F(1,12)  < 1. 
However, a main effect of previous feedback indicated that the high 
punishment-sensitive group did show a general slowing after punishments, 
F(1,12) = 7.309, p < .05, whereas the low punishment-sensitive group did 
not, F(1,11) < 1. The modulation of the Gratton effect per punishment-
sensitivity group in the error rates, as well as each Gratton effect separately, 
garnered no significant results in both conditions, but followed a 
numerically similar trend as the reaction times, as summarized in Table 1.  
Alternatively, instead of exploring the four-way interaction between 
congruency, previous congruency, previous feedback, and punishment 
sensitivity, by looking at the separate punishment-sensitivity groups, we also 
performed analyses on the effects of punishment sensitivity on the Gratton 
effect, after punishment and no-punishment trials separately. The Gratton 
effect after punishment was not significantly larger in the low punishment-
sensitive than in the high punishment-sensitive group, F(1,23) = 2.546, p = 
.124. After no-punishment trials, however, the Gratton effect was 
significantly smaller in the low punishment-sensitive group than in the high 
punishment-sensitive group, F(1,23) = 5.538, p = .028. This interaction hint 
at differences in the respective Gratton effects. Therefore, we tested the 
Gratton effects in all four conditions separately. Interestingly, the Gratton 
effect after punishment in the high punishment-sensitive group did not reach 
significance, F(1,12) = 3.069, p = .105, while the same Gratton effect in the 
low punishment-sensitive group did, F(1,11) = 10.883, p < .01. Specifically, 
post-hoc t-tests showed a significant slow-down (17 ms) of congruent trials 
after punished incongruent trials, t(12) = 5.042, p < .001, as compared to 
after punished congruent trials. The decrease in reaction times on 
incongruent trials after punished incongruent trials (17 ms) in the low 
punishment-sensitive group, t(12) = 1.659, p = .125, did not reach 
significance. The Gratton effect after no-punishment trials in the high 
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punishment-sensitive group was significant, F(1,12) = 15.121, p < .01, while 
this Gratton effect in the low punishment-sensitive group was not, F(1,11) < 
1. Specifically, in the high punishment-sensitive group a significant slow-
down (12 ms) of congruent trials after unpunished incongruent trials was 
observed, t(12) = 4.276, p < .01, as well as a marginally significant speed-up 
(9 ms) of incongruent trials after unpunished incongruent trials, t(12) = 
2.048, p = .063.  
 
Table 1. Mean error rate (%) as a function of previous congruency, current congruency and 
preceding feedback for each punishment sensitivity group differently.  
 low punishment-sensitive 
group 
 
high punishment-sensitive 
group 
n-
1 
n 
after 
punishment 
after 
no-punishmen
t 
after 
punishment 
after 
no-punishmen
t 
C C 16.8 19.5 18.5 15.0 
I 25.4 23.3 21.9 22.1 
I C 21.6 19.8 13.6 17.3 
I 22.9 23.4 24.4 21.5 
Note: C = congruent; I = incongruent; n - 1 = preceding trial; n = current trial. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In line with previous studies (Stürmer et al., 2011), a group analysis 
of the current study suggested that punishment signals do not influence 
adaptations to conflict. However, by taking into account individual 
differences in punishment sensitivity, we have demonstrated how 
punishment can have an effect on cognitive control, depending on the 
punishment’s perceived severity. Participants low in punishment-sensitivity 
showed an enhanced Gratton effect after punished trials. Participants high in 
punishment-sensitivity showed no such modulation. Instead, highly 
punishment-sensitive participants slowed down after punishments. 
Our results clearly stress the importance of taking into account 
individual differences when studying the role of motivational variables in 
modulating cognitive control (Kanske, 2012). Especially when investigating 
motivational or emotional influences on cognitive control, individual 
differences in sensitivity can help expose underlying mechanisms of how 
these variables influence cognitive adaptations (e.g., Amodio, Master, Yee, 
& Taylor, 2008; Boksem, Tops, Kostermans, & De Cremer, 2008; Boksem, 
Tops, Wester, Meijman, & Lorist, 2006; Braem et al., 2012; Cavanagh, 
Frank, & Allen, 2010; De Pascalis, Varriale, & D’Antuono, 2010; Hickey, 
Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b; van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). 
For example, using electrophysiological recordings, De Pascalis, Varriale, 
and D’Antuono (2010) demonstrated a higher feedback-related negativity 
following punishments as a function of participants' BIS-score. Boksem, 
Tops, Kostermans, and De Cremer (2008) investigated the influence of 
punishment sensitivity (as measured by the BIS-scale) on behavioural 
adaptations after punished performance errors and demonstrated how high 
punishment-sensitive people show more slowing after punishments than low 
punishment-sensitive people do. Our results add to these findings by 
demonstrating that punishments can also promote adaptive behaviour, as 
long as people are not too sensitive to punishments. 
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Surprisingly, in the low punishment-sensitive group, the modulation 
of the Gratton effect was not only reflected in a larger Gratton effect after 
punishments, but also an absent Gratton effect after no-punishment trials. 
This finding is in line with earlier studies investigating motivational effects 
on cognitive control, in that these studies also demonstrated how the 
motivationally less significant condition is not the neutral and constant 
baseline as sometimes assumed (e.g., Braem et al., 2012; Hickey, Chelazzi, 
& Theeuwes, 2010a; 2011; Muhle-Karbe & Krebs, 2012). Instead, by 
introducing a motivationally significant reinforcement signal, a context is 
created where both punishment and no-punishment trials receive an 
informative value: by increasing the motivational value of punishment trials 
the value of no-punishment trials is simultaneously decreased. 
At first sight, our findings might sound counterintuitive in suggesting 
that higher sensitivity to a reinforcement signal is associated with lower 
benefits of this reinforcement signal on task-adaptive behavior. Instead, 
task-performance seems to be impeded, rather than promoted after 
punishment for high punishment-sensitive people. Therefore, we believe our 
results might reflect the right hand side of an inverted-U shaped function 
between punishment saliency and task performance. Too often, existing 
theories of cognitive psychology assume a linear, more-is-better effect of 
cognitive variables (e.g., medication, reward, working memory capacity, 
etc.) on performance, whereas both empirical progress (Grant & Schwartz, 
2011) and evolution theory (Hills & Hertwig, 2011) have indicated it is wise 
to assume a curvilinear, inverted U-shape function. Our findings corroborate 
this idea: by taking into account punishment sensitivity, we demonstrated 
how we are able to flexibly adapt our behaviour after punishments, as long 
as they don't overwhelm us. 
Specifically, our findings could be framed within the Yerkes-Dodson 
law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), which suggests that there is an inverted U-
shaped relation between arousal and task performance. Reinforcement 
signals that are too arousing will decrease, rather than increase, task 
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performance. We can interpret our data as an extension of the Yerkes-
Dodson law, in the sense that not only general task performance is 
modulated by a curvilinear function of arousal, but also cognitive control is 
(i.e., trial-to-trial adaptations to conflict). This, however, does not mean that 
our findings can exclusively be explained in terms of the ABBA, which 
describes adaptations to conflict as a function of (conflict-induced) arousal. 
In fact, the arousing value of a punishment might as well directly impact the 
experienced aversiveness (Botvinick, 2007) or the saliency with which it 
will promote reactive control (Braver, 2012).  
We suggest that for the low punishment-sensitive group of 
participants that showed an enhanced Gratton effect following punishment 
signals, punishments induced the appropriate levels of saliency for 
increasing cognitive control. This modulation could reflect an enhanced 
strengthening of task relevant associations (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 
2009), a modulation of task attention (Botvinick et al., 2001; Botvinick, 
2007), or a shift from a more proactive to a more reactive control modus 
(Braver et al., 2009), after punishment. However, participants highly 
sensitive to punishment showed no modulation of the Gratton effect after 
punishment, suggesting that arousal levels were too high to modulate 
cognitive control processes. These participants showed an overall increase 
in response latencies following punishment. This finding is in line with 
Stürmer et al. (2011). Similarly, Padmala, Bauer, and Pessoa (2011) showed 
how arbitrarily presenting highly arousing negative pictures (i.e., pictures of 
mutilated corpses) in between Stroop trials, elicited an overall reaction time 
slowing, and even a reduced conflict adaptation effect.  
The overall differential influence of punishment and reward signals, 
in that reward signals modulate adaptations to conflict (Braem et al., 2012; 
Stürmer et al., 2011) while punishment signals do not (Stürmer et al., 2011; 
our overall analysis), could also be attributed to a difference in arousal 
levels induced by both reinforcement signal types. For example, keeping 
everything else equal, Gomez and McLaren (1997) systematically examined 
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the effects of reward and punishment signals and demonstrated how 
punishment schedules (as opposed to reward schedules) induced higher 
overall arousal levels, as measured by the skin conductance response. 
Similarly, comparing appetitive with aversive motivational systems, Tranel 
(1983) demonstrated how the latter was associated with an increased skin 
conductance response, while the former was not. These findings are also 
consistent with the more general idea of a negativity bias, which relates to 
the finding that people tend to pay more attention and give more weight to 
negative, as compared to positive, experiences (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001).  
In fact, this apparent different impact of rewards and punishments 
may reflect a similar difference observed between post-conflict and post-
error behavioural adjustments. While cognitive conflict seems to help task 
focus, errors elicit an orienting response, causing an overall slowing rather 
than enhanced performance (Notebaert & Verguts, 2011). Interestingly, both 
post-error and post-conflict processes have been linked to arousal (e.g., Carp 
& Compton, 2009; Compton, Arnstein, Freedman, Dainer-Best, & Liss, 
2010; Notebaert et al., 2009; Nunez Castellar, Kühn, Fias, & Notebaert, 
2010, Verguts & Notebaert, 2009), yet conflict-induced arousal, although 
reliable, seems to be substantially smaller than error-induced arousal 
(Compton, Arnstein, Freedman, Dainer-Best, & Liss, 2010). Similar to error 
processing, we suggest that people highly sensitive to punishment may have 
experienced a short-lived orienting response (Notebaert et al., 2009) towards 
the punishment signal, but away from the task, reflecting a failure to 
disengage from the punishment. Analogously, it has been demonstrated that 
high punishment-sensitive people attend longer to aversive stimuli and have 
difficulty disengaging attention from these stimuli (Poy, Eixarch, & Ávila, 
2004).  
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 CHAPTER 6 
NO PAIN, NO GAIN: THE BIVALENT AFFECTIVE NATURE 
OF COGNITIVE CONFLICT
1
 
The cognitive control theory of Botvinick (2007) integrates cognitive 
and affective control processes by emphasizing the aversive nature of 
cognitive conflict. Using an affective priming paradigm, we replicate earlier 
results showing that conflict is indeed perceived as aversive (Dreisbach & 
Fischer, 2012). Importantly, in two experiments we show that this negative 
affect switches into positive affect after responding successfully to a 
conflict-inducing stimulus. Furthermore, in a control experiment, we 
demonstrate that this positive affect only occurs after resolving conflict, and 
not merely after correctly responding to difficult trials. The results are 
discussed in light of a computational model (Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 
2011) in which it is assumed that outcome expectancies are more negative 
for incongruent trials than congruent trials. Hence, the reward after 
successful completion is larger for incongruent than congruent trials. These 
findings divulge a novel perspective on cognitive adaptations to conflict. 
                                                     
1
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive control models have developed from ‘cold’ models, 
assigning no role to affective modulations (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; 
Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977), to models integrating cognition and emotion (e.g., Botvinick, 2007; 
Gray, 2004; Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). An integration between both 
domains is supported by numerous neuroimaging studies, showing for 
instance that the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC), an area thought to be 
a central node in the cognitive control network (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen, 2001), is also activated during the experience of negative 
affect and pain (for a review see Shackman et al., 2011). 
Cognitive control studies typically use congruency tasks to investigate 
the processing of, and adaptation to conflict (e.g., flanker task, Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974; Stroop task, Stroop, 1935; Simon task, Simon, 1969). In 
these tasks, conflict is induced by competition of a task-relevant dimension 
with an irrelevant to-be-ignored stimulus feature. For instance, in the Stroop 
task, participants have to name the ink colour of a word (relevant 
dimension), while ignoring the meaning of the word (irrelevant dimension). 
The processing of this irrelevant dimension can facilitate task performance 
when being congruent with the relevant dimension, as when the word 
meaning and ink colour correspond (e.g., ‘RED’ in red ink). On incongruent 
trials, however, there is a mismatch between word meaning and ink colour 
(e.g., ‘RED’ in blue ink), inducing a cognitive conflict that impedes task 
performance. Interestingly, it has recently been suggested that such conflicts 
between processing dimensions are aversive and thus evoke negative 
affective reactions (Botvinick, 2007; Corr, 2008). Furthermore, Botvinick 
(2007) suggested that this aversive nature of conflict triggers subsequent 
behavioural adaptations. Consistently, van Steenbergen, Band, and Hommel 
(2009, 2010) demonstrated that cognitive adaptations after incongruent trials 
can be counteracted by positive mood.  
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Several recent studies support the notion of conflict aversiveness. 
Lynn, Riddle, and Morsella (2012) showed that participants reported a 
greater urge to quit the task at hand after incongruent Stroop trials, than after 
congruent Stroop trials. Similarly, in a colour Stroop task where participants 
had to let their computer avatar walk towards or away from the stimulus, 
Schouppe, De Houwer, Ridderinkhof, and Notebaert (2012) showed a 
reduction of the Stroop effect when participants had to walk away from the 
Stroop stimulus (relative to approaching), suggesting that, in the face of 
conflict, avoidance is the more likely response. Using a variation of the 
Simon task, Cannon, Hayes, and Tipper (2010) found that responding to 
response compatible stimuli evoked greater activity of the zygomaticus 
muscle (associated with smiling) than to response incompatible stimuli. 
They also reported the activity of the corrugator muscle (associated with 
frowning) and found a trend suggesting greater activity after incompatible 
reactions than compatible reactions (but see Schacht, Dimigen, & Sommer, 
2010, who failed to obtain such an effect). Similarly, Brouillet, Ferrier, 
Grosselin, and Brouillet (2011) used an affective priming paradigm, 
typically applied to measure the affective value of stimuli (Fazio, 2001), and 
showed that action compatible trials are indeed positively evaluated 
compared to action incompatible trials. In this task, participants evaluated 
the valence of target words (e.g., joy) that were preceded by graspable 
objects as primes. Participants were faster to evaluate positive (compared to 
negative) words, when the orientation of the handle of the object was 
compatible with the response hand for target evaluation. Dreisbach and 
Fischer (2012) recently also used an affective priming paradigm but with 
congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli as primes. Importantly, they found 
a negative affective priming effect after incongruent primes. Thus, although 
participants did not respond to the prime (i.e., Stroop) stimuli, they were 
faster to categorise a negative target word after an incongruent prime than 
after a congruent prime. Conversely, participants were slower to evaluate a 
positive target when it was preceded by an incongruent prime compared to a 
congruent prime. These results thus suggest that incongruent trials are 
indeed registered as more negative than congruent stimuli.  
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In their reward value and prediction model (RVPM) of the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC), Silvetti, Seurinck, and Verguts (2011) provided a 
neuro-computational account for the affective connotation of conflicting 
situations. They proposed that incongruent trials evoke negative prediction 
error signals (negative surprises) in the ACC due to the longer reaction 
times needed to respond to incongruent stimuli, and to the higher probability 
of an error response (see also Alexander & Brown, 2011). As a consequence 
of frequent negative prediction errors, the success (or reward) expectation 
evoked by an incongruent stimulus is lower than that evoked by a congruent 
one. Interestingly, the RVPM also predicts that once an incongruent trial is 
correctly solved, it evokes a positive prediction error signal (positive 
surprise) that is larger than on congruent trials. This model thus predicts a 
shift from a negative to a positive prediction error after conflict resolution 
(i.e., responding correctly to an incongruent stimulus), and interprets the 
conflict-related ACC activation as the conjoined effect of both negative and 
positive prediction error signals.  
Hence, the model predicts that cognitive tasks can induce both 
positive and negative evaluative signals. In line with this idea, Kennerley, 
Behrens, and Wallis (2011) showed that neurons in monkey ACC exhibit a 
switching response pattern within a trial. For example, if a neuron encodes 
reward probability positively during the cue period (higher probability, 
stronger response), it responds as an inverse function during positive 
feedback (higher probability, weaker response). Similarly, Satterthwaite et 
al. (2012) recently suggested that people experience intrinsic reinforcement 
during standard cognitive tasks, even in the absence of a reward 
manipulation. Using a working memory task, they demonstrated how the 
ventral striatum, known for its central role in motivation and reinforcement 
learning, responded to task performance as a function of task difficulty, in 
the sense that correct responses on more difficult trials resulted in higher 
ventral striatum activation. Furthermore, Molapour and Morsella (2010) 
observed that nonsense shapes that co-occurred with incongruent Stroop 
stimuli were preferred over shapes that co-occurred with congruent or 
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neutral Stroop stimuli. Crucially, and in contrast to the study of Dreisbach 
and Fischer (2012), participants had to respond to each Stroop stimulus. 
Responding to an incongruent Stroop stimulus allowed participants to 
resolve the cognitive conflict that was induced by this stimulus. As 
predicted by Silvetti et al. (2011), conflict resolution might result in a 
positive affective state, which would transfer to the shapes that were paired 
with incongruent Stroop stimuli. However, the findings of Molapour and 
Morsella provide at best indirect evidence for the potentially rewarding role 
of conflict resolution. We therefore set out to examine this issue more 
directly.  
In the first experiment, we wanted to replicate the findings of 
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) using a combination of a flanker task and an 
affective priming task. Each trial started with the presentation of a congruent 
or incongruent flanker (prime) stimulus that did not require a response. 
Congruent flanker stimuli consisted of arrows that all pointed in the same 
direction. In incongruent flanker stimuli, the central arrow pointed to a 
different direction than the other arrows. Immediately following the flanker 
stimulus, a positive or negative word was presented that had to be evaluated 
as positive or negative. Because observation is sufficient for conflict 
detection (van Schie, Mars, Coles, & Bekkering, 2004; Winkel et al., 2009, 
2012), we can assume that incongruent flanker trials would elicit conflict 
while congruent flanker primes would not. Moreover, to ensure that 
participants associated incongruent trials with conflict, a normal flanker task 
preceded each experimental block where participants did have to respond to 
the flanker stimuli. Similar to Dreisbach and Fischer, we predicted negative 
affective priming (i.e., relative to congruent primes, incongruent primes 
facilitate responding to negative targets).  
In the second experiment, participants first had to respond to the 
congruent and incongruent flanker stimulus (i.e., they were instructed to 
indicate the direction of the central arrow) before making an affective 
judgment. In this case, we predicted positive affective priming (i.e., relative 
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to congruent primes, incongruent primes facilitate responding to positive 
targets), because the conflict elicited by the incongruent primes had to be 
resolved.  
Furthermore, in order to verify that the difference in affective priming 
between Experiment 1 and 2 was due to conflict resolution rather than the 
mere act of responding to the primes, we conducted Experiment 3 in which 
participants made a similarity judgement to the prime stimuli (i.e., determine 
whether the flanker arrows point in the same direction as the central arrow). 
Hence, participants could respond to the primes without resolving the 
conflict induced by incongruent primes. If successful conflict resolution 
drives the positive affective priming effect, then we should not find a 
positive priming effect in the control experiment.  
In Experiment 4, we aimed at replicating the results of Experiment 2 
and extending it to a four-colour Stroop task. Participants had to indicate the 
ink colour of congruent (e.g., ‘RED’ in red ink) and incongruent (e.g., 
‘RED’ in blue ink) Stroop primes before making an affective judgement. As 
in Experiment 2, we predicted positive affective priming after responding to 
incongruent primes relative to congruent primes, thereby demonstrating how 
this effect is not specific to the flanker task alone. Moreover, by using an 
adapted version of the Stroop task (see also De Houwer, 2003; Schouppe et 
al., 2012; Van Veen & Carter, 2005), we could investigate to what extent the 
positive affective priming effect is specific to different types of conflict.  
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EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty right-handed students (18-23 years old; 2 men) at Ghent 
University initially participated in the study. Due to a misunderstanding of 
the response mapping instructions (as indicated by an error rate of more than 
45%), the data of seven participants (18-20 years old; all women) were 
removed from the analyses. These systematic misunderstandings of the 
response mapping are most probably due to the lack of a training phase. 
Moreover, there was no online feedback; therefore participants were not 
aware of using an incorrect response mapping. To ensure a correctly 
balanced design, 7 additional participants (18-21 years old; 1 men) were 
tested. All participants provided written informed consent and were paid or 
received course credits in return for participation.  
Stimuli 
The primes were flanker stimuli consisting of a vertical array of five 
arrows. The direction of the central arrow could either match (congruent 
prime) or mismatch (incongruent prime) the direction of the neighbouring 
arrows. Target stimuli (see Appendix, or Aarts, De Houwer, & Pourtois, 
2012) were positive and negative words, selected on the basis of a normative 
study involving affective ratings of 700 Dutch words (Hermans & De 
Houwer, 1994). 
Procedure 
Participants were told that their main task was to evaluate the valence 
of words that were preceded by flanker stimuli. Each trial started with a 
fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by a flanker stimulus for 400 ms, after 
which the affective word appeared. The affective word remained on the 
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screen until a response was given. The inter-trial interval was 1000 ms (see 
Figure 1).  
The experiment consisted of two experimental blocks of 360 trials, 
intermixed with self-paced breaks every 90 trials. In each block, each of the 
60 words was paired 4 times with a congruent flanker stimulus and 2 times 
with an incongruent stimulus. This frequency manipulation was adopted to 
increase the conflict elicited by an incongruent stimulus (Tzelgov, Henik, & 
Berger, 1992). To ensure that participants were aware of the conflict elicited 
by the incongruent flanker stimulus, a practice block of 40 trials involving 
only flanker stimuli (50% congruent, 50% incongruent) preceded each 
experimental block. In this practice block, a trial started with a fixation cross 
for 500 ms, after which a flanker stimulus appeared. This stimulus remained 
on the screen until a response was given or until a response deadline of 1000 
ms was exceeded. The inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. 
Each task (the flanker task and the affective judgment task) was 
assigned to a different hand. The task-to-hand mapping was counterbalanced 
across participants. When performing the affective judgment task with their 
left hand, participants pressed the ‘D’ key for positive words and the ‘S’ key 
for negative words. When using their right hand, they pressed the ‘L’ key 
for positive words and the ‘K’ key for negative words. In the flanker task, 
participants pressed the ‘E’ or ‘D’ key with their left hand (or ‘I’ or ‘K’ key 
with their right hand) when the central arrow pointed upwards or 
downwards respectively.  
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Figure 1. Trial procedure for Experiment 1 (left panel), Experiments 2 and 3 (middle panel) 
and Experiment 4 (right panel). The only difference between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 
concerns the instructions. In Experiment 2 participants were asked to respond to the direction 
of the central arrow in the array, in Experiment 3 participants had to determine whether the 5 
arrows in the array were similar to each other or not. 
 
Results 
Affective Priming Task 
Mean RTs and error rates for responses to the target words were 
analysed using a 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime congruency 
(congruent vs. incongruent) and target valence (positive vs. negative) as 
within-subjects factors. The first trial after each break was omitted. Also, 
trials following an error were excluded to avoid interfering effects of errors 
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on the affective judgement task (Aarts et al., 2012). For the RT analysis, 
errors (5%) were discarded. Also, trials with responses faster than 200 ms or 
slower than 2000 ms (< 1%) were excluded. For the error analysis, we used 
the arc sine square root transformation of the percentage of incorrect 
responses. This transformation was also used for the following error 
analyses of Experiment 2-4. 
Reaction times. We found a significant interaction between target 
valence and prime congruency, F(1, 19) = 4.52, p < .05, ηp² = .19. As 
depicted in Figure 2, this interaction indicated faster responses on positive 
targets, relative to negative targets, when preceded by a congruent flanker 
compared to an incongruent flanker. Paired t-tests (two-tailed) did not show 
a significant difference between congruent and incongruent primes on 
responses to positive targets, t(19) = 1.6, p > .1, ηp² = .11, and also not on 
responses to negative targets, t(19) = .3, p > .1, ηp² = .006. The main effects 
of prime congruency and target valence were not significant (all ps > .1).  
Error rates. In the analysis of the error rates, there was a marginally 
significant main effect of target valence, F(1, 19) = 4.0, p = .061, ηp² = .173, 
and a significant main effect of prime congruency, F(1, 19) = 7.6, p < .05, 
ηp²  = .29, indicating more errors on positive words and after congruent 
primes respectively. The interaction effect was not significant, F(1, 19) < 1, 
ηp² = .008 
 
Discussion  
Using a similar procedure as Dreisbach and Fischer (2012), we 
replicated the main finding of an interaction between prime congruency and 
target valence. Although the effects are relatively small (neither of the 
pairwise t-tests reached significance), the interaction indicates affective 
priming in the sense that congruent stimuli (relative to incongruent stimuli) 
prime responses to positive targets.  
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Figure 2. Mean reaction times (RT) for negative and positive word judgements after 
congruent and incongruent primes. The left panel of the figure demonstrates that congruent 
stimuli are preferred over incongruent stimuli when there is no response to these stimuli 
required (Experiment 1). When participants successfully resolved the conflict elicited by the 
prime stimuli, a preference for the incongruent stimuli was shown (Experiment 2). No 
preference emerged when participants correctly responded to the prime stimuli, but did not 
experience conflict (Experiment 3). Error bars are based on the mean square error of the 
interaction term (Loftus & Masson, 1994).  
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EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether a different affective priming 
pattern would emerge when participants successfully responded to the prime 
stimuli by indicating the direction of the central arrow. However, besides 
conflict resolution, an additional difference between Experiment 1 and 2 is 
the prime-to-target interval. Whereas it is constant across conditions in 
Experiment 1, it is systematically larger for the incongruent condition 
compared to the congruent condition in Experiment 2 (i.e., congruency 
effect on prime responses). To counter an explanation in terms of varying 
prime-to-target intervals, we analyzed the data with prime RT (50% fastest 
vs. 50% slowest responses) as an additional factor in the design. If the 
prime-to-target interval drives the priming effect, rather than prime 
congruency, we would expect an interaction between prime RT and valence 
where relatively fast prime RTs (whether congruent or incongruent) would 
have to produce negative priming. 
 
Method 
 Participants 
Twenty right-handed students (18-26 years old; 3 men) at Ghent 
University participated in Experiment 2. Due to a misunderstanding of the 
instructions (as indicated by an error rate of more than 45%), the data of 
three participants (18-21 years old; 1 men) could not be used for analyses. 
To ensure a correctly balanced design, three additional participants (18-21 
years old; all women) were tested. All participants provided written 
informed consent and were paid or received course credits in return for their 
participation.  
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Procedure 
Stimuli and trial procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to 
Experiment 1, except that participants first responded to the direction of the 
central arrow of the prime stimulus within a 1000 ms response deadline, 
before performing the affective judgment task (see Figure 1). The same 
response keys were used as in Experiment 1. The response to the prime 
stimuli and the response to the target stimuli were assigned to different 
hands. This task-to-hand mapping was counterbalanced across participants.  
Two experimental blocks of 360 trials were administered. The same 
frequency of congruency manipulation as in Experiment 1 was adopted. To 
ensure that participants understood the double task instructions, they could 
first familiarise themselves with the experiment in a practice block of 24 
trials. None of the target words used for these practice trials occurred in the 
experimental blocks.  
 
Results 
Prime Task 
Practice trials, first trials after each break and trials with RTs shorter 
than 200 ms were excluded. For the RT analysis, erroneous responses were 
discarded. RTs were faster on congruent trials (541 ms) compared to 
incongruent trials (643 ms), thus revealing a significant congruency effect of 
102 ms, t(19) = 11.9, p < .001, ηp² = .88. Overall, mean accuracies were 
94%. The error rates also demonstrated a significant congruency effect of 
4.2% (5.4% on incongruent trials vs. 1.2% on congruent trials), t(19) = 5.8, 
p < .001, ηp² = .64.  
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Affective Priming Task 
Mean RTs and error rates for responses on the target words were 
analysed using a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), target valence (positive vs. 
negative) and prime RT (50% fastest vs. 50% slowest prime responses; 
based on a median split on prime RTs for each congruency condition 
separately) as within-subjects factors. Practice trials, the first trial after each 
break and the first trial following an erroneous response were excluded. For 
the RT analysis, errors (9% target errors and 6% prime errors) were also 
discarded. Also, trials faster than 200 ms or slower than 2000 ms (2%) were 
excluded. 
Reaction times. Target RTs showed a main effect of prime RT, F(1, 
19) = 65.8, p < .001, ηp² = .78. Targets preceded by a fast prime response 
were responded to faster than targets preceded by a slow prime response. 
Also a marginally significant interaction between prime congruency and 
prime RT was found, F(1, 19) = 4.4, p = .050, ηp²  = .19, indicating a larger 
effect of prime congruency on target RTs when the target was preceded by a 
fast prime response compared to a slow prime response. Most importantly, 
the interaction between target valence and prime congruency was 
significant, F(1, 19) = 5.1, p < .05, ηp²  = .21, demonstrating that participants 
responded faster on negative targets, relative to positive targets, when 
preceded by a congruent flanker compared to an incongruent flanker (see 
also Figure 2). No other main and interaction effects were significant (all ps 
> .1). Crucially, the interaction between target valence and prime RT was 
not significant, F(1, 19) = 1.3, p > .1, suggesting that variability in prime-to-
target interval did not influence responses to positive and negative targets. 
Moreover, the interaction between target valence, prime congruency and 
prime RT was not significant, F(1, 19) < 1, indicating that the prime-to-
target interval did not modulate the obtained affective priming effect. 
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We zoomed further into the significant affective priming effect by 
means of paired t-tests (two-tailed). The results showed that negative words 
were faster responded to when preceded by a congruent prime than by an 
incongruent prime, t(19) = 2.6, p < .05, ηp² = .26. The nature of the prime 
did not influence responding to positive words, t(19) = 0.4, p > .1, ηp² = 
.009.  
The affective priming effect is exactly the reserve pattern as observed 
in Experiment 1 and Dreisbach and Fischer’s study (2012). This is also 
demonstrated by the 2 (prime congruency: congruent vs. incongruent) x 2 
(target valence: positive vs. negative) x 2 (experiment: 1 vs. 2) repeated-
measures ANOVA on mean RTs, showing a significant three-way 
interaction between target valence, prime congruency and experiment, F(1, 
38) = 8.9, p < .01, ηp² = .19.  
Error rates. The error rates showed a main effect of target valence, 
F(1, 19) = 4.8, p < .05, ηp² = .20, indicating more errors on trials with 
positive targets compared to trials with negative targets. All other main and 
interaction effects were not significant, all ps > .1.  
 
Discussion  
The results of Experiment 2 showed that correctly responding to 
incongruent trials is evaluated more positive than correctly responding to 
congruent trials. As there was a congruency effect of 102 ms in prime RTs, 
the average prime-target interval was approximately 100 ms shorter for 
congruent trials. However, the binary factor prime RT (with fast and slow 
prime trials that were separated on average 154 ms apart) did not show an 
influence on the priming effect, yielding an explanation in terms of different 
prime-target intervals unlikely.  
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EXPERIMENT 3 
As predicted, we observed positive affective priming after 
incongruent primes in Experiment 2, thereby contrasting the results of 
Experiment 1 and of Dreisbach and Fischer (2012). However, to further 
investigate whether the positive affective priming effect is due to resolving 
the conflict induced by incongruent primes, we conducted a control 
experiment that was identical to Experiment 2, except that participants now 
responded on the basis of the similarity of the direction of the central and 
flanker arrows. We can expect that participants are faster to determine that 
all arrows point in the same direction than to determine that the central and 
flanker arrows point in a different direction (i.e., similarity judgement effect, 
Nickerson, 1965). Therefore, the stimuli still vary in task difficulty, but no 
longer induce conflict. Hence, determining whether arrows point in a 
different direction does not require conflict resolution. If the positive 
affective priming effect after incongruent primes in Experiment 2 is caused 
by conflict resolution, we should not observe positive priming in 
Experiment 3. However, when the positive priming is caused by correctly 
responding to a more difficult stimulus, as predicted by the model of Silvetti 
et al. (2011), we should observe a similar positive priming effect for 
‘different’ responses.  
 
Method 
 Participants 
Twenty right-handed students (18-25 years old; 6 men) at Ghent 
University initially participated. Due to a misunderstanding of the 
instructions (as indicated by an error rate of more than 45%), the data of 
three participants could not be used for analyses (18-21 years old; all 
women). To ensure a correctly balanced design, three additional participants 
(18-24 years old, 1 men) were tested. All participants provided written 
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informed consent and were paid or received course credits in return for their 
participation.  
Procedure 
Experiment 3 was identical to Experiment 2, except that participants 
were instructed to determine whether all the arrows in the array pointed in 
the same direction or not. In Experiment 2 the key assignment of the flanker 
task (e.g., ‘up’ and ‘down’ responses) was kept constant. In Experiment 3 
however, the key-to-response mapping (same vs. different) of the similarity 
judgment task was also counterbalanced. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure that participants in Experiment 3 were 
aware of the fact that some prime stimuli induced conflict whereas others 
did not, they also completed a block of 40 trials with only flanker stimuli 
(50% congruent, 50% incongruent) immediately before each experimental 
block. In this flanker block, a trial started with the presentation of a fixation 
cross for 500 ms, after which a flanker stimulus appeared. This stimulus 
remained on the screen until a response was given or until a response 
deadline of 1000 ms was exceeded. The inter-trial interval was 1000 ms. 
 
Results 
Prime Task 
Practice trials, first trials after each break and trials with RTs shorter 
than 200 ms were excluded. For the RT analyses, erroneous responses were 
also discarded. Overall, mean accuracy for the prime task was 92%. Results 
revealed a significant similarity effect, both in RTs (65 ms), t(19) = 11.3, p 
< .001, ηp² = .87, and error rates (1.9%), t(19) = 2.7, p < .05, ηp² = .28, with 
faster and more accurate responses for same responses (554 ms; 3.8%), 
compared to different responses (619 ms; 5.7%).  
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Affective Priming Task 
Mean RTs and error rates for responses on the target words were 
analysed using a 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime 
congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), target valence (positive vs. 
negative) and prime RT (50% fastest vs. 50% slowest) as within-subjects 
factors. Practice trials, the first trial after each break and the first trial 
following an erroneous response were excluded. For the RT analyses, errors 
(9% target errors and 8% prime errors) were also discarded. Also, trials 
faster than 200 ms or slower than 2000 ms (2%) were excluded. 
RTs and error rates showed a main effect of target valence, however, 
the direction of this effect was opposite to what is typically found in 
affective priming studies. More specifically, we observed faster, F(1, 19) = 
7.5, p < .05, ηp² = .28, and more accurate, F(1, 19) = 6.1, p < .05, ηp² = .24,  
responses to negative targets than to positive targets. RTs also showed a 
main effect of prime RT, F(1, 19) = 30.3, p < .001, ηp² = .62, indicating that 
a fast prime response is followed by a fast target response. Furthermore, a 
marginally significant main effect of congruency was present in the error 
rates, F(1, 19) = 3.0, p = .098, ηp² = .14. All other main and interaction 
effects in the RT and error rate analyses did not reach significance (all ps > 
.1). 
Importantly, when comparing Experiment 2 to Experiment 3 we found 
a significant three-way interaction between prime congruency, target 
valence and experiment on mean RTs, F(1, 38) = 4.4, p < .05, ηp² = .10 (see 
also Figure 2), indicating that conflict resolution, rather than acting upon a 
difficult trial is critical for the positive priming effect obtained in 
Experiment 2. Furthermore, this control experiment also provides us with an 
extra test whether the different prime-to-target intervals between congruent 
and incongruent conditions drive the positive affective priming effect in 
Experiment 2, compared to Experiment 1. An affective priming effect 
similar to Experiment 1 would provide additional evidence that the prime-
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to-target interval is not critical in obtaining the reversed priming effect in 
Experiment 2. This was confirmed by the non-significant interaction 
between prime congruency, target valence and experiment (1 vs. 3), F < 1. 
Discussion  
The results of Experiment 3 did not show a significant affective 
priming effect, indicating that correctly responding to difficult trials, relative 
to easy trials, did not prime responses to positive targets. This suggests that 
conflict resolution is crucial for bringing about the positive affective 
priming effect of Experiment 2. 
 
EXPERIMENT 4 
We replicated the original observation of Dreisbach and Fischer 
(2012) in a flanker task, showing how incongruent stimuli can induce a 
negative affective priming effect (Experiment 1), suggesting that cognitive 
conflict is aversive. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that this effect turns 
into a positive affective priming effect when subjects respond to the prime 
stimuli. This effect turned out to be specific to conflict resolution 
(Experiment 3). In this final experiment, we aimed at replicating the positive 
affective priming effect after conflict resolution, using a four-colour Stroop 
task. By testing our hypothesis in a Stroop task, we were able to directly link 
back to the original observation of Dreisbach and Fischer (2012), who 
showed a negative affective priming effect after merely observing 
incongruent Stroop primes, compared to congruent Stroop primes. A 
reversal of this priming effect after responding to the Stroop primes would 
validate our conclusion that conflict resolution results in positive affect. 
Moreover, by mapping four colours to two responses we could distinguish 
between (1) congruent (CO) trials, in which the colour and the meaning of 
the word matched, (2) stimulus incongruent (SI) trials, in which the colour 
and the meaning of the word mismatched, but activated the same response, 
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and (3) response incongruent (RI) trials, in which the colour and the 
meaning of the word mismatched, and also activated a different response. SI 
and RI trials have been demonstrated to have dissociable effects on 
behaviour (e.g., Notebaert & Verguts, 2006; Schouppe et al., 2012) and 
brain activity (e.g., Van Veen & Carter, 2005). However, we believe both 
can have a similar effect on our affective priming task, since both types 
induce a cognitive conflict that needs to be resolved for efficient task 
performance.  
 
Method 
 Participants 
Thirty-two right-handed students (17-31 years old; 6 men) at Ghent 
University initially participated. Due to a misunderstanding of the 
instructions (as indicated by an error rate of more than 45%), the data of 
four participants could not be used for analyses (18-19 years old; 1 men). To 
ensure a correctly balanced design, four additional participants (18-19 years 
old, 1 men) were tested. All participants provided written informed consent 
and were paid or received course credits in return for their participation.  
Stimuli 
Prime stimuli now consisted of the Dutch words ‘BLAUW’, 
‘GROEN’, ‘ROOD’, or ‘GEEL’ (meaning blue, green, red, or yellow), 
presented in uppercase letters in a blue, green, red, or yellow font colour. 
Target stimuli were the same as in the preceding experiments. 
Procedure 
Experiment 4 was similar to Experiment 2, except that the prime 
conflict task was now a four-colour Stroop task, instead of an arrow flanker 
task. In a Stroop task, participants are instructed to respond to the ink colour 
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of a word, while ignoring its meaning. We used a Stroop task where four 
colours were mapped onto two responses (see De Houwer, 2003; Schouppe 
et al., 2012; Van Veen & Carter, 2005). For example, in one response 
mapping, participants were instructed to press the upper button when the ink 
colour was red or yellow, and the lower button when the colour was blue or 
green (stimuli-set to button assignment was counterbalanced across 
participants). In this way, we can create SI and RI stimuli. The former are 
stimuli where the ink colour differs from the colour word, but both colours 
are associated with the same response (e.g., the word ‘RED’ in yellow ink). 
In the latter, ink colour again differs from the colour word, but now both 
colours are associated with a different response (e.g., the word ‘RED’ in 
blue). One third of the trials were SI trials, another third of the trials were RI 
trials and a last third of the trials were CO trials, where the ink colour of the 
word corresponded to its meaning (e.g., ‘RED’ in red). To keep the possible 
stimulus combinations (combining stimulus colour and word meaning) 
constant across conditions (four per congruency type), only a subset of the 
eight possible RI stimuli was used. This subset was counterbalanced across 
participants. The trial procedure was identical to Experiment 2, except that 
participants now first responded to the ink colour with no response deadline, 
before performing the affective judgment task. The same response keys were 
used as in the preceding experiments. The response to the prime stimuli and 
the response to the target stimuli were assigned to different hands. This task-
to-hand mapping was also counterbalanced across participants. Altogether, 
each participant was randomly assigned to one of the eight versions of this 
experiment (counterbalancing stimuli-set to button assignment, task-to-hand 
mapping, and subset RI stimuli). 
Two experimental blocks of 360 trials were administered, intermixed 
with self-paced breaks every 90 trials. To ensure that participants 
understood the double task instructions, they could first familiarise 
themselves with the experiment in a practice block of 24 trials. None of the 
target words used for these practice trials occurred in the experimental 
blocks.  
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Results 
Prime Task 
Practice trials, first trials after each break and trials with RTs shorter 
than 200 ms were excluded. For the RT analyses, erroneous responses were 
also discarded. RTs showed an increase from CO trials to SI trials to RI 
trials. CO trials (736.5 ms) were significantly faster than SI trials (765.3 
ms), t(31) = 4.6, p < .001, ηp² = .41 and RI trials (810.7 ms), t(31) = 7.3, p < 
.001, ηp² = .63. Moreover, RTs on SI trials were significantly faster than on 
RI trials, t(31) = 4.7, p < .001, ηp² = .42. Overall, mean accuracy for the 
prime task was 96%. More errors were made on RI trials (5.3%), compared 
to CO trials (3.4%), t(31) = 3.9, p < .001, ηp² =  .33, and SI trials (2.8%), 
t(31) = 5.1, p < .001, ηp² = .46. Error rates did not differ significantly 
between CO and SI trials, t(31) = 1.1, p > .1, ηp² = .04.  
Affective Priming Task 
Mean RTs and error rates for responses on the target words were 
analysed using a 3 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with prime 
congruency (CO, SI, RI), target valence (positive vs. negative) and prime RT 
(50% slowest vs. 50% fastest) as within-subjects factors. Practice trials, the 
first trial after each break and the first trial following an erroneous response 
were excluded. For the RT analyses, errors (7% target errors and 4% prime 
errors) were also discarded. Also, trials faster than 200 ms and slower than 
2000 ms (1%) were excluded. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to the p-
values are used when the sphericity assumption was violated, but 
uncorrected degrees of freedom are reported for ease of reading. 
Reaction times. RTs showed a main effect of prime RT, F(1, 31) = 
164.2, p < .001, ηp² = .84, and a main effect of prime congruency, F(2, 62) = 
14.2, p < .001, ηp² = .31. Furthermore, the interaction between target valence 
and prime congruency was significant, F(2, 62) = 3.3, p < .05, ηp² = .10 (see 
Figure 3). All other main and interaction effects were not significant (all ps 
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> .1). Importantly, neither the interaction between prime RT and target 
valence, F(2, 62) < 1, nor the interaction between prime RT, target valence 
and prime congruency were significant, F(2, 62) = 2.1, p > .1.  
The significant target valence x prime congruency interaction was 
further investigated using contrast analyses. Firstly, there was no priming 
effect for RI over SI trials, F(1, 31) < 1. Secondly, a positive priming effect 
for SI primes over CO primes was shown, F(1, 31) = 6.6, p < .05, ηp² = .18. 
Paired t-tests (two-tailed) on this CO-SI priming effect showed that negative 
words were responded to faster when preceded by a CO prime than by a SI 
prime, t(19) = 3.0, p < .01, ηp² = .22, with no difference between the two 
prime conditions on positive words, t(19) < 1. Lastly, there was a positive 
affective priming effect for RI primes over CO primes, F(1, 31) = 4.6, p < 
.05, ηp² = .13. Looking into this CO-RI priming effect, results showed faster 
responses on negative targets when preceded by CO trials compared to RI 
trials, t(19) = 5.0, p < .001, ηp² = .448, as well as faster responses on positive 
targets when preceded by CO trials compared to RI trials, t(19) = 3.2, p < 
.01, ηp² = .25, yet the RT difference between prime conditions on positive 
targets is smaller than the difference between prime conditions on negative 
targets, thereby causing the positive affective priming effect.   
Error rates. There were no significant main or interaction effects 
found in the error rates, all ps > .1. 
 
Discussion  
Using an affective priming procedure where Stroop stimuli served as 
primes, Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) recently demonstrated the negative 
nature of incongruent stimuli. In Experiment 4, we used a similar procedure 
as Dreisbach and Fischer, with the only exception that participants were first 
asked to respond to the Stroop stimuli before making an affective 
judgement. Our results showed a reversed affective priming effect, thereby 
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replicating the results of Experiment 2 and confirming our conclusion that 
conflict resolution is associated with positive affect. Moreover, we showed 
that resolving both stimulus and response conflict induced this affective 
state. 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction times (RT) for negative and positive word judgements after CO, SI 
and RI primes. Error bars are based on the mean square error of the interaction term (Loftus 
& Masson, 1994). 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The hypothesis that conflict is aversive (Botvinick, 2007) has spurred 
a great deal of research. Whereas previous studies suggested that 
incongruent stimuli are affectively negative (Brouillet et al., 2011; Cannon 
et al., 2010; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Lynn et al., 2012; Schouppe et al., 
2012; van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010), our results suggest that conflict 
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resolution results in positive affect. Specifically, in Experiment 2 and 4 we 
found a positive affective priming effect after responding to incongruent 
primes, relative to responding to congruent primes. Furthermore, we did not 
find a similar positive evaluation in a control experiment in which 
participants also had to respond to the prime stimuli but did not need to 
resolve conflict, suggesting that conflict resolution is crucial.  
Our observed positive affective priming effect, induced by responding 
to incongruent trials, is consistent with the findings of Molapour and 
Morsella (2010) who demonstrated that participants expressed more liking 
towards nonsense shapes, when these shapes co-occurred with responding to 
incongruent, but not with responding to congruent or neutral Stroop stimuli. 
Their effect, as well as ours, could reflect a positive prediction error signal, 
following the initial outcome expectancy, that is lower for incongruent, than 
congruent stimuli (Silvetti et al., 2011). Our findings also concur with the 
recent interest of an affective dimension in cognitive tasks: whereas earlier 
research implied a strict division between cognitive and affective processing 
in ACC (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000), more extensive analyses demonstrated 
that affect (e.g., pain) related and conflict related brain areas overlap 
considerably (Shackman et al., 2011). In line with our conclusions on the 
positive aspect of conflict resolution, other studies have argued that relief 
from pain can also have a rewarding effect (Tanimoto, Heisenberg, & 
Gerber, 2004). For instance, Leknes, Lee, Berna, Andersson, and Tracey 
(2011) showed an activation overlap in ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 
rostral ACC during an appetitive reward task and a relief from pain task. 
On the basis of Silvetti et al. (2011), we predicted a positive priming 
effect after successfully responding to incongruent primes. In this 
computational model, incongruent stimuli have worse performance 
characteristics than congruent trials both in terms of RT and accuracy, 
which can explain the negative priming effect in Experiment 1. After a 
correct response, a positive prediction error (doing better than expected) 
occurs which could cause the positive priming effect. Our control 
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experiment, however, showed a similarity effect on the prime responses, 
both in reaction times and in error rates, indicating that ‘different’ trials also 
had worse performance characteristics than ‘same’ trials. Consequently, the 
model would also predict a positive prediction error (and positive priming) 
after successfully responding to ‘different’ trials.  
The fact that this is not observed suggests that the positive affect is 
specifically associated with resolving conflict and did not merely result from 
correctly responding to a more difficult trial. An incongruent trial differs 
qualitatively from a congruent trial in that the processing of irrelevant 
conflicting stimulus features need to be overridden in order to efficiently 
respond to the relevant task feature. This idea that mean RT and accuracy do 
not fully characterize conflict processing was also recently demonstrated by 
Hughes and Yeung (2011). They used two versions of the flanker task 
(conflict and masked), which were matched in RT and accuracy, but elicited 
different neurophysiological correlates of conflict. In their masked version 
of the flanker task, incongruent trials were replaced by masked congruent 
trials. Although these trials were harder to discriminate (equally difficult as 
incongruent stimuli), they did not induce conflict, as evidenced by 
lateralised motor activity.  
Besides task difficulty, we also wanted to differentiate between 
stimulus and response incongruency (Experiment 4). Some studies have 
highlighted the dissociable effects of both congruency types on behaviour 
(e.g., Notebaert & Verguts, 2006; Schouppe et al., 2012) and brain activity 
(e.g., Van Veen & Carter, 2005). However, recent electrophysiological 
studies demonstrated how ACC activity, induced by SI or RI trials, does not 
dissociate between both trial types (Nigbur, Cohen, Ridderinkhof, & 
Stürmer, 2012; Wendt, Heldmann, Münte, & Kluwe, 2007). Therefore, in 
line with the RVPM of ACC activity, we hypothesized that the conflict-
induced positive affective priming effect should not depend on conflict type 
(stimulus or response conflict). Our results are in line with this hypothesis 
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and hence further support generalized detection and resolution of stimulus 
or response conflict.  
In both Experiments 2 and 4, the interaction between prime 
congruency and target valence manifested as a faster processing of negative 
targets after congruent compared to incongruent primes (SI or RI). However, 
the results of Experiment 2 and 4 do not warrant the inference that 
congruent primes facilitate the evaluation of negative targets. For example, 
it is also plausible that a main effect of valence (as was observed in 
Experiment 3) is being countered after incongruent primes, suggesting that 
the affective priming effect in Experiment 2 and 4 is the result of 
incongruent primes facilitating responses to positive targets. One possibility 
to verify this in future research could be the inclusion of neutral primes.  
Using an affective priming paradigm, we demonstrated how 
responding to incongruent trials is associated with positive affect. However, 
at first sight, other experiments that resemble our setup may seem to contrast 
our results. Specifically, Brouillet et al. (2011) and Cannon et al. (2010) 
concluded that responding to compatible prime stimuli results in positive, 
rather than negative, affect. However, instead of the simultaneous 
assessment in Brouillet et al. (2011) and Cannon et al. (2010), our affect 
measurement occurred after conflict resolution. Therefore, we suggest that 
in these previous studies conflict and its associated negative affect is still 
experienced during the affect measurement. Additionally, the studies of 
Brouillet et al. (2011) and Cannon et al. (2010) used a different type of 
conflict, investigating the affective nature of responses to grasp-compatible 
versus grasp-incompatible objects. According to the taxonomy of Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, and Osman (1990; see also Egner, 2008), the conflict in these 
tasks originates from a dimensional overlap between an irrelevant stimulus 
dimension and the response dimension. A recent study of Kerzel and Buetti 
(2012) indeed suggested that conflict of this type leaks into the movement 
execution, because of continuing response conflict. We argue that response 
conflict in the studies of Brouillet et al. (2011) and Cannon et al. (2010) is 
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still experienced at the time of responding, explaining positive affect on 
compatible responses. In contrast, our flanker and Stroop conflict is induced 
by a dimensional overlap between an irrelevant and relevant stimulus 
dimension, suggesting that conflict mainly occurred before the response.  
Our results have important implications for theories of cognitive 
control. Until now, these theories have focused mainly on the aversive 
nature of cognitive conflict. For example, it has been argued that this 
negative valence may drive adaptations to conflict (Botvinick, 2007). 
Consistently, van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2010) found that conflict 
adaptation disappears in a state of positive mood (but see Kunde, Augst, & 
Kleinsorge, 2012 who failed to find such effects). They argued that a 
positive mood counteracts the negative valence of conflict and thus 
eliminates adaptation after conflict. These findings are in line with other 
theories postulating that positive mood increases task distractibility 
(Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Dreisbach, 2006) and suggest that cognitive 
control is mainly driven by aversive task demands. 
However, our findings shed a new light on this issue. In contrast to 
Botvinick (2007) and van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2010), we suggest that 
conflict adaptation may as well be caused by the intrinsic positive evaluation 
that occurs after responding to incongruent stimuli. The rewarding value of 
resolving an incongruent stimulus may motivate a person to enhance the task 
focus that drove him/her to that response. Computationally, this would mean 
that task-relevant associations are strengthened after (intrinsic) reward 
experience (for instance, as implemented in the adaptation by binding 
model, Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). It would imply that conflict 
resolution, rather than conflict itself, triggers adaptations. This idea is in line 
with the observation that cognitive conflict and errors trigger different 
adaptations (Notebaert & Verguts, 2011; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & 
Sommer, 2011) and the observation that conflict adaptation was increased 
after performance-related reward, and disappeared after reward omission 
(Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012). Note that our hypothesis 
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does not exclude the idea that cognitive adaptations are driven by the 
aversiveness of conflict. However, we suggest that this may occur more 
indirectly than originally thought: the intrinsic positive evaluation triggered 
by resolving the (aversive) cognitive conflict can be what motivates us in 
adapting our strategy. 
In sum, we demonstrated that conflict resolution can have a positive 
connotation. This positive affect is not observed when participants are not 
required to resolve conflict. These findings have important implications for 
the current theorizing on the role of cognitive conflict in cognitive control 
and suggest that theories should include this potential rewarding role in 
explaining task (e.g., trial-to-trial) adaptations.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Target words selected from the Dutch affective rating list of Hermans and De 
Houwer (1994) 
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 CHAPTER 7 
AFFECTIVE MODULATION OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
IS DETERMINED BY PERFORMANCE-CONTINGENCY
1
 
Cognitive control requires a fine balance between stability, the 
protection of an on-going task-set, and flexibility, the ability to update a 
task-set in line with changing contingencies. It is thought that emotional 
processing modulates this balance, but results have been equivocal 
regarding the direction of this modulation. Here, we tested the hypothesis 
that a key mediating factor in this modulation is whether affective stimuli 
are introduced as performance-contingent or as task-irrelevant signals. 
Combining functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with a conflict 
task-switching paradigm, we contrasted the effects of presenting negative- 
and positive-valence pictures on the stability/flexibility trade-off, depending 
on whether picture presentation was contingent on behavioural 
performance. Both the behavioural and neural expressions of cognitive 
control were modulated by stimulus valence and performance-contingency: 
As predicted, in the performance-contingent condition, cognitive flexibility 
was enhanced following positive pictures, whereas in the non-performance-
contingent condition, positive stimuli promoted cognitive stability. 
Moreover, while the stability/flexibility trade-off was reflected in a 
differential recruitment of doroslateral frontopariatal and striatal regions, 
its affective modulation was mirrored by neural responses in the 
ventromedial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices, whose activity 
reflected the degree of behaviour flexibility, as modulated by affect and 
performance-contingency.  
                                                     
1
 Braem, S., King, J. A., Korb, F. M., Krebs, R. M., Notebaert, W., & Egner, T. 
(submitted). Affective modulation of cognitive control is determined by 
performance-contingency and mediated by cingulate cortex. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Successful navigation through our environment requires the ability to 
focus on the current task while simultaneously being capable of switching to 
a more urgent task or respond to unexpected events. This optimal balancing 
between stability (exploitation) and flexibility (exploration) plays a 
fundamental role in our daily decision-making (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 
2007; Gittins & Jones, 1974) and anomalies in this balance are central to 
various clinical disorders (Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & Moreno, 2009; 
Strauss et al., 2011). It is widely thought that affective processes modulate 
this stability/flexibility trade-off (Easterbrook, 1959; Isen, 2000). However, 
the nature of this modulation is presently equivocal. 
One attractive hypothesis for the affective modulation of cognitive 
stability/flexibility is based on the idea that positive (negative) stimuli 
increase (decrease) dopamine release, which facilitates (suppresses) the 
gating of new information into prefrontal working memory or task-set 
representations (Ashby, Isen & Turken, 1999; Braver & Cohen, 2000). 
While some studies have supported this idea (van Steenbergen, Band, & 
Hommel, 2009, 2012), others have produced contradictory results (Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008; Padmala, Bauer, & Pessoa, 2011). Here, we tested the 
hypothesis that performance-contingency is a key factor in determining the 
exact nature of these emotion-cognition interactions.  
Specifically, we predicted that performance-contingent positive affect 
signals that task goals are being met successfully, loosening task focus 
toward a more exploratory mode (Carver, 2003; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2011, van Steenbergen et al., 2009), while performance-contingent negative 
affect promotes the need for stabilizing the present task-set, directing 
attention towards the task (van Steenbergen et al., 2012). By contrast, Gable 
and Harmon-Jones (2008) demonstrated how presenting non-contingent 
positive pictures can speed local (relative to global) target detection, arguing 
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that positive pictures rouse an “approach motivation”, inducing a narrower 
(exploitation) task focus, while non-contingent negative pictures have been 
argued to shift attention away from the task (Padmala et al., 2011). We 
tested these predictions by presenting negative or positive pictures following 
trials of a task-switching experiment that employed bivalent stimuli, which 
could be either congruent or incongruent (i.e., conflict-inducing). 
Importantly, the presentation of the affective stimuli was either 
performance-contingent, or not. We tested this manipulation on a single, 
direct metric of the stability/flexibility trade-off, namely the conflict-
modulated task-switch cost (“Goschke effect”), referring to a larger switch 
cost following incongruent trials than following congruent trials (Goschke, 
2000). This effect is thought to reflect the detrimental impact of conflict-
induced enhancement of task-focus (i.e., increased stability, Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) on the cognitive flexibility required 
for a task-switch. Thus, a smaller (larger) Goschke effect reflects more 
flexibility (stability).  
Moreover, because neuroscience models of affective modulation of 
cognitive control (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Gray, 2001; Pessoa, 2008, 
2009; Shackman et al. 2011) have not previously considered the exact role 
of performance-contingency (Chiew & Braver, 2011), the neural substrates 
of these key emotion-cognitive interactions are presently unknown. By 
pairing our task-switching experiment with functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI), we sought to identify the brain regions associated with the 
Goschke effect and its potential modulation by affect and performance-
contingency.  
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Participants  
Thirty-five participants took part in this study (mean age = 26 years, 
SD = 6; 17 female). All participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision, and were right-handed as assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory. They gave their informed written consent and reported no current 
or history of neurological, psychiatric or major medical disorder. Every 
participant was paid $35 for participating, as well as an extra $16 during the 
task as part of the experiment's reward schedule (which will be explained 
below). The work has been completed with the approval of the Duke 
University Health System Institutional Review Board. 
Stimuli 
The task stimuli were the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 or 9, centrally 
presented in isoluminant green or blue. Fifty positive and fifty negative 
pictures were selected from the from the International Affective Pictures 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) data-base, matched on 
their semantic content (e.g. crying baby vs. smiling baby, cute animal vs. 
dangerous animal, sunset vs. thunderstorm). All stimuli were presented 
against a black background on a back-projection screen, which participants 
viewed in a mirror mounted to the head coil. This setup simulated a viewing 
distance of 80 cm, resulting in picture sizes of 10° wide and 7.4° high and 
number stimuli of approximately 0.4° wide and 0.8° high. Responses were 
registered via a MR-compatible response box (Current Designs), which was 
placed on the participant's abdomen (oriented perpendicular to the length of 
their body). The task required the participants to press the left- or rightmost 
button (out of four horizontally aligned response buttons) with their left or 
right hand, respectively. Stimuli presentation and response registration were 
performed using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems). 
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Procedure  
The goal of the study design was to assess the effect of affective 
stimuli (positive or negative IAPS pictures) on cognitive-control processes 
involved in switching between conflicting task goals, depending on whether 
the affective stimuli were tied to task performance or not. To this end, we 
presented affective picture stimuli (positive vs. negative) tied to monetary 
gains following each trial of a standard task-switching protocol. Importantly, 
in one group of subjects ("non-performance-contingent condition”), these 
affective stimuli were unrelated to performance, whereas in another, closely 
matched group of subjects (“performance-contingent condition”), affective 
feedback (and monetary gain) was dependent on performance speed and 
accuracy.  Specifically, participants were informed that task stimuli would 
be followed by a randomly chosen positive or negative picture and that 
positive pictures were associated with 10 cents monetary gain. In the non-
performance-contingent condition, the instructions explicitly mentioned that 
the picture presentation was unrelated to task performance. In the 
performance-contingent condition, participants were informed that there 
would be no picture presentation (and therefore no chance of gaining 
money) after incorrect or too slow responses. Finally, response speed and 
accuracy were stressed in both conditions. Importantly, besides the 
difference in instructions concerning the pictures, and the absence of 
pictures after inaccurate or slow responses (exceeding the 1500 ms deadline) 
in the performance-contingent condition, there were no differences between 
the two conditions.  
The task switching paradigm itself required participants to carry out 
either a parity or magnitude judgment on the digit stimuli depending on the 
color in which each digit was presented. Specifically, when the digit was 
presented in blue, subjects had to press a left-hand button if the number was 
odd and a right-hand button if the number was even. When the number was 
presented in green, subjects had to press left if it was smaller than five and 
right if it was bigger than five. These task-color associations were 
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counterbalanced across participants. A random serial presentation of these 
stimuli (excluding number repetitions) created task sequences of task 
repetitions and task switches, allowing us to assess typical task-switch costs. 
Moreover, because the digit stimuli were bivalent, that is, each stimulus was 
associated with possible responses in both task-sets, and stimulus categories 
in the different task-sets were mapped onto overlapping response sets, each 
stimulus could be either congruent (i.e., it would produce the same manual 
response in both task-sets) or incongruent (it would render different 
responses in the two task-sets). Overall, these manipulations produced a 
factorial mixed-effects design, which we analyzed according to the 
following 5 factors of interest: the within-subject factors of task sequence 
(task-repetition vs. task-switch), previous trial congruency (congruent vs. 
incongruent), current trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent trial), and 
the valence of the picture (positive vs. negative) that preceded the current 
trial (we call this factor “preceding valence” from here onwards); and 
finally, the between-subjects factor of contingency condition (performance-
contingent vs. non-performance-contingent).  
As shown in Figure 1A, each trial began with a colored digit stimulus, 
presented 0.6° above a central fixation dot (which remained on-screen 
throughout the task) for 200 ms. There was a maximum response time (RT) 
window of 1500 ms, starting from stimulus onset. Stimulus presentation was 
followed by a variable stimulus-picture interval. Thereafter, an IAPS picture 
was presented for 500 ms, which was followed by another variable picture-
stimulus interval until the next digit stimulus was presented. Both variable 
time-intervals were independently randomized and were drawn from a 
pseudo-exponential distribution (50 % lasted 3 seconds (s), 25 % 3.5 s, 12 % 
4 s, 7 % 4.5 s, and 6 % 5 s), resulting in a mean time interval of ~ 3.5 s. This 
jittering allowed us to estimate independently activations associated with 
each digit and picture stimulus (e.g., Ollinger, Corbetta, & Shulman, 2001). 
Importantly, in the performance-contingent condition, the picture did not 
follow the response if the subjects had not responded correctly or within the 
response time window. Instead, the fixation dot was presented for 500 ms.  
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Figure 1. General paradigm and behavioral results. A. Trial procedure. Participants had to 
respond to digit stimuli’s parity or magnitude, depending on stimulus color. A randomly 
chosen positive or negative picture was presented after each stimulus, except in the 
performance-contingent condition, were a black screen was shown if the preceding response 
to the task stimulus was incorrect or too slow (> 1500 ms). In both conditions, each positive 
picture presentation was associated with a $ 0.1 monetary gain. The background color in the 
experiment was black. B. Group mean RTs for each contingency condition separately. Dotted 
lines indicate task switches and full lines indicate task repetitions. Prev con and prev incon 
indicate that the trial was preceded by a congruent and incongruent trial respectively. The 
results demonstrate how the conflict-enhanced task-switch cost, as an index of cognitive 
stability, is counteracted after positive affect (green) in the performance-contingent condition, 
and after negative affect (orange) in the non-performance-contingent condition. C. The bars 
represent the respective conflict-enhanced task-switch costs (i.e. Goschke effects) for each 
valence and contingency condition separately (calculated by subtracting the task-switch cost 
after congruent trials from the task-switch cost after incongruent trials). All error bars are ± 1 
standard error of the mean (SEM). 
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After a short practice block of 32 trials outside the scanner, 
participants performed 5 experimental blocks during scanning. Each block 
contained 64 trials. There was a short break between blocks in which the 
participants could see their updated score. Each of the 32 stimulus-picture 
combinations (eight numbers × two task colors × picture valence) was 
presented ten times in a randomized order and IAPS pictures were randomly 
chosen from the appropriate valence group, but never reoccurred within a 
block. On average, participants in the performance-contingent condition 
would mostly end up with a slightly smaller amount than people in the non-
performance-contingent condition (who always won the maximum amount: 
$16). However, after the experiment, participants received the same 
maximum amount possible, irrespective of their outcome or contingency-
condition. 
Behavioral data analyses  
Three participants were excluded from analyses because of too few 
registered responses (26%, 30%, and 51% of their responses exceeded the 
response registration deadline). The remaining 32 participants had a mean of 
3.7% (SD = 4%) of unregistered responses. There was an equal amount of 
men and women (eight women and eight men) assigned to each condition 
and age did not differ significantly (non-performance-contingent condition: 
mean age = 25, SD = 4%; performance-contingent condition: mean age = 
27, SD = 7%), t(1,30) = 1.187, p > .1. Before analyses, trials following an 
error and the first trial of each block were removed. We carried out an 
ANOVA with the four within-subject factors task sequence (repetition vs. 
switch), current trial congruency (congruent vs. incongruent), previous trial 
congruency and preceding valence (positive vs. negative picture) and the 
between-subjects factor of contingency condition (performance-contingent 
vs. non-performance-contingent) on correct trial RTs and error rates. 
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Questionnaires  
All participants completed the Behavioural Inhibition 
System/Behavioural Activation System (BIS/BAS) questionnaire (Carver & 
White, 1994) and the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson 
et al., 1988). These scores were used to ensure that differential effects 
obtained for the between-subjects factor could not be attributable to overall 
group differences in mood, or punishment/reward sensitivity.  
fMRI data acquisition  
Imaging was conducted on a GE Discovery MR750 system at 3.0 tesla 
using a standard head coil. We acquired functional images parallel to the 
AC-PC plane with a T2*-weighted single-shot gradient EPI sequence of 36 
contiguous axial slices [repetition time, 2000 ms; echo time, 28 ms; flip 
angle, 90°; field of view, 192mm; array size, 64 × 64] with 3 mm thickness 
and 3 × 3mm in-plane resolution. Structural images were acquired with a 
T1-weighted FSPGR axial scan using a 3D inversion recovery prepared 
sequence, recording 120 slices of 1 mm thickness and in-plane resolution of 
1 × 1 mm.  
fMRI data analysis  
All preprocessing steps and statistical analyses were performed using 
SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/). Functional data 
were slice-time corrected and spatially realigned to the first volume of the 
task. The structural image was normalized to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) template brain (resampled voxel size 2 mm
3
). The 
normalization parameters were then applied to the functional images to 
ensure an anatomically informed normalization. The first 5 volumes of each 
run in which no stimulation occurred were discarded before estimating 
statistical models. A 128 s temporal high-pass filter was applied to the data. 
Temporal autocorrelations were estimated using restricted maximum 
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likelihood estimates of variance components with a first-order 
autoregressive model, and the resulting non-sphericity was used to form 
maximum likelihood estimates of activations. A spatial smoothing filter of 8 
mm FWHM (full-width at half maximum) was applied.  Event-related 
regressors convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF) were created corresponding to the stimulus onsets and picture onsets 
of each trial defined by the same factors as the behavioural data analyses. 
More specifically, both picture- and stimulus-locked onset regressors were 
defined by the congruency of the present trial, the congruency of the 
previous trial, and the task sequence status (task repetition or task switch). 
Furthermore, the regressors of picture onsets were also defined by the 
picture valence of the current trial, while the regressors of stimulus onsets 
were defined by the picture valence of the preceding trial (because the 
picture of the current trial is only presented after stimulus-onset). Error 
trials, trials following an error, and the first trial of each run were modelled 
separately as nuisance variables. Single-subjects contrasts on stimulus-
locked regressors were calculated to establish the hemodynamic correlates 
of the task-switch cost (switch > repetition) and the Goschke effect (task-
switch cost following incongruent trials > task-switch cost following 
congruent trials). Group effects were assessed by submitting the individual 
contrast images to voxelwise one-sample t-tests (random-effects model). 
Between-group differences in the modulation of the Goschke effect by 
previous picture valence, as well as the effect of picture valence on picture-
locked regressors were assessed by submitting the individual contrast 
images to voxelwise independent two-sample t-tests.  
To control for false-positive rates, combined voxel activation intensity 
and cluster extent thresholds corrected for multiple comparisons were 
calculated and determined by using the 3dClustSim software package 
(http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/pub/dist/doc/program_help/3dClustSim.html). 
Specifically, the program was used to run 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations 
taking into account the whole-brain search volume and the estimated 
smoothness of each axis of the respective group SPMs to generate 
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probability estimates of a random field of noise producing a cluster of 
voxels of a given extent for a set of voxels passing a specific voxelwise p 
value threshold, which we set at 0.005 for all analyses. Given this voxelwise 
threshold, the simulations determined that cluster sizes of 215 to 252 voxels, 
depending on the specific analysis, corresponded to a combined threshold of 
p < 0.05 (corrected). 
ROI analyses  
For evaluation of interaction effects, we extracted mean β estimates 
from empirically defined ROIs, using Marsbar software 
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/). Specifically, we extracted for each 
participant activation estimates from a 5 mm radius sphere centered on 
activation maxima in the contrast of interest and submitted the resulting 
values to statistical tests.  
 
RESULTS  
Behavioural data 
Mean accuracy and RTs did not differ between the performance-
contingent (accuracy = 89.9 %; mean RT = 834 ms) and non-performance-
contingent condition (accuracy = 88.4 %; mean RT = 833 ms) and there 
were no differences in punishment/reward sensitivity scores (BIS/BAS) or 
mood scales (PANAS) between both conditions (all t(1,30) < 1).  
As expected, there was a significant task-switch cost, in both RTs, 
F(1,30) = 92.853,  p < .001, and error rates, F(1,30) = 43.175,  p < .001, 
indicating higher RTs and error rates when a task alternated (870 ms, 9.8 % 
errors) as opposed to when the task repeated (807 ms, 5.5 %). We also 
observed a typical congruency effect which was expressed in higher RTs, 
F(1,30) = 94.678,  p < .001, and higher error rates, F(1,30) = 49.604,  p < 
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.001, for incongruent trials (882 ms, 12.6 %) as opposed to congruent trials 
(795 ms, 2.7 %). Additionally, we observed a main effect of previous 
congruency in RTs, F(1,30) = 10.872, p < .01, and a trend in error rates, 
F(1,30) = 3.824, p = .06: trials following an incongruent trial were slower 
and less accurate (847 ms, 8.3 %) than trials following a congruent trial (831 
ms, 6.9 %). Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between 
congruency and task sequence in both RTs, F(1,30) = 11.378,  p < .01, and 
error rates, F(1,30) = 23.474,  p < .01, showing a greater congruency effect 
for task-switch, than task-repeat trials. As expected, a significant Goschke 
effect was observed in the error rates (two-way interaction between previous 
congruency and task sequence), F(1,30) = 12.361,  p < .01, indicating a 
higher task switch cost following incongruent trials (6.1 %), as opposed to 
congruent trials (2.6 %). This effect was not observed in the RTs. However, 
most importantly, a four-way interaction in RTs between condition, task 
sequence, previous congruency, and preceding valence indicated diverging 
effects of the IAPS pictures on cognitive control, dependent on the 
contingency condition, F(1,30) = 10.407,  p < .01 (Figure 1B,C). No other 
main effects or interactions reached significance (all p > .1). 
In order to further investigate the four-way interaction involving the 
effect of IAPS picture presentation on cognitive control, we examined each 
contingency condition separately. In the performance-contingent condition, 
there was a significant three-way interaction between task sequence, 
previous congruency, and preceding valence, F(1,15) = 8.350, p < .05.  
There was a tendency for an increased task-switch cost after incongruent 
trials, as opposed to after congruent trials, when preceded by a negative 
picture (task-switch cost after incongruent trials minus the task-switch cost 
after congruent trials = 25 ms), F(1,15) = 4.271, p = .056, but not when 
preceded by a positive picture (-23 ms), F(1,15) = 1.637, p > .1. By contrast, 
in the non-performance-contingent condition, there was a marginally 
significant three-way interaction between task sequence, previous 
congruency, and previous valence in the opposite direction, F(1,15) = 3.616, 
p = .077, as the Goschke effect could be observed following positive 
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pictures (38 ms), F(1,15) = 5.256, p < .05, but not following negative ones (-
7 ms), F(1,15) < 1. In other words, the typical conflict modulated task-
switch cost (Goschke effect) was observed following negative pictures (but 
not positive ones) in the performance-contingent group and following 
positive pictures (but not negative ones) in the non-performance-contingent 
group. As predicted, these results show how the affective modulation of the 
Goschke effect is defined by the performance-contingency of the affective 
pictures. Specifically, the Goschke effect, as a measure of cognitive stability 
(at the cost of cognitive flexibility), was counteracted after performance-
contingent positive pictures, but enhanced after performance-contingent 
negative pictures. This is consistent with the idea that positive affect 
following an achieved goal signals a comfortable environment, where task 
focus is loosened towards a more exploratory mode (Carver, 2003; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2011, van Steenbergen et al., 2009), while performance-
contingent negative affect calls for enhanced cognitive stability (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2012). By contrast, non-contingent positive pictures 
enhanced the Goschke effect, in line with the idea that non-contingent 
(unexpected) positive pictures induced an approach motivation, and thus 
induce a narrower task focus (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). Non-
contingent negative pictures counteracted the Goschke effect, suggesting 
negative pictures triggered an avoidance state, shifting attention away from 
the task (e.g., Padmala et al., 2011). We next turned to the fMRI data in 
order to determine the neural mediators of this affective modulation of 
cognitive control.  
fMRI data: task-switching and its modulation by previous congruency  
All activations we report are whole-brain corrected at p < .05 (see 
Methods). We begin by analysing neural substrates of task-switching to 
provide a point of contact with the previous literature, and then move on to 
assess the neural correlates of the Goschke effect, that is, activations 
associated specifically with updating a task-set in opposition to recently 
activated task-set stabilization processes. As displayed in Figure 2A (and 
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Table 1), a random-effects analysis of the fMRI data on the task-switch cost 
(task-switch > task-repetition) uncovered a dorsolateral frontoparietal 
network, as well as the insulae, right thalamus, posterior cingulate cortex, 
and medial frontal cortex, consistent with typical findings from the task-
switching literature (Brass & von Cramon, 2002; Braver, Reynolds, & 
Donaldson, 2003; Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 2000).   
Next, having identified the brain regions involved in task-switching 
per se, we investigated how previous trial congruency modulated task-
switching activity, assessing the neural correlates of the behavioural 
phenomenon of enhanced switch costs following an incongruent trial 
(Goschke, 2000). Our results show the neural signature of the Goschke 
effect (switch-cost after incongruent trials > switch-cost after congruent 
trials) to consist of a modulation of the dorsolateral frontoparietal network 
and the right dorsal striatum (Figure 2B, Table 1).  
This dorsolateral frontoparietal network has been widely identified as 
a cognitive-control (or “multiple-demand”) network that is recruited when 
the need for top-down control processes is high (Niendam et al., 2012; 
Dosenbach et al., 2006; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Macdonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000). Accordingly, the activations show a task-switch 
cost following incongruent trials, but not following congruent trials (Figure 
2C). This is precisely in line with the stipulation that, following incongruent 
trials, extra cognitive resources are needed to deal with task-alternations due 
to the increased task-focus and/or enhanced task-associations after cognitive 
conflict, which have to be overcome in order to implement a successful 
switch (Braem, Verguts, Roggeman, & Notebaert, 2012; Brown, Reynolds, 
& Braver, 2007; Goschke, 2000; Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). However, as 
indicated by our behavioral results, picture valence, depending on 
performance-contingency, is an important modulator of the conflict-
modulated switch cost, attenuating the cost following performance-
contingent positive stimuli, and enhancing it following non-contingent 
positive stimuli. To identify the neural mediators of these modulations, we 
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next searched for brain regions where the expression of the Goschke effect 
varied as a function of picture affect and performance-contingency. 
 
Figure 2. A. The regions identified by the stimulus-locked task-switch cost (task-switch > 
task-repetition) regression analysis are plotted at p < .05 (corrected) on sagittal (x 0), coronal 
(y 20), and axial (z 46) of an individual brain in MNI space. B. The regions identified by the 
stimulus-locked Goschke effect (switch cost after incongruent trials > switch cost after 
congruent trials) regression analysis are plotted at p < .05 (corrected) on coronal (y 12) and 
cortex surface of an individual brain in MNI space. C. Group mean activations for the task 
switch cost (switch trials - repetition trials; β estimates ± SEM) across contingency-conditions 
in the right dorsal striatum, left and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and left and 
right dorsolateral parietal cortex (DLPC) are plotted for trials following congruent and 
incongruent trials, all F(1,30) > 10.8, p < .005. 
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fMRI data:  
performance-contingency and affective modulation of cognitive control  
Having established our cognitive-control effect of interest, both at the 
behavioural and neural level, we now turn to its modulation by affect and 
performance-contingency. As predicted, the RT analyses demonstrated that 
the affective modulation of the Goschke effect was determined by the 
performance-contingency of the affective pictures. As shown in Figure 3A 
(and Table 1), a whole-brain analysis of this four-way interaction indicated 
the involvement of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) including the pre-genual anterior cingulate, the 
right middle temporal gyrus (rMTG) and superior medial frontal cortex 
(sMFC) in this modulation. 
These brain regions' activity patterns show an inverse relationship 
with the behavioural expression of the Goschke effect: neural task-switch 
costs were highest in conditions where behavioural costs were smallest in 
terms of RTs. Specifically, all four regions showed a significant modulation 
of the Goschke effect in the performance-contingent condition (all F's > 5.1, 
p's < .05), in that a neural signature of the Goschke effect (greater task-
switch cost after incongruent trials as opposed to congruent trials) could be 
observed after positive pictures, which was reversed after negative pictures 
(Figure 3B), while reaction times showed a Goschke effect after negative 
pictures, but not after positive pictures (cf. Figure 1C). Both the PCC and 
rMTG also showed a significant modulation of the Goschke effect in the 
non-contingent condition, both F's > 5.2, p's < .05. In the vmPFC, this 
interaction reached marginal significance, F(1,15) = 4.147, p = .06, but the 
sMFC showed no such modulation in the non-contingent condition, F(1,15) 
= 1.413, p > .1.  
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Figure 3. A. The regions identified by the modulation of the stimulus-locked Goschke effect 
by picture valence and contingency condition regression analysis are plotted at p < .05 
(corrected) on axial (z 12), sagittal (x 0), and axial (z 68) of an individual brain in MNI space. 
B. Group mean activations for the Goschke effect (switch cost after incongruent trials - switch 
cost after congruent trials; β estimates ± SEM) for each contingency-conditions separately in 
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), right middle 
temporal gyrus (rMTG) and superior medial frontal cortex (sMFC) are plotted following 
positive or negative pictures, all F(1,30) > 10.4, p < .005. C. The right inferior parietal lobule 
(rIPL) identified by the picture valence × contingency-condition regression analysis is plotted 
at p < .05 (corrected) on sagittal (x 38) of an individual brain in MNI space. D. Group mean 
activations for each contingency-condition separately in the rIPL (β estimates ± SEM) are 
plotted for positive (pos) and negative (neg) picture presentations, F(1,30) = 12.3, p < .005. 
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Overall, these results suggest that heightened activity in these regions 
reflected the (affect- and contingency-dependent) recruitment of resources 
instrumental in attenuating the behavioural Goschke effect, hence enhancing 
flexibility. However, it could alternatively be argued that these regions 
simply become more active whenever control demands are relatively low, 
akin to areas whose activity might be released from suppression under low 
task demands (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 
2001). If the latter interpretation were correct, activity in these regions 
should be higher for any comparison between a less demanding (lower RT) 
with a more demanding (higher RT) condition. However, none of the 
regions showed a main effect of task-switch or congruency (in spite of 
highly significant RT effects), all F's < 1.4, p's > .25 (except for the sMFC, 
showing a marginally significant congruency effect, F(1,30) = 3.055, p = 
.09, with higher activations for incongruent trials). This renders an 
explanation in terms of a global inverse relationship with task demands 
implausible. Instead, our data suggest that these regions were differentially 
recruited to attenuate task-switch costs depending on previous congruency 
and the affect-induced cognitive control mode (exploration vs. exploitation). 
For example, positive performance-contingent affect promoted cognitive 
flexibility in a context dependent manner, by enhancing this network's 
activity on task-alternations following incongruent trials (when the 
enhancement of cognitive flexibility is most desirable). This is consistent 
with the involvement of the PCC and the vmPFC in other recent 
investigations of the affective modulations of cognitive control (Hart, Green, 
Casp, & Belger, 2010; Sakaki & Niki, 2011; Subramaniam, Kounios, 
Parrish, & Beeman, 2009). 
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Table 1. Stimulus onset locked activations revealed by the task-switch cost, the Goschke 
effect, and the modulation of the Goschke effect by affect and performance-contingency 
analyses, and picture onset locked activations revealed by picture valence × contingency 
condition. 
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fMRI data: performance-contingency and the processing of stimulus 
valence 
Lastly, the jittered time-interval between picture and stimulus 
presentation also allowed us to identify brain regions differentially activated 
by affect as a function of performance contingency. Consistent with our 
behavioural data, we hypothesized that positive affect experienced after a 
goal has been achieved induces an exploratory state, while non-contingent 
(unexpected) positive affect triggers approach behaviour towards the task, 
narrowing task-focus. Conversely, experiencing negative affect after a goal 
has been achieved calls for an enhanced task-focus, while non-contingent 
(unexpected) negative affect disturbs task focus. We expected that this 
differential modulation of attentional scope by picture valence and 
performance contingency would also be reflected in the brain, following 
picture presentation, but before actual task-performance (trial onset). The 
analysis investigating this (picture-locked) valence × contingency condition 
contrast revealed activation in the right inferior parietal lobe (rIPL, Figure 
3C, Table 1). A recent literature review proposed an important role for the 
rIPL in flexibly reconfiguring behaviour between two different modes of 
attention: maintaining control on current task-goals, on the one hand, and 
flexibly switching to new external demands, on the other hand (Singh-Curry 
& Husain, 2009). This seems consistent with our behavioural data, 
demonstrating a differential impact of picture valence on cognitive 
stability/flexibility, depending on performance-contingency. Post-hoc t-tests 
of rIPL activity within each performance-contingency condition demonstrate 
how positive pictures, relative to negative pictures, significantly deactivated 
this region in the performance-contingent condition, t(15) = 3.0, p < .01, 
and, marginally significant, enhanced this region in the non-contingent 
condition, t(15) = 1.9, p = .083 (Figure 3D). 
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DISCUSSION 
In this study, we set out to investigate the role of performance-
contingency in defining affective modulations of cognitive control. We 
report four novel findings: First, in line with our predictions, we found that 
positive affective stimuli promoted cognitive flexibility when performance-
contingent, but enhanced stability when not performance-contingent. 
Second, the Goschke effect, as a measure of the trade-off between cognitive 
stability and flexibility, was associated with activation of the striatum and a 
dorsolateral frontoparietal network, displaying a neural switch cost after 
incongruent trials, but not after congruent ones. Third, interestingly, the 
performance-contingency-dependent affective modulation of this effect was 
mediated by a different network, centered on the vmPFC/anterior cingulate 
and the posterior cingulate. Specifically, these regions’ activation profiles 
were inversely related to the behavioral expression of the Goschke effect, as 
modulated by performance contingency and preceding picture valence. 
Lastly, we documented that the rIPL might play an important role in setting 
up this contingency-dependent processing of affective stimuli. In the 
following, we discuss these findings in turn.  
By explicitly manipulating performance contingency, we 
demonstrated how this factor determined the impact of affect on different 
modes of cognitive control (i.e., stability/exploitation versus 
flexibility/exploration). Previous studies did not manipulate, or were unclear 
about, the performance-contingency of affective stimuli. For example, 
affective stimuli were sometimes described as “reward signals” 
(immediately following response and accompanied by monetary gain), but 
were also presented following erroneous responses (van Steenbergen et al., 
2009; 2012), thus rendering their interpretation ambiguous (for a discussion, 
see Braem et al., 2012; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012). By systematically 
manipulating performance contingency in the present study, we can confirm 
previous conclusions that performance-relevant positive affect enhances 
cognitive flexibility (van Steenbergen et al., 2009; 2012). This is consistent 
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with the hypothesis that positive stimulus presentation after an achieved 
goal signals that task performance is going well, and a more flexible or 
explorative mode of cognitive control can be permitted (Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2011). However, it has also been argued (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2011) that this popular hypothesis of positive affect-induced cognitive 
flexibility (Ashby et al., 1999; Braver & Cohen, 2000; Dreisbach, 2006) is 
probably restricted to block-wise mood inducements (e.g., Dreisbach & 
Goschke, 2004) or post-goal affect (e.g., van Steenbergen et al., 2009). Our 
results corroborate this idea. In fact, when introducing positive pictures as 
performance-unrelated stimuli, these stimuli appeared to narrow rather than 
broaden attention. This is in line with the observation that positive pictures 
facilitate the detection of local (relative to global) targets (Gable & Harmon-
Jones, 2008; Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009), presumably by inducing an 
approach-motivated attentional state: manipulations that increase approach 
motivation intensity, and individual differences in approach sensitivity, have 
been shown to modulate this effect (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). 
Negative affective stimuli showed the converse pattern: when task-relevant, 
negative stimuli signal a need for stabilizing the present task-set, directing 
attention towards the task (van Steenbergen et al., 2012) at the cost of 
cognitive flexibility. Non-contingent negative pictures, on the other hand, 
appear to pull attention away from the task at hand, thus broadening focus 
(Padmala et al., 2011).  
It is important to note that this effect of performance-contingency is 
specific for affect-inducing stimuli, like positive and negative pictures. 
Other studies that used abstract colours or numbers as performance-
contingent reinforcement signals (Braem et al., 2012; Stürmer, Nigbur, 
Schacht, & Sommer, 2011) observed an improved, rather than diminished, 
conflict-enhanced task-focus. This discrepancy in findings likely reflects 
differences in the type of post-goal stimuli used and is in line with 
theoretical work on the motivation of adaptive behaviour, suggesting 
fundamental differences in the impact of affective versus reward feedback 
(Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Chiew & Braver, 2011; Smith, Berridge, & 
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Aldridge, 2011): whereas positive pictures in the current experiment 
induced a post-goal positive affect, signalling a comfortable environment 
after successful performance (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011), the reward 
signals in the studies of Braem et al. (2012) and Stürmer et al. (2011) likely 
acted as mere learning signals, eliciting a more motivational component (i.e. 
encouraging to enhance associations after conflict).  
Previous studies of affective modulations of cognitive stability mainly 
investigated the modulation of the congruency sequence effect (Padmala et 
al., 2011; van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012), whereas affective modulation 
of cognitive flexibility was investigated in task-switching studies (Dreisbach 
& Goschke, 2004). To test the optimal balancing between a flexible and 
rigid mode of cognitive control, we instead employed a single task-
switching protocol where both flexibility/exploration (task-switching) and 
stability/exploitation (conflict control) could be investigated simultaneously. 
Specifically, we examined the Goschke effect (Goschke, 2000): the 
observation that a task-switch cost is enhanced after incongruent as opposed 
to congruent trials. Our fMRI data allowed us to identify the associated 
brain regions and uncovered enhanced task-switch costs after cognitive 
conflict in dorsolateral frontal and parietal cortices and right dorsal striatum. 
Similarly, Hyafil, Summerfield, and Koechlin (2009) observed how the 
dlPFC was most recruited on task-switches where both the current and 
preceding trial were incongruent. These activations likely represent the 
enhanced recruitment of a top-down cognitive-control network (Niendam et 
al., 2012; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Duncan & Owen, 2000; Macdonald et al., 
2000) when switch processes need to be implemented in opposition to task-
set reinforcement mechanisms that were activated by an incongruent 
stimulus encountered on the preceding trial (Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2009). 
Adding the factors performance-contingency and picture valence, we 
further examined the contingency-dependent affective modulation of the 
Goschke effect. Interestingly, this interaction was primarily associated with 
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activations of the PCC and vmPFC, with increased activity predictive of 
better performance (smaller conflict-modulated switch costs). The vmPFC 
and PCC are thought to be core nodes of a network that first gained 
popularity as the “default mode” or “resting state” network (Gusnard et al., 
2001; Raichle et al., 2001) of regions commonly displaying task-negative 
activations (Fox et al., 2005). However, recent evidence indicates this 
network to be highly reactive and tuneable (Singh & Fawcett, 2008), closely 
tied to task control networks (Fair et al., 2008; Leech, Braga, & Sharp, 
2012; Sridharan, Levitin, & Menon, 2008), and important for efficient task 
performance. Importantly, this network has been shown to play a critical 
role in facilitating cognitive control for task-switching (Hayden, Smith, & 
Platt, 2010) and, more generally, cognitive flexibility (Pearson, Heilbronner, 
Barack, Hayden, & Platt, 2011; Waltz et al., 2013), as well as the influence 
of positive mood thereon (Sakaki & Niki, 2011; Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
Lastly, the vmPFC has an important role in integrating affective and 
cognitive processes (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001; Vertes, 
2006).  
It has been suggested that goal-related positive affect fosters cognitive 
flexibility via dopaminergic gating signals to dorsolateral prefrontal working 
memory regions (Ashby et al., 1999; Braver & Cohen, 2000; Dreisbach, 
2006). While we did not directly measure dopaminergic signals in the 
present study, we did not observe a modulation of dorsolateral prefrontal 
activity by affect and performance-contingency. Instead, the present data are 
more commensurate with an affective recruitment, conditioned on 
performance-relevance, of the medial vmPFC-PCC network described above 
(which is also subject to dopaminergic modulation, see Dang, Donde, 
Madison, O'Neil, & Jagust, 2012; Delaveau et al., 2010; Nagano-Saito et al., 
2008; Nagano-Saito, Liu, Doyon, & Dagher, 2009). Specifically, we propose 
that the affective trial-to-trial modulations of cognitive control, regulating 
the balance between cognitive flexibility and stability in task switching, is 
mediated by a modulation of cingulate components of the "default mode 
network", where higher activation of this network is associated with 
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enhanced cognitive flexibility (Sakaki & Niki, 2011; Subramaniam et al., 
2009).  
Lastly, we also investigated how picture processing itself was 
determined by the performance-contingency condition. This analysis 
uncovered the rIPL, consistent with its supposed role in regulating two 
different modes of attention (Singh-Curry & Husain, 2009; see also 
Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008): maintaining control on current task-
goals on the one hand, and flexibly switching to new external demands on 
the other (e.g., Desmet, Fias, Hartstra, & Brass, 2011).  We speculate that 
enhanced activity in the rIPL in the present study may have led to the further 
enhancement of task-relevant associations after conflict, promoting a form 
of cognitive stability; by contrast, this region’s deactivation would enhance 
cognitive flexibility, allowing a better preparation for task-switches after 
conflict. 
In sum, our results demonstrated how performance-contingency 
determines the way trial-to-trial affect inducements modulate the balancing 
between cognitive flexibility and cognitive stability. While post-goal 
performance-related positive affect promoted exploration and cognitive 
flexibility, post-goal negative affect narrowed attention and enhanced task 
focus. However, non-contingent affect showed a reversed pattern. We 
suggest that these affective modulations of cognitive control occur via a 
(likely dopamine-induced) modulation of the vmPFC and PCC, "default 
mode network" nodes associated with cognitive flexibility. As a modulator 
between these different modes of attention, the rIPL might play an important 
role in the demonstrated differential impact of affective stimuli on cognitive 
stability/flexibility, depending on performance-contingency. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The way we interact and navigate through our environment is 
characterized by the overcoming of numerous obstacles and challenges, 
requiring us to constantly update our choices, action tendencies, and 
information processing. In the lab, we investigate this by studying conflict 
processing: the observation that we can both monitor and learn from 
conflicting information as a function of efficient task performance. In the 
introduction of this dissertation, we described how reinforcement learning, 
both in its philosophy and practice, can help at further understanding the 
underlying mechanisms determining the way we deal with these conflicts. 
Over the past decades, a (still growing) offspring of reinforcement learning 
theories helped us exemplifying how much of our behavior can be explained 
by both simple and complex learning rules that strive towards maximizing 
reward. Motivated by this literature, we set out to examine the role of 
reinforcement learning in conflict processing in six empirical studies and 
demonstrated that (1) the way we react to conflict is subject to such learning 
rules (Chapter 2 and 4), (2) reinforcement signals modulate these 
adaptations to conflict (Chapter 3, 4, and 5), (3) the to-be-maximized reward 
experience can very well be part of the conflict processing itself (Chapter 6), 
and (4) affective states might help us in determining when to start and stop 
adapting to conflict, depending on how this affect is related to our 
performance (Chapter 7). 
In this chapter, while making a short overview of our results, we will 
try to integrate these findings with the existing literature. To this end, we 
will not only recapitulate the frameworks and ideas outlined in the 
introduction, but also devote a special part of this discussion to 
incorporating both affective and reinforcement signal modulations of 
cognitive control. We shall also discuss some of the possible underlying 
neuromodulatory systems, and, finally, present some new interesting 
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research directions, through which the role of reinforcement learning in 
explaining cognitive control could be further investigated.  
 
Adaptations to conflict by Hebbian Learning 
We dedicated a first part of this dissertation to investigating the 
underlying mechanisms of conflict adaptation. Specifically, we set out to 
demonstrate how adaptations to conflict can be understood by a conflict-
induced Hebbian learning rule (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). 
According to this model, the detection of conflict (as modeled by Botvinick 
et al., 2001) triggers a neuromodulatory signal throughout the brain that 
helps strengthening all active (task) associations. This model led us to 
hypothesize that, therefore, response modalities or irrelevant salient context 
features would be taken into account when the strengthening of associations 
occurs, arguing for a response- or context-specific implementation of 
conflict control. In line with this hypothesis, we observed in Chapter 2 how 
adaptations to conflict were restricted to effector (hand or feet) repetitions, 
versus effector alternations. Likewise, in Chapter 4, conflict adaptation was 
restricted to conditions where the surrounding task-irrelevant color remained 
the same, as opposed to color alternation conditions.  
In a similar vein, Spapé and Hommel (2008) observed how the 
stimulus modality of an irrelevant stimulus dimension determined 
subsequent adaptations to conflict. Specifically, Spapé and Hommel (2008) 
used an auditory Stroop where the word presented on the screen indicated 
participant's response, while at the same time a congruent or incongruent 
word could be auditory presented. Notably, this auditory word presentation 
was brought by either a male or female voice. Their results demonstrated 
how adaptations to conflict only occurred when the task-irrelevant voice 
(male or female) repeated, versus alternated (Spapé and Hommel, 2008). 
The authors concluded that conflict-induced adaptations are therefore 
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mediated by the automatic retrieval of specific episodic events (Spapé, 
2009; Spapé and Hommel, 2008). This is very much in line with our results 
demonstrating the role of response modality (Chapter 2) and visual context 
(Chapter 4) in determining adaptations to conflict, but also with the more 
general framework of Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009). Other studies 
have further supported this idea. For example, Fischer, Plessow, Kunde, and 
Kiesel (2010) demonstrated how task context, rather than task load, was an 
important factor in predicting trial-to-trial modulations in the Simon task. 
Correspondingly, Hazeltine, Lightman, Schwarb, and Schumacher (2011) 
demonstrated how stimulus modality repetitions, but not alternations, set the 
stage for conflict adaptation (but see their Experiments 2 and 4). Lastly, also 
in the task-switching literature, Dreisbach and Wenke (2011) showed how 
irrelevant stimulus feature repetitions can impede task-switching 
performance, presumably because these features were integrated in 
associative learning processes after successful response executions on the 
previous trial.  
Still, we would like to note that some studies have also observed 
Gratton effects across "task-sets" or stimulus modalities (Akçay & 
Hazeltine, 2008; Freitas, Bahar, Yang, & Banai, 2007; Hazeltine et al., 
2011). Therefore, similar to our argumentation in Chapter 2, Hazeltine and 
colleagues (2011) argued that it is important to consider that "task-sets" can 
have flexible boundaries. We can predict more generalization across tasks 
when the tasks exhibit more overlap. However, these flexible boundaries do 
not only depend on such accidental task properties, but can also vary 
dependent on task instructions, feature saliency, and people's goals 
(Hazeltine et al., 2011).  
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Reinforcement signals modulate adaptations to conflict 
Having demonstrated how adaptations to conflict can be understood 
by a conflict-induced strengthening of associations, we were interested in 
how reinforcement signals might help in bringing about this effect.  In the 
introduction, we hypothesized that, in the spirit of reinforcement learning, 
the above described learning effects can be modulated by reinforcement 
signal processing.  
In Chapter 3, we put this hypothesis to the test by presenting 
infrequent contingent rewards in a flanker experiment (Experiment 1), and a 
task-switching study (Experiment 2). Our results suggested that both the 
Gratton and Goschke effect were enhanced after rewarded trials, but 
reduced, in fact absent, after no-reward trials. This absence of a Gratton and 
Goschke effect was not entirely foreseen. Although the modulation of these 
adaptations to conflict were in the hypothesized direction, we did not predict 
that the sequential modulations after conflict would also be largely 
diminished after no-reward trials. Nonetheless, this observation is consistent 
with previous literature, demonstrating that reward signals often preserve 
otherwise observed attentional effects (e.g., Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 
2010a; Muhle-Karbe & Krebs, 2012), while no-reward trials tend to weaken 
or counteract these effects
1
. Our effects are consistent with those of Stürmer, 
Nigbur, Schacht, and Sommer (2011), also demonstrating an enhanced 
Gratton effect after reward, but inconsistent with those of van Steenbergen, 
Band, and Hommel (2009, 2012) who showed that reward counteracts 
                                                     
1
 It was exactly driven by this observation that we choose to investigate the potential 
rewarding nature of resolving cognitive conflict in Chapter 6. Our chapters were 
introduced independently in the introduction, but, in fact, our hypothesis for Chapter 
6 originated from the results of Chapter 3. We hypothesized that the reward signals 
in Chapter 3 might have superseded motivational aspects otherwise present in tasks 
without an explicit reward manipulation, thereby demotivating people after no-
reward trials.  
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conflict adaptation. Below, we will argue why we believe this might be due 
to the nature of the stimuli used.  
In Chapter 4, we wanted to examine if our reward manipulation might 
also have an impact on the context-sensitivity of adaptations to conflict. 
Combining our preceding two hypotheses, we predicted that reward would 
enhance the conflict-induced strengthening of associations, and do so in a 
context-specific manner. Our findings confirm this hypothesis by showing 
how adaptations to conflict are enhanced after high reward on context 
repetitions, but not on context alternations. Moreover, our data shows a 
second pattern, in that following low reward, the Gratton effect was 
significant  on context alternations, but not on context repetitions. Similarly, 
Hickey et al. (2010a) and Della Libera and Chelazzi (2009) demonstrated 
how low reward might act to shift attention to alternative task features, 
thereby strengthening associations to these, rather than target, features. 
However, this pattern has to be interpreted with caution. For example, in 
Experiment 3, the Gratton effect after low reward on context repetitions was 
numerically the same as on context alternations, and reached near 
significance. Therefore, we believe the most important message from this 
experiment is that reward enhances adaptations to conflict in a context-
sensitive manner, but the precise conditions and mechanisms remain to be 
investigated. 
In both Chapters 3 and 4, the magnitude of the (contextual) impact of 
reward on cognitive control was often predicted by the participant’s score 
on the BAS Reward Responsiveness subscale of the BIS/BAS personality 
assessment, consistent with earlier reports demonstrating a relationship 
between BAS subscales and the impact of reward on cognitive control or 
attentional selection (e.g. Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010b; Van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009). We can see these correlations as a 
manipulation check reassuring us that the overall effects of the 
reinforcement signals were indeed reward driven, but these correlations can 
also be seen as support for the general idea that motivational and affective 
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modulations of cognitive control are highly dependent on individual 
differences, as recently stressed by Kanske (2012).  
The latter was even stronger demonstrated in Chapter 5. There, we 
aimed at looking into the impact of punishment signals on the Gratton 
effect. We assumed that, much like rewards, punishments could reinforce 
behavior and support the conflict-induced strengthening of associations. 
Although this could sound counterintuitive at first (punishments normally 
signal that actions should not be repeated), note that our punishment 
schedule (infrequently) punished erroneous, and too slow (slower than 350 
milliseconds) responses only. Therefore, the punishments signaled a need 
for improved task performance. Although our results suggest that 
punishment signals reinforced adaptations after conflict, this effect was not 
observed for high punishment-sensitive participants. In fact, highly 
punishment-sensitive participants only slowed down after punishments, 
rather than reinforcing sequential congruency effects. Similar results were 
obtained in the study of Stürmer et al. (2011). Although this could indicate 
that all participants in the study of Stürmer and colleagues were overly 
sensitive to punishments, this effect may also be confounded with only 
punishing the slowest responses in their design. Due to autocorrelation 
between nearby trials, it could be more likely to observe slower reaction 
times after (slower) punished trials, than no-punishment trials. 
Together, these three Chapters offer us interesting insights in how 
reinforcement signals can reinforce conflict-induced learning processes. 
Both infrequent rewards and punishments (when not too disruptive), 
irrespective of their valence, showed to uphold adaptations to conflict 
(Chapters 3 and 5). This is in line with the idea that arousing stimuli, 
notwithstanding their valence, can help at promoting the Hebbian learning 
processes (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). Yet, a strict interpretation of 
Botvinick's model (2007) - assuming that conflict adaptation is aversiveness 
driven, and hence can be counteracted by reward (van Steenbergen et al., 
2009) - can no longer hold, given that reward signals, assumed to induce 
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positive feelings, did not counteract, but enhance both the Gratton and 
Goschke effects in our studies. In Chapter 4, our reward signals were not 
confounded with frequency. Note that there, we introduced both high- and 
low-reward signals, closely following the design of Hickey and colleagues 
(2010a), to test if high reward would again enhance adaptations to conflict, 
but now in a context-sensitive manner. Low reward trials too, modulated the 
Gratton effect, by enhancing it on context alternations. Therefore we believe 
these reinforcement signals mainly manipulated which context features 
would be incorporated in the conflict-induced reinforcement of associations, 
consistent with the overall observation of Hickey and colleagues (2010a) 
that low reward shifts attention towards the distractor context. Although 
theoretically building further on the ideas of Chapter 2 and 3, the 
experimental design does bear some differences with our other 
reinforcement signal manipulations. The low-reward signals should 
especially not be confused with the punishment signals used in Chapter 5. 
Whereas the former followed correct responses only, the latter also 
indicated erroneous and "too slow" responses. Moreover, the latter could be 
overcome, whereas the former just indicated less luck after successfully 
having completed a conflict trial. 
 
The motivational significance of conflict processing 
Conflict adaptation effects are a reflection of trial-to-trial conflict-
induced (Hebbian) learning effects, as suggested by both their specificity to 
contextual features and susceptibility to learning signals. However, our next 
research question was to investigate what drives these learning effects in 
contexts without explicit rewards or punishments. We believe that the 
answer to this question lies in a reinterpretation of reinforcement signals, 
rather than trying to dismiss the applicability of reinforcement learning 
theories in "reinforcement-signal-free" environments. To this end - partially 
reciting Satterthwaithe and colleagues (2012) - we believe that being right 
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could actually very well be its own reward. In a similar vein, Aarts, De 
Houwer, and Pourtois (2012) demonstrated how correct responses are more 
positively evaluated than errors. Therefore, Chapter 6 was set up to test the 
hypothesis that resolving cognitive conflict can be perceived as more 
positive, or rewarding, countering its negative evaluation before response 
execution (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Fritz & Dreisbach, in press). 
In line with this prediction, we demonstrated that, while observing 
incongruent trials (relative to congruent trials) can be perceived as negative 
(our Experiment 1, replicating Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Fritz & 
Dreisbach, in press), responding to these trials was experienced as positive 
(our Experiments 2 and 4). Furthermore, in testing if this was specific to 
overcoming conflicting information for efficient task performance, we tested 
if also overcoming a similarity judgment would be followed by a more 
positive emotion. The latter, according to our Experiment 3, was not the 
case. In fact, if anything, the affective priming paradigm suggested more 
negative feelings after dissimilar (difficult), than similar (easy) trials. This 
could indicate that our effect in Experiments 2 and 4 is specific to 
overcoming conflict. However, we believe this interpretation should be 
treated with caution, for a number of reasons. First, we only tested one other 
paradigm manipulating task  difficulty. It could be that the non-existence of 
our effect could be due to the less motivating aspect of this task, rather than 
the unique motivating aspect of conflict tasks. Second, Satterthwaithe and 
colleauges (2012), who did not use a conflict task but an n-back task where 
participants need to indicate if a figure is identical to the n-th preceding trial 
(varying n as a measure of difficulty), did find enhanced ventral striatum 
activation (usually associated with feelings of reward), after correct as 
opposed to incorrect trials; an effect that grew as a function of task 
difficulty. Third, the RVPM model of Silvetti and colleagues (2011) predict 
this effect only on the basis of outcome expectancies and, hence, does not 
differentiate between different sorts of task difficulty. Still, Experiment 3 
does come to suggest that task difficulty alone, might not be sufficient for 
expecting enhanced positive feelings after successful task performance. 
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Performance relatedness of affect determines affective modulations of 
conflict control 
In our last empirical chapter, Chapter 7, we studied if adaptations to 
conflict, understood as a manifestation of conflict-induced cognitive 
stability, would be modulated by affect, and if so, which role performance 
contingency would play therein. We demonstrated how the Goschke effect 
was promoted following performance-contingent negative pictures, and non-
contingent positive pictures, but counteracted after performance-contingent 
positive pictures and non-contingent negative pictures. These results are 
consistent with the idea that only following contingent positive pictures, a 
feeling of post-goal affect signals that a more exploratory mode can be 
permitted, thereby counteracting the Goschke effect (Carver, 2003; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2011, van Steenbergen et al., 2009), while after contingent 
negative pictures, a higher need for task focus is being called for, resulting 
in an enhanced conflict-induced strengthening of associations (van 
Steenbergen et al., 2012). Following non-contingent pictures, this 
observation was reversed, consistent with the idea that non-contingent 
negative pictures might distract attention away from the task (see also 
Padmala, Bauer, & Pessoa, 2011). Padmala and colleagues even observed 
counteracted conflict adaptations and overall slower response times after 
non-contingent negative pictures, but note that their picture set included 
more salient negative pictures (such as mutilated corpses) than ours, which 
were presented immediately after the response and half a second before next 
stimulus presentation. In contrast, non-contingent positive pictures can 
induce an approach motivation, moving attention towards the task and its 
ongoing strengthening of associations (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; 
Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2009). 
Most importantly, these results come to stress the importance of 
taking into account performance contingency when investigating inter-trial 
effects of affective stimuli. This clearly demonstrates that, for example, 
arousal alone, irrespective of its task relevance, cannot be the sole 
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contributor to modulations of conflict-induced strengthening of associations 
(Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). Secondly, our results suggest that the 
observations that positive affect counteracts (van Steenbergen et al., 2009), 
while negative affect enhances adaptations to conflict (van Steenbergen et 
al., 2012), only holds for affect inducements introduced as relevant for task 
performance. However, these results stand in sharp contrast with our 
findings from Chapter 3, suggesting seemingly diverging effects for reward 
signals and performance-contingent positive affect inducements.  
 
In these next paragraphs, we would like to explore the different 
frameworks that could either integrate or disambiguate our findings, but also 
demonstrate how Chapter 7, although convincingly stressing the importance 
of performance contingency in affect modulations, only offers a first step 
towards exploring the exact mechanisms responsible for affective 
modulations of cognitive control. In our introduction, we already suggested 
some potential underlying factors that might lie at the root of our differential 
results between Chapter 7 and Chapters 3, 4, and 5. However, in what 
follows we would like to tentatively extend this discussion to other factors 
that could have played an important role in creating these different effects of 
affective and motivational variables on adaptations to conflict.  
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ON THE THIN LINE BETWEEN REWARD AND AFFECT: 
REWARD AS A DIMENSION 
In our introduction, but also in the preceding part of this discussion, 
we often kept reinforcement signals and affect as separate entities. We 
explicitly distinguished the beneficial effects of reinforcement signals on 
adaptations to conflict (Chapters 3 to 5), from the effects of affect on 
cognitive stability and flexibility (Chapter 7; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004). 
This dissociation has had its benefits in that it assures the best link to 
previous literature and studies, and it has been argued and demonstrated that 
both might have different, sometimes opposing, effects on cognitive control 
and attention (Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Chiew & Braver, 2012). Indeed, 
our results corroborate this idea, by demonstrating how performance-
contingent reward signals enhanced the Goschke effect (Chapter 3), while 
performance-contingent positive affect counteracted the Goschke effect 
(Chapter 7).  
But are those two all that different? And if so, where do they diverge? 
There is often a thin line between studies that investigate the one or the 
other, making it sometimes hard to distinguish the effects of reward from 
positive affect (Aarts et al., 2012; van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2012). 
Therefore, we cannot pretend that reward and positive affect are entirely 
independent constructs. For example, we took the observation of facilitated 
responses to positive affective words as possible evidence for the rewarding 
aspect of overcoming cognitive conflict (Chapter 6), clearly assuming that 
positive affect is an inherent part of the reward experience. This is referred 
to as the hedonic aspect of reward (Berridge & Robinson, 2003) and is even 
more apparent when emotional symbols are used to signal reward. Although 
most studies use monetary gains denoted by (relatively) abstract symbols 
(our Chapters 3 and 4, Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010; Hickey et al., 
2010a, 2010b; Lu et al., 2013; Padmala & Pessoa, 2011; Savine & Braver, 
2010; Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, & Sommer, 2011), some have used smiley 
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faces or affective pictures to indicate the monetary gain (our Chapter 7; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2009; 2012). 
In that respect, the main difference between Chapters 3 and 4 on the 
one hand, and Chapter 7, on the other, lies in the different type of reward
2
 
signal used (for an overview on different kind of emotional stimuli, see 
Okon-Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, in press). Specifically, when 
salient enough, the effect of the hedonic aspect of reward might override the 
motivational part of reward (a dissociation following the theoretical work of 
Berridge & Robinson, 2003; Smith, Berridge, & Aldridge, 2011), thereby 
signaling a comfortable environment after successful performance (Carver, 
2003; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011), allowing for a more exploratory 
mode. In contrast, the reward signals used in Chapter 3 and 4 or the studies 
of Stürmer et al. (2011) likely acted as mere learning signals, mainly 
eliciting a motivational component (i.e. encouraging to enhance associations 
after conflict). The latter might entail a higher motivational saliency, as 
suggested by Gable and Harmon-Jones (2011), therefore bringing about a 
form of pre-goal affect (the overall goal, getting the best score, has yet to be 
achieved). 
Consider the following analogy: Imagine you are playing pinball at 
the arcade. The main goal is to keep the steel ball away from the drain by 
using two hand-controlled "flippers" to gather as many points as possible. 
                                                     
2
 Feeding into this difficult dissociation is the divergent use of the term reward. Note 
that Merriam-Webster's dictionary defines reward both as "something that is given in 
return for good or evil done or received or that is offered or given for some service 
or attainment" and "a stimulus administered to an organism following a correct or 
desired response that increases the probability of occurrence of the response". This 
first definition is the definition we have been using throughout this dissertation, only 
describing the intended manipulation of the experimental design, but not its effect. 
The second definition, derived from early learning psychology, already implicates 
the anticipated effect that it will reinforce the behavior it follows.  
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As you will see your score raising, you can experience those as reward 
signals narrowing your focus and helping you to concentrate on the game. 
However, secondary objectives and bonus missions can maximize your 
score even faster. Achieving those bonus missions or breaking a record, 
often indicated by a victory song or flickering lights, will get you even more 
excited, up to the point this might bring you in a positive mood which will 
broaden your focus, and increase distractibility. Similarly, our reward 
signals in Chapters 3 and 4 helped us focusing at the task, while the more 
salient reward signals in Chapter 7 (affective pictures) induced a positive 
mood and exploratory focus, counteracting task focus, but facilitating task 
switching.  
This dissociation does not necessarily have to constitute a dichotomy 
in reward signal type. Rather, it could also represent both ends of a 
continuum, where the more salient or affective a reward signal becomes, the 
more it will bring the subject into a positive (long- or short-term) mood, 
setting the stage for an exploratory mode of cognitive control. When, on the 
contrary, the reinforcement signals are more basic, merely providing 
somebody with informatory feedback, this person will try to integrate this 
feedback by reinforcing (ongoing) task association updating processes. 
Optimally, this hypothesis could be tested in a paradigm where the saliency 
or magnitude of affective stimuli is parametrically manipulated, best taking 
into account individual differences in responsiveness to these stimuli. Such 
a design could potentially demonstrate how reward signals are most 
efficient, when not too salient (for a similar reasoning on punishment 
signals, see Chapter 5). 
Interestingly, in a recent review, Bijleveld, Custers and Aarts (2012) 
suggested that rewards can be processed on different levels. When rewards 
are presented only briefly, or time does not permit a full processing of the 
reward signal, rewards are only processed in a rudimentary form, quickly 
updating task associations and facilitating task performance. However, when 
rewards can be processed more fully, more strategic decisions can be made 
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and the effect on performance can then diverge from those of initial reward 
processing. We believe this framework can also apply to the above-
described dissociation between our Chapters 3 and 4, and Chapter 7: When 
time is short and reward signals are basic, rewards result in a quick 
reinforcement of the ongoing learning processes. However, when the inter-
trial interval was prolonged, and rewards were more salient, the rewards 
signals promoted an exploratory mode, helping at counteracting the conflict-
induced strengthening of associations that are disadvantageous for task-
switching. 
 
LOOKING AT THE NEGATIVE SIDE OF THINGS 
Besides the reinforcing aspects of reward and the broadening of 
attention after positive affect, we also looked into punishment signals and 
negative affect. Similar to the debate on positive affect and reward (Chiew 
& Braver, 2011), models of cognitive and affective control often treat the 
effects of punishment and negative affect interchangeably (e.g., Botvinick, 
2007; Shackman et al., 2011). These models are aimed at unifying and 
integrating, rather than specifying, the potential effects of punishment, affect 
and cognitive conflict. However, we argue that a dissociation addressing the 
performance-contingency of negative affect is of prime importance for 
modeling its resulting effects on cognitive control. We demonstrated how 
negative affect, when performance-contingent, can promote conflict-induced 
cognitive stability. However, when non-contingent, negative affect will most 
likely distract attention away from the task, disrupting the ongoing 
enhancement of associations after conflict (Chapter 7). In our punishment 
study, Chapter 5, we demonstrated how punishment signals also promoted 
the Gratton effect, as far as people were not too sensitive to punishment. 
Similar to unexpected non-contingent negative affect (Chapter 7), subjects' 
attention was distracted away from the task, when punishment signals were 
perceived as too salient (Chapter 5). Attentive readers may wonder why 
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attention was not captured away from the task (impeding rather than 
promoting cognitive stability) in the performance-contingent condition of 
Chapter 7 as well, given that the negative pictures could easily be 
considered more arousing than the depictions of "-1" in the punishment task 
(Chapter 5). However, we believe that at least three factors may have 
dampened the arousing aspect of the pictures used in Chapter 7, relative to 
the punishment signals in Chapter 5. First, both the time intervals between 
response and feedback signals and feedback signals and the next trial were 
more than three seconds longer (per interval) in Chapter 7, than Chapter 5. 
Second, the punishment signals in Chapter 5 were infrequently presented 
relative to no-punishment trials, while the performance-contingent negative 
pictures Chapter 7 were equally often presented as their positive 
counterparts. Third, the negative pictures in Chapter 7 did not influence 
monetary status, meaning bad luck after correct responses, while the 
punishment signals in Chapter 5 did affect the score and could be avoided 
by responding (very) fast. 
 
AROUSAL AFTER ALL? 
As introduced above, Verguts and Notebaert (2009) suggested that the 
arousing value of stimuli, irrespective of their valence or task relatedness, 
can help at reinforcing ongoing Hebbian learning processes that underlie the 
adaptations to conflict. We already refuted this hypothesis by demonstrating 
how task relatedness or performance contingency can, in fact, play a major 
role in the affective modulations of cognitive control (being the take-home 
message of Chapter 7). This suggests that the way we deal and interact with 
affectively salient stimuli largely depends on what they tell us about our 
performance. However, although we drew conclusions about the valence 
dimension of our affective stimuli, the arousal dimension was insufficiently 
controlled for. We did not measure skin conductance responses, alpha 
power, or pupil dilations (although we are currently analyzing data looking 
248     CHAPTER 8 
into pupil dilation measures), generally recognized as physiological 
measures of arousal. Both our reward ( Chapter 3) and punishment (Chapter 
5) data could be considered as a demonstration of enhanced conflict 
adaptation as a result of arousal-inducing signals, albeit only when task-
relevant (see control experiments Chapter 3). Similarly, in Chapter 7, the 
negative pictures can also be considered more arousing than the positive 
pictures. We did not measure arousal responses in those stimuli, nor did we 
assess arousal ratings by the participants themselves. However, according to 
the IAPS database, the negative pictures we selected were scored slightly, 
but reliably, more arousing than the positive pictures. By nature, negative 
information is more arousing than positive information (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Rozin & Royzman, 2001), and this 
was also reflected in the IAPS database. We deliberately chose to match the 
negative and positive pictures on their semantic content (e.g., smiling vs. 
crying child, for a similar reasoning see Taylor, Phan, Decker, & Liberzon, 
2003; Waszak & Pholulamdeth, 2009), rather than to match arousal levels as 
this would yield an artificial selection of high arousing positive pictures 
(often erotic) or an artificial selection of low arousing negative pictures 
(often non-living things). Therefore, the negative pictures we selected did 
not only differ in valence, but also in arousal. This could mean that the 
Goschke effect promoted by performance-contingent negative pictures is 
driven by its arousing value, rather than the valence of these pictures.  
Consistently, some studies investigating the effects of task-relevant 
emotional stimuli, have demonstrated how emotional saliency, irrespective 
of the valence, can facilitate task performance. For example, while 
Verbruggen & De Houwer (2007) observed how task-irrelevant emotional 
stimuli impeded response inhibition (see also Blair et al., 2007), Pessoa, 
Padmala, Kenzer, and Bauer (2011) demonstrated how emotion can also 
improve response inhibition, when using these emotional stimuli as stop-
signals (i.e., making them task-relevant). Similarly, while task-irrelevant 
emotion has been shown to interfere with cognitive conflict processing 
(Hart, Green, Casp, & Belger, 2010; Padmala, Bauer, & Pessoa, 2011), task-
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relevant emotional stimuli (making the emotional stimuli the target), did 
seem to speed up conflict resolution (Kanske & Kotz, 2010; 2011a; 2011b). 
Taken together, these studies demonstrate how emotional arousal, 
irrespective of valence, can help at a faster processing of the target, hence 
facilitating conflict processing.  
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has ever investigated 
the effect of emotional arousal in performance-contingent feedback trials 
(for example by comparing to neutral pictures) on conflict adaptation 
processes. Studies that did control for arousal, investigating the influence of 
picture presentation (van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2011), or mood 
inducements (Larson, Gray, Clayson, Jones, & Kirwan, in press; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010), on conflict control did not notice an 
effect of arousal over valence (but see Demanet, Liefooghe, & Verbrugge, 
2011, showing an effect of arousal, rather than valence, in voluntary task-
switching). To better dissociate the affective from arousing effects of 
feedback stimuli on adaptations to conflict dependent on performance 
contingency, simultaneous assessment of physiological arousal measures 
would be required.  
 
SKINNER UNDER THE SKIN: 
BRAIN REGIONS AND NEUROTRANSMITTER FUNCTIONS 
In his review on fifty years of Behaviorism, Skinner consistently 
talked about processes "under the skin" (Skinner, 1963), and refused to 
describe these processes as long as they are not observable. Fifty years later, 
scientific progress has much progressed and now allows us to 
simultaneously measure brain activity while performing experimental 
paradigms, exponentially increasing insights into how neurophysiological 
variables can help explaining our everyday behavior. 
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Most models of conflict adaptation (Botvinick, 2001; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009) assume that conflict is being monitored by the ACC, while 
the updating of task sets following conflict occurs in the dorso-lateral 
prefrontal-cortex (DLPFC). Consistently, studies that examined the Gratton 
effect inside the scanner, demonstrated how the DLPFC is differentially 
recruited following incongruent trials (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005a, 2005b; 
Kerns, 2006; Kerns et al., 2004; van Veen & Carter, 2006), guaranteeing 
more efficient conflict processing. In our study, we chose to investigate an 
alternative indexation of adaptations to conflict: the Goschke effect, or the 
observation of an enhanced task-switch cost following incongruent trials. By 
pairing a task-switching experiment with functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) in Chapter 7, we examined if the enhanced task-switch cost 
following incongruent trials would reflect a similar neural signature as the 
well-studied Gratton effect. Indeed, our Goschke effect was similarly 
reflected in enhanced DLPFC, but also striatum, activation on task 
alternations relative to task repetitions, following incongruent trials only. 
We believe this reflects an enhanced recruitment of these task-set 
reconfiguration networks to adapt to the less-prepared-for task alternations 
after the strengthened task associations following conflict. Similarly, Hyafil, 
Summerfield, and Koechlin (2009) demonstrated more DLPFC activation on 
task alternations, where both the previous and current trial were 
incongruent. Hyafil and colleagues (2009) further argued and demonstrated 
that only the DLPFC, but not the ACC, played a role in dealing with the 
interfering enhanced task-focus after cognitive conflict (Botvinick et al., 
2001, Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). The ACC, modulated by the overall 
switch cost, only configures the priorities associated with the new task 
(Hyafil et al., 2009). We did not observe the ACC in our task-switch 
contrast, but a ROI analysis on the medial frontal cortex (just dorsal to the 
ACC) identified in our above discussed task-switch contrast showed no 
modulation of the switch cost by previous congruency (p > .1), similar to 
Hyafil et al. (2009).  
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Although not discussed in Chapter 7, we also looked at the conflict 
contrast, responsible for triggering the conflict-enhanced task-switch cost 
(the Goschke effect). This congruency effect (incongruent > congruent 
trials) was associated with motor cortex and striatum, but no ACC, 
activation. The striatum activation could reflect increased intrinsic 
motivation after successful response execution (Lutz, Pedroni, Nadig, 
Luechinger, & Jäncke, 2012), which has been found to increase with task-
difficulty (Satterthwaite et al., 2012). One step further, our data could even 
suggest that the striatum (Humphries & Prescott, 2010), rather than, or next 
to, the ACC, might have played an important role in signaling for 
subsequent adaptations (the striatum has been suggested to play an 
important role in adaptive behavior following conflict, Silvetti et al., 2011). 
Consistently, a recent review on the ACC (Mansouri, Tanaka, & Buckley, 
2009) concluded that, despite its active role as monitor, its importance in 
regulating subsequent behavior and signaling for adaptations to other brain 
regions is still uncertain. Still, the ACC has been observed in many other 
conflict tasks (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter & van Veen, 2007), and was 
recently shown to be crucial for bringing about the Gratton effect, as 
evidenced after a surgically targeted ablation of the ACC (Sheth et al., 
2012). Interestingly, the ACC entertains connections to noradrenergic and 
dopaminergic neurotransmitter systems, both having been modeled as 
crucial learning signals in reinforcement learning processes, such as 
Hebbian learning (e.g., Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2009), the exploitation/exploration balance (e.g., Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Cools & D'Esposito, 2011; Frank, Doll, Oas-Terpstra, & 
Moreno, 2009), and reward learning (e.g., Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sara, 
2009). 
Although there have been first studies looking into the role of such 
regions home to dopaminergic (Boehler et al., 2011a; 2011b; Satterthwaite 
et al., 2012) or noradrenergic (Krebs, Fias, Achten, & Boehler, in press) 
neuron populations in cognitive control performance, no study, to our 
knowledge, has demonstrated a functional role of these regions in conflict 
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adaptation. However, van Bochove, Van der Haegen, Notebaert, and 
Verguts (in press) demonstrated how adaptations to conflict varied as a 
function of eye-blink behavior, as a measure of dopaminergic activity, but 
not pupil dilation, as a measure of noradrenergic activity. Moreover, in line 
with this idea, Duthoo and colleagues (submitted) demonstrated how 
dopaminergic medication determined if Parkinson disease patients adapted 
to conflict or not. By contrasting Stroop task behavior once on medication, 
once following overnight withdrawal, Duthoo and colleagues demonstrated 
how the Gratton effect persisted following overnight withdrawal, but was 
absent on dopaminergic medication. These results were interpreted in terms 
of a dopamine overdose hypothesis (Cools & D'Esposito, 2011) stating that 
the medication may have overdosed relatively preserved brain regions in 
Parkinson disease patients, such as the ventral striatum and prefrontal 
cortex, thereby impeding adaptations to conflict. While this study offers 
some first interesting insights in the possible primary neurotransmitters 
responsible for conflict control, more studies are needed to unfold the 
precise functions essential for adaptations to conflict. In that respect, a more 
systematic investigation of these neurotransmitters and associated brain 
regions (and their relation to the common ACC-DLPFC loop) would be 
desirable, and might benefit from the already developed models on 
noradrenaline and dopamine learning (e.g. Montague, Hyman, & Cohen, 
2004), reminiscent from reinforcement learning principles. 
Another avenue to approach this research question of how 
reinforcement learning can help at uncovering the brain regions important 
for conflict adaptation would be by investigating the impact of 
reinforcement learning signals inside the scanner. Therefore, in Chapter 7, 
we also investigated the impact of affective pictures on the Goschke effect. 
Moreover, we were interested in how these affective variables could impact 
adaptations to conflict differently, depending on the performance 
contingency of these pictures. Yet, because neuroscience models of affective 
modulation of cognitive control (Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999; Gray, 2001; 
Pessoa, 2008, 2009; Shackman et al. 2011) are unclear about the exact role 
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of performance-contingency (Chiew & Braver, 2011), the neural signature 
of these type of trial-to-trial interactions between emotion and cognition is 
still unidentified. For example, in their adaptive control hypothesis, 
Shackman and colleagues (2011) demonstrate how the ACC makes a similar 
functional contribution to negative affect, punishment, and cognitive 
control, but make no dissociation between the potentially diverging effects 
of task-irrelevant negative affect or tasks-relevant negative affect and 
punishment.  
Interestingly, although our overall Goschke effect was reflected in the 
differential recruitment of striatal and dorsolateral frontopariatal regions, its 
interaction with affective picture presentation, dependent on performance 
contingency, was mainly reflected in a network surrounding activations of 
the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(vmPFC). Specifically, activity in those regions was increased when 
performance was fastest, following an inverse function of the respective 
Goschke effects. This is consistent with the involvement of this network in 
facilitating cognitive control for task-switching (Hayden, Smith, & Platt, 
2010) and, more generally, cognitive flexibility (Pearson, Heilbronner, 
Barack, Hayden, & Platt, 2011; Waltz et al., 2013), as well as the influence 
of positive mood thereon (Sakaki & Niki, 2011; Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
Note that contrary to the theories suggesting that positive affect might 
promote cognitive flexibility via dopaminergic gating signals to the DLPFC 
(Ashby et al., 1999; Braver & Cohen, 2000; Dreisbach, 2006), our data 
shows a modulation of this PCC-vmPFC network. However, the modulation 
of these regions could still be driven by dopaminergic modulations (Dang, 
Donde, Madison, O'Neil, & Jagust, 2012; Delaveau et al., 2010; Nagano-
Saito et al., 2008; Nagano-Saito, Liu, Doyon, & Dagher, 2009). Further 
studies, where both the effects of affective modulations and dopaminergic 
medication are investigated in the scanner could offer new perspectives on 
this topic. 
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CONFLICT MONITORING AND REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: 
AN OVERARCHING FRAMEWORK? 
When introducing this dissertation, we stressed how the rich history 
of reinforcement learning theory can contribute to a better understanding of 
complex cognitive control behavior. Inspired by the accumulating models, 
theories, and data on this topic, we will now outline a framework in which, 
we believe, adaptations to conflict can be best understood. We hypothesized 
and demonstrated how one of the hallmark effects of cognitive control, the 
Gratton effect, could be reinterpreted in terms of conflict-induced Hebbian 
learning (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). This model of Verguts and 
Notebaert (2008, 2009) offers a highly parsimonious approach to unraveling 
the underlying mechanisms of conflict-induced "cognitive control". 
However, we also believe it falls short on some issues.  
Most importantly, as a learning signal for initiating or modulating this 
Hebbian learning process, the model defines the reinforcement factor δ as 
conflict-likelihood, associated with an increased arousal response helping to 
strengthen associations throughout the brain. The only way the model allows 
for reinforcement signals or other variables to influence this monitoring 
process is by adding more arousal to this conflict-induced Hebbian learning 
process (Verguts & Notebaert, 2009). However, we demonstrated how the 
evaluation of a response outcome can significantly impact the conflict-
induced Hebbian learning process and this impact goes well beyond the 
mere effect of arousal alone. Therefore, we believe a computation of 
conflict that includes task performance and outcome expectancies would be 
more desirable. 
Another approach could be to follow the suggestion of Botvinick 
(2007) and argue that adaptations to conflict are motivated by their aversive 
nature, inducing an avoidance response away from mental effort. Although 
Botvinick's suggestion probably applies well to voluntary choice and 
decision making paradigms (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; but 
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see Orr, Carp, & Weissman, 2012), a constant focus on the aversive nature 
of mental effort in forced-choice paradigms might soon be 
counterproductive. Again, also Botvinick's suggestion only describes the 
influence of conflict and the therewith associated affect, but not the 
subsequent performance that follows it, whereas we believe that the 
response following conflict is actually an important aspect of the conflict 
experience that could even alter its affective value. 
 In fact, when people cannot avoid an obstacle, they might actually 
find pleasure in successfully overcoming it, effectively turning a negative 
event into a positive one. We introduced and tested this prediction by 
demonstrating how correct responses to incongruent trials, relative to 
congruent trials, resulted in a more positive state. A model successfully 
capturing this idea is the reward value and prediction model (RVPM) of 
Silvetti and colleagues (2011). Following the principles of reward 
maximization reminiscent to reinforcement learning theories, the RVPM 
explicitly models how cognitive conflict can initially be perceived as 
negative (due to its low outcome expectancy), but, upon resolution, rapidly 
changes into a positive evaluation. Furthermore, it incorporates not only 
both conflict experience and conflict resolution, but also applies to 
reinforcement signal or error processing. For these reasons, this monitoring 
function could serve well to signal adaptations to conflict and the influence 
of reinforcement signals thereon.  
However, the next question that poses itself is what component of the 
RVPM would signal this need for subsequent adjustments: (1) the negative 
prediction error during conflict processing, or (2) positive prediction error 
during conflict resolution, or, if there are any, (3) the reinforcement signals? 
Earlier, we tentatively suggested that the potential rewarding aspect of 
conflict resolution could be what motivates adaptations to conflict. 
However, a conclusion that only correct responses on incongruent trials 
signal conflict adaptation would be too preliminary, but also unlikely. Even 
our own data suggests that the potential rewarding feeling after correctly 
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responding to an incongruent trial does not exclusively promote adaptations 
to conflict: Subsequent reinforcement signals or affective variables can play 
an important role, too.  
Therefore, we would like to stress that the motivational significance 
of cognitive conflict is a product of the aversive nature of cognitive conflict, 
as well as the rewarding impact of successfully overcoming it, and, 
potentially, the reinforcement signals. We propose that all processing stages 
can contribute to the potential signaling for Hebbian learning. Specifically, 
we believe that conflict monitoring processes already start at the initial 
(aversive) experience of conflict processing itself. This idea is 
commensurate with the observation that within-trial conflict processes 
already feed into (or constitute) the adaption processes that influence the 
subsequent trial (Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke, 2011). 
Still, although adaptation processes could be initiated early in time, they are 
constantly subject to modulation by, for example, the conflict resolution 
experience, as well as potential reinforcement signals that follow this. 
Therefore, the RVPM, which constantly updates reward value predictions, 
should be able to incorporate the impact of both conflict detection, and 
resolution, and reinforcement signal parameters on subsequent performance.  
Following the RVPM, a higher reward prediction error could signal 
the higher need for cognitive control. However, to approximate the 
behaviorally observed influence of affective and motivational variables on 
cognitive control, an inverted U-shape, rather than a strictly linear, function 
between the absolute value of the reward prediction error signal and the 
strengthening of associations might even be more appropriate (e.g., Grant & 
Schwartz, 2011; Hills & Hertwig, 2011). This way, we could model how 
increased saliency of (or sensitivity to) punishment signals would be 
associated with more efficient (re)focusing on task performance up to an 
optimal point, after which even higher levels of saliency might only act to 
distract attention away from the task at hand. Similarly, the functionality of 
reward signals in strengthening associations for ongoing behavior can raise 
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as a function of reward salience (or reward sensitivity), where after even 
more salient or affective reward signals will signal a positive mood and 
induce a more exploratory mode enhancing task flexibility, but impeding 
task focus. Error monitoring too, might signal the need for strengthening 
associations as a function of an inverted U-shape. We briefly touched upon 
this idea in Chapter 5, stating that (infrequent) errors, in contrast to 
incongruent trials, send higher reward prediction errors, causing people to 
slow down at first (Notebaert et al., 2009), before adapting task 
performance.  
A last topic that we did not address in the empirical studies of our 
dissertation, but that also calls for our attention in modeling conflict control 
behavior, is the idea that context, rather than conflict, might drive 
adaptations to conflict (Schlaghecken & Martini, 2012). This idea was 
recently supported by two studies (Compton, Huber, Levinson, & Zheutlin, 
2012; Lamers & Roelofs, 2011) that both suggest that congruent, rather than 
incongruent trials, might be driving the Gratton effect (but see Desender, 
Van Lierde, & Van Den Bussche, 2013). Note that none of our studies 
implemented neutral trials, hence the impact of incongruent trials was 
always computed relative to congruent trials. The original conflict 
monitoring system as implemented in the models of Botvinick and 
colleagues (2001) and Verguts and Notebaert (2008; 2009) calculates a form 
of conflict likelihood and thus predominantly focuses on detecting and 
resolving conflict. Although those models can also explain the effects of 
congruent trials (or the absence of conflict) by a loosening of task 
parameters after congruent trials, the main message of Schlaghecken and 
Martini (2012), we believe, is a re-emphasis on how cognitive control is not 
driven by a relative measure of conflict alone. By implementing a monitor as 
described by Silvetti and colleagues (2011), conflict itself loses its special 
value, because the outcome expectancies and performance statistics, rather 
than the conflict itself, would be what determines the need for adaptation. 
Therefore, inherent to its architecture, the RVPM itself models context, 
rather than conflict. 
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Note that these above-mentioned postulations represent guidelines, 
rather than axioms, which we believe, based on our empirical data and 
reviewed literature, might help in contributing to a broader perspective on 
conflict monitoring and the influence of reinforcement learning (signals) 
thereon. At the very least, we think these suggestions (which are obviously 
not exclusively ours) can help spark up the ongoing debate on the roles of 
reinforcement learning and reinforcement signals in conflict monitoring and 
cognitive control. Below, we will outline some future directions, suggesting 
how some of the here presented ideas can be examined. 
 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the interactions 
between conflict monitoring and reinforcement learning, which soon led us 
to reinterpret the conflict adaptation effect as a reinforcement learning 
process itself. We hope our work will help towards a deeper understanding 
of how we adapt to our everyday ever-changing environments, motivating 
others to either confirm, specify, or falsify, the findings and ideas presented 
in this thesis. Therefore, we will end this dissertation by presenting some 
possible ways as to how the role of reinforcement learning in explaining 
conflict monitoring (and beyond) could be further examined. 
In this work, we fostered the idea that adaptations to conflict, as a 
well-studied manifestation of cognitive control, would be subject to a 
conflict-induced Hebbian learning rule. By using this framework, we could 
exemplify how associative learning processes can underlie flexible trial-to-
trial behavioral adaptations. The adaptation-by-binding model naturally 
extends its predictions to all conflict-induced forms of learning. For 
example, we demonstrated how also the Goschke effect (Goschke, 2000) 
could be seen as a very similar indexation of conflict-induced Hebbian 
learning. Another prime example of this mechanism could be seen in the 
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asymmetrical task-switch cost (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994). The 
asymmetric task-switch cost is the finding that in task switch studies with 
two tasks of differing task difficulty, task-switch costs are larger for the 
easier task, than for the more difficult task. That is, people experience more 
difficulty when switching to the easier task, than switching to the more 
difficult task. This is typically studied within a vocal Stroop task with 
incongruent stimuli only, where participants have to switch between word-
naming (easier) and color-naming (more difficult task). Again, the model of 
Verguts & Notebaert (2009) could explain this by strengthening task-
relevant connections after conflict. After performing the color-naming task 
(more conflict), subjects strengthen their task-relevant connections. This 
makes it more difficult to switch to the easier task, thereby increasing the 
task-switch cost. By examining the (motivational, context-specific, etc.) 
modulations of such effects, next to the popular Gratton effect, we can 
expand our knowledge on trial-to-trial adaptations after conflict. However, 
also beyond conflict, using a different reinforcement factor than conflict 
likelihood (as suggested above), this Hebbian learning rule could easily be 
extended to other paradigms. For example, an asymmetric task-switch cost 
where the differences in task difficulty are not necessarily defined by 
(differences in) stimulus- or response-conflict. Alternatively, a recent study 
by Moeller, Klein, & Nuerk (in press) already extended the implications of 
the model of Verguts and Notebaert (2008, 2009) to the research domain of 
implicit learning. 
Secondly, we demonstrated how the impact of reward could be 
investigated, not only by using cues, but also by examining the after-effects 
of reward presentation on attention and performance. Surprisingly, in the 
research domain of cognitive control, such reward studies have only been 
scarcely investigated. For example, to the best of our knowledge, the 
paradigm of Hickey and colleagues (2010a) was the first to examine this in 
visual attention, and the paradigm of van Steenbergen and colleagues (2009) 
in cognitive control. Nevertheless, we believe these rapid modulating effects 
of reward signals on a trial-to-trial level offer some interesting insights and 
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implications for the being-modulated effect of interest, but also for reward 
signal processing itself. By demonstrating the absence of a Gratton effect 
after no-reward trials, we demonstrated how the Gratton effect, also under 
normal conditions, might be subject to reinforcement learning rules (and the 
maximization of reward). Therefore we encourage to investigate these direct 
effects of reward presentation also in other (conflict) tasks. For example, we 
already piloted the effect of reward on the above-mentioned asymmetric 
task-switch cost using a similar reward schedule as Chapter 3, again 
observing an asymmetric task-switch cost after reward, but not after no-
reward trials, F(1,7) = 6.453, p > .05. 
Thirdly, in the introduction we argued that a conflict-induced 
strengthening of associations can be considered as a measure of conflict-
induced cognitive stability. However, this strengthening of associations, and 
the resulting enhanced task focus, might not always ensure the most optimal 
performance. For example, in a task-switching experiment, the enhanced 
task-focus after conflict impedes task switching behavior (the Goschke 
effect). We demonstrated how performance-contingent positive picture 
presentation could help counteracting this conflict-induced cognitive 
stability as a function of more efficient task-switching. In a context-specific 
congruency paradigm (Crump, Gong, & Milliken, 2006), where a context 
(such as location on the screen) could be largely predictive of the 
congruency type, people would benefit from a more cognitive flexible mode. 
If people constantly were to focus on the task alone, they could overlook 
these contingencies that might otherwise benefit their performance. 
Therefore, we believe that the context-specific congruency effect (i.e., the 
observation that the congruency effect is smaller in contexts where 
incongruent trials are more expected) might be enhanced under a cognitive 
flexible mode, in contrast to the Gratton effect. Therefore, in a mood study 
such as the study by van Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel (2010), we could 
expect an enhanced context-specific congruency effect when in a positive 
mood, as opposed to a negative mood, in contrast to the pattern expected 
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and observed for the Gratton effect (Kuhbandner & Zehetleitner, 2011; van 
Steenbergen, Band, & Hommel, 2010). 
Fourthly, we illustrated and demonstrated how positive intrinsic 
reward prediction errors can be enhanced after successfully completing a 
more difficult trial. Although we suggested how this may impact, or even 
determine, the subsequent adaptations to conflict on the following trial, this 
has not yet been investigated. One way to test for this potential relation 
would be to see how this affective priming effect (as demonstrated in 
Chapter 6), might correlate with the Gratton effect, independently measured 
in the same group of participants. This enhanced positive feeling after 
responding to a more difficult trial could also impact the way we deal with 
subsequent feedback. Building further on this idea, we re-analyzed the data 
of Chapter 7, investigating how correct responses, dependent on task 
difficulty (as determined by task sequence and congruency conditions), 
could determine perceived picture saliency. In line with the idea that 
feedback valence processing after correct responses is modulated by task 
difficulty, this interaction uncovered the anterior cingulate cortex and 
premotor cortices. Furthermore, dependent on the contingency condition, 
this led to the differential activation of a memory network, involving the 
parahippocampal gyri and medial temporal lobe. To see if these activations 
reflected enhanced attention to those pictures, and hence improved memory 
(Chun & Turk-Browne, 2007), we ran a follow-up study, in which we 
independently demonstrated how, indeed, task difficulty (and contingency 
condition) impacts picture memory in a surprise recall test. Specifically, 
when contingent on performance, negative pictures (relative to positive 
pictures) presented after correct responses enhanced parahippocampal 
activity and picture memory as a positive function of task difficulty. These 
results suggest that negative, relative to positive, feedback following a 
difficult trial, might be perceived as more salient than the same pictures 
following a more easy trial. This is consistent with the idea that a negative 
stimulus following the rewarding feeling of successfully completing a more 
difficult task induces a larger reward prediction error. These preliminary 
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results are in line with the affective priming study, also adding to the idea 
that performance monitoring has an affective component, that can determine 
the way we perceive feedback and adapt our behavior. Therefore, we believe 
more paradigms and alternative approaches are needed to further uncover 
this impact of cognition on emotion, contrasting to the idea that only 
emotion can bias cognition and not vice versa (e.g., Reeck & Egner, 2011). 
Lastly, earlier in this discussion we already suggested how reward 
studies on cognitive control, independent of the reward implementation in a 
block-, cue-, item- or performance-specific manner, would benefit from 
parametrically manipulating reward saliency. This could be done by 
manipulating its frequency or the type of reward stimuli being used (Okon-
Singer, Lichtenstein-Vidne, & Cohen, in press), but also by taking into 
account individual differences in reward sensitivity. We believe this could 
be important for investigating the hypothesis that reward, as its saliency 
increases, does not always garner the same effects. Specifically, while 
moderate rewards might help reinforce behavior, very salient rewards might 
set a positive mood signaling that goals have been comfortably achieved, 
thereby broadening attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2011). In a similar 
vein, following the ideas of Bijleveld, Custers and Aarts (2012), it would be 
interesting to manipulate the inter-trial interval between reward and next 
stimulus presentations, as a deeper processing of reward might have 
different implications on subsequent behavior. 
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 NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING: 
CONFLICT MONITORING 
EN REINFORCEMENT LEARNING 
INLEIDING 
 In onze dagdagelijkse omgeving dienen we ons constant aan te 
passen aan conflicterende informatie die het efficiënt uitvoeren van 
bewegingen, of het vlot maken van beslissingen, dikwijls bemoeilijken. 
Ondanks het feit dat die obstakels ons regelmatig doen vertragen, of fouten 
doen maken, zijn we al even vaak verrassend goed in het aanpassen aan die 
conflicterende situaties. Dit doet vermoeden dat we beschikken over een 
zeer adaptief mechanisme dat ons helpt ons gedrag bij te sturen en 
efficiënter keuzes te maken. Dit vermogen dat ons alledaags gedrag 
kenmerkt wordt vaak naar gerefereerd onder de noemer "cognitieve 
controle". 
Dit vermogen wordt vaak nagegaan aan de hand van conflict taken. 
Deze paradigmas simuleren dit alledaags conflict door irrelevante informatie 
te presenteren op een computerscherm, die de reactietijden in het uitvoeren 
van een taak doen vertragen, of de accuraatheid doen dalen. Specifiek 
worden in dergelijke taken willekeurig door elkaar congruente of 
incongruente beurten aangeboden. Een gekend voorbeeld van een conflict 
taak is de Stroop taak (Stroop, 1935). Daar dient men de kleur te benoemen 
waarin een woord gepresenteerd wordt. Echter, dit woord kan ook de 
betekenis van een kleur aannemen. Zo kan men bijvoorbeeld vragen de kleur 
van het woord "ROOD" of de kleur van het woord "ZWART" te benoemen. 
Hoewel in beide gevallen het antwoord zwart is, zal het eerste woord (dit is 
een voorbeeld van een incongruente beurt) dit bemoeilijken omdat de 
betekenis van het woord een ander antwoord uitlokt (rood), terwijl het 
tweede woord (dit is een voorbeeld van een congruente beurt) dit net kan 
versnellen omdat de betekenis van het woord hetzelfde antwoord uitlokt 
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(zwart). In dergelijke taken observeert men steeds een congruentie-effect, 
zijnde de verschilscore in reactietijden of accuraatheid tussen incongruente 
en congruente trials. Gratton, Coles en Donchin (1992) toonden daarbij 
overtuigend aan dat dit congruentie-effect steeds kleiner is, wanneer de 
vorige trial incongruent is, dan wanneer de vorige trial congruent is. 
Daarmee was een van de eerste indexeringen van een adaptieve vorm van 
"cognitieve controle" geboren: het Gratton effect. Dit opende heel wat 
mogelijkheden, want het Gratton effect stond toe gemakkelijk "cognitieve 
controle" na te gaan in bijvoorbeeld een fMRI scanner (die beeldvorming 
van de hersenen toestaat), of een EEG-aparaat (wat de elektrische activiteit 
in de hersenen kan meten) om zo de relevante mechanismen achter 
cognitieve controle na te gaan. Precies die ontwikkelingen leidden tot de 
ontwikkeling van het invloedrijk model van Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, en Cohen (2001): de conflict monitoring theorie. 
In hun conflict monitoring theorie stelden Botvinick en collegae voor 
dat conflict wordt gedetecteerd door de anterieur cingulate cortex (ACC). 
Aan de hand van een kwantificeerbare maat kan zo bepaald worden wanneer 
conflict aanwezig is, en kan een signaal doorgestuurd worden naar de 
dorsolaterale prefrontale cortex (DLPFC) om gedrag aan te passen aan het 
gesignaliseerde conflict. Op deze manier kan verklaard worden waarom het 
congruentie-effect steeds kleiner is na incongruente trials, dan na congruente 
trials. Namelijk, op incongruente trials wordt conflict gedetecteerd, en dit 
staat toe om gedrag aan te passen door het verwerken van taakrelevante 
eigenschappen te versterken. Echter, deze implementatie blijft eerder vaag 
en kan bijgevolg niet alle fenomenen verklaren. Zo is het bijvoorbeeld 
onduidelijk hoe de "conflict monitoring theorie" weet waar welke taak(-
eigenschappen) moeten aangepast worden. Bovendien kan deze theorie niet 
instaan voor enkele recente bevindingen die aantonen dat conflict adaptatie, 
oftewel het Gratton effect, op een itemspecifiek niveau werken, eerder dan 
op een algemeen taakniveau.  
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Om cognitieve controle processen beter te kunnen modelleren en 
begrijpen, geloven we dat een nieuwe invalshoek vanuit het 
onderzoeksdomein rond reinforcement learning gunstig kan zijn. 
Reinforcement learning begint reeds bij de eerste ontdekkingen van vroege 
behavioristen zoals Pavlov, Skinner, en Watson, maar groeide de laatste 
decennia exponentieel uit tot een multidisciplinair onderzoeksgebied. In dit 
doctoraat willen we nagaan of deze recente ontwikkelingen, maar ook 
enkele reeds oudere onderzoeksideeën uit de reinforcement learning-
theorieën kunnen bijdragen tot het beter begrijpen van conflict adaptaties.  
Als eerste invalshoek willen we nagaan hoe Hebbiaans leren een 
alternatief kan bieden voor het modelleren van conflictprocessen en meer 
specifiek, het Gratton effect. Hebbiaans leren wordt vaak samengevat door 
de leuze: what fires together, wires together. Eenvoudig samengevat 
betekent dit dat wanneer twee neuronen op dezelfde tijd hun actiepotentiaal 
zenden, ze na verloop van tijd verbindingen met elkaar vormen. In de lijn 
van dit idee is een recent model ontwikkeld aan onze vakgroep dat het 
Gratton effect op die manier verklaart (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008, 2009). 
Meer specifiek wordt er gesteld dat wanneer conflict gedetecteerd wordt, er 
een arousal signaal door de hersenen wordt gestuurd die alle actieve 
associaties versterkt door een Hebbiaans leerprincipe. Desondanks de 
algemeenheid van deze leerregel, leidt ze echter tot heel specifieke 
predicties. Zo kunnen we gaan verwachten dat wanneer actieve 
verbindingen versterkt worden, ze ook taak-irrelevante prominente 
eigenschappen mee kunnen versterken. Evenzeer kunnen we voorspellen dat 
adaptaties na conflict op een item- en effectorspecifiek niveau zullen gaan 
werken. Deze voorspellingen gingen we na in Studies 1 en 3.  
Volgens reinforcement learning-theorieën wordt steeds geleerd in 
functie van het maximaliseren van een bekrachtiging. Dit kan een beloning 
zijn in vorm van voedsel, maar ook geld, of meer vage doelen, zoals het 
bereiken van een succesvolle carrière. In een eenvoudige reactietijdentaak 
kan dit zelf de (minieme) zelfvoldoening zijn na het succesvol 
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beantwoorden van een beurt op de taak (Satterthwaithe et al., 2012). Daarom 
hebben we ook experimenten opgezet waarin we nagingen of beloning na 
correcte respons (of straf na te trage/foutieve respons) invloed kon hebben 
op het Gratton effect. Daarbij waren we ook benieuwd naar interindividuele 
verschillen in belonings- en strafgevoeligheid en hebben we simultaan ook 
steeds de BIS/BASvragenlijsten afgenomen, die verondersteld worden straf- 
en beloningsgevoeligheid te meten. Deze experimenten werden afgenomen 
in Studies 2, 3, en 4. 
Reinforcement learning-theorieën doen ook uitspraken over hoe 
beloning wordt verwerkt of ervaren. Er wordt hierbij gesteld dat het ervaren 
van een beloning steeds een verschil is tussen de verwachtte beloning en de 
effectief verkregen beloning. Hoe groter het verschil tussen die twee is, hoe 
groter onze reward prediction error is. Een recent model die het werken van 
de ACC wil modelleren, voorspelt dat de ACC precies zo'n berekeningen 
maakt en dat deze dat ook doet in cognitieve taken, waar geen expliciete 
beloning wordt uitgedeeld. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer we een congruente beurt, 
versus een incongruente beurt, te zien krijgen, weten we dat onze outcome 
expectancy, oftewel onze verwachting dat we accuraat op deze beurt zullen 
scoren, groter is bij congruente, dan bij incongruente. Daarom kan ook 
worden voorspeld dat bij het zien van incongruente beurt meer negatief 
affect zal worden ervaren (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012), dan bij het zien van 
een congruente beurt. Echter, wanneer dan ook effectief goed geantwoord 
wordt op deze stimulus, kan men gaan verwachten - in de filosofie van 
reward prediction errrors - dat deze ervaring omkeert. Net omdat de 
outcome expectancy lager was bij incongruente, dan bij congruente stimuli, 
kan het correct beantwoorden van deze beurt als meer positief of "belonend" 
ervaren worden. Deze voorspelling werd nagegaan in Studie 5. 
Een probleem waar elk reinforcement learning-algorithme mee te 
kampen heeft, is het probleem van exploratie versus exploitatie, of 
cognitieve flexibiliteit versus stabiliteit. Een eeuwenoude wet binnen 
bekrachtigingleren stelt dat wanneer iets gevolgd wordt door een beloning, 
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deze de daartoe leidende acties zal versterken (Thorndike, 1911). Op die 
manier is het dan ook verstandig om te exploiteren (i.e., uit te buiten) wat 
reeds geweten is. Echter, omgevingen veranderen, en soms is de beste 
oplossing van gisteren niet meer de beste oplossing van vandaag. Daarom is 
het belangrijk steeds uit te kijken voor andere mogelijkheden en dus te 
exploreren. Hoe die balans gemaakt wordt tussen exploreren en exploiteren 
in ons alledaags leven is vaak nog onduidelijk. Een onderzoeksrichting die 
reeds eerste inzichten biedt in wat ons daarin kan sturen is onderzoek naar 
positief en negatief affect. Heel algemeen wordt daarbij vooronderstelt, dat 
een algemeen positief gevoel er vaak toe leidt meer te gaan exploreren, 
terwijl een algemeen negatief gevoel er meer zal toe leiden meer te 
exploiteren. Binnen het onderzoek rond conflict verwerking kunnen we het 
Gratton effect zien als een maat van exploitatie of conflictgeïnduceerde 
cognitieve stabiliteit. Dit pas binnen het idee dat na conflict, verbindingen 
worden versterkt die tot het succesvol beantwoorden van die incongruente 
beurt leidden. Een stap verder, kunnen we dan ook verwachten, dat na een 
incongruente beurt, het moeilijker zou zijn om van taak te verwisselen, dan 
na een congruente beurt. Dit is ook reeds aangetoond. Goschke (2000) 
toonde reeds aan dat in een taak-wisselexperiment, waar het steeds de 
bedoeling is willekeurig van taak te moeten wisselen, dit moeilijker verloopt 
wanneer je net een incongruente beurt beantwoorde, dan wanneer de vorige 
beurt een congruente was. Dit zullen we van hier af aan het Goschke effect 
noemen, en dit zal ook de indexering zijn van conflict adaptaties die we 
zullen hanteren in studies 2 en 6. Specifiek zullen we nagaan in studie 6 of 
het Goschke effect kan beïnvloed worden door positief en negatief affect, en 
of een eventuele link tussen het affect en het taakgedrag daarin een rol 
speelt.  
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STUDIE 1: CONFLICT ADAPTATIE IS EFFECTORSPECIFIEK 
Het doel van deze eerste studie was om na te gaan of conflict 
adaptatie, oftewel het Gratton effect, ook te zien zou zijn wanneer men 
afwisselend een taak met handen of voeten diende uit te voeren. Hierbij 
voorspelden we dat, als het inderdaad zo is dat conflict adaptatie gebeurd 
door het versterken van actieve verbindingen, stimulusrespons verbindingen 
die actief waren op de vorige beurt meer versterkt zouden worden dan 
alternatieve stimulusrespons associaties. In andere woorden verwachtten we 
dus enkel een Gratton effect als de vorige en huidige beurt met dezelfde 
effectoren dienden uitgevoerd te worden. Effectief, we vonden enkel een 
Gratton effect van handen naar handen, of voeten naar voeten, maar niet van 
handen naar voeten of voeten naar handen. Dit is consistent met het idee dat 
het Gratton effect effectorspecifiek is. Om andere kleine verschillen tussen 
het toewijzen van de taak aan handen en/of voeten in rekening te nemen, 
werd ook een controle-experiment uitgevoerd waar beide responsmappings 
met de handen werden uitgevoerd. Daar vonden we zowel binnen als tussen 
verschillende responsmappings een Gratton effect.  
 
STUDIE 2: BELONING MODULEERT ADAPTATIES NA CONFLICT 
In deze tweede studie gingen we na of het (sporadisch) aanbieden van 
beloningssignalen het Gratton en Goschke effect zouden beïnvloeden. 
Hierbij vooronderstelden we dat als het Gratton en Goschke effect effectief 
leereffecten zijn die hoofdzakelijk bestaan uit het versterken van associaties, 
dan zou het aanbieden van een beloning enkel dit versterken van associaties 
moeten promoten. Hiertoe combineerden we een eenvoudige conflict taak in 
een eerste experiment, en twee conflicttaken in een tweede experiment, met 
het aanbieden van beloningssignalen om de invloed van die 
beloningssignalen op respectievelijk het Gratton en Goschke effect na te 
gaan. Beide experimenten toonden aan dat de adaptaties na conflict stand 
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hielden wanneer beloning werd uitgeleverd, maar niet wanneer er geen 
beloning werd getoond. Twee controle-experimenten toonden aan dat dit 
effect niet te wijten was aan het louter aanbieden van een sporadische 
visuele stimulus. Daarenboven werd ook een correlatie aangetoond tussen de 
BAS beloningsgevoeligheid vragenlijsten en de modulatie van het Gratton 
en Goschke effect. Deze bevindingen tonen aan dat adaptaties wel degelijk 
kunnen versterkt worden na beloning, en, opmerkelijk, dat het uitblijven van 
een beloning in een beloningscontext zelf de waarde van het correct 
beantwoorden kan wegnemen zodat conflict adaptatie op de volgende beurt 
uitblijft. 
 
STUDIE 3: BELONING MODULEERT CONTEXTSPECIFIEKE ADAPTATIES 
NA CONFLICT 
We toonden reeds aan dat conflict adaptatie contextspecifiek is in 
Studie 1 en dat beloning conflict adaptatie kan versterken in Studie 2. In 
deze derde studie was het de bedoeling om beide bevindingen samen na te 
gaan en te zien of conflict adaptatie wordt versterkt na beloning op een 
contextspecifieke manier. Daartoe hebben we ons laten inspireren op een 
paradigma van Hickey, Chelazzi, & Theeuwes (2010) waarbij ze aantoonden 
dat in een visuele zoektaak een hoge beloning de aandacht naar een 
taakirrelevante kleur kan doen versterken als dit bijdroeg tot het sneller 
uitvoeren van de taak, terwijl een lage beloning eerder de aandacht naar een 
alternatieve afleidende kleur (die de taakuitvoering vertraagt) doet 
versterken. Door deze taak te combineren met een conflicttaak kunnen we 
nagaan of deze invloed van beloning op taakirrelevante kleuren ook een 
weerslag zou hebben op conflict adaptatie. In een eerste experiment toonden 
we aan dat, zonder beloningsmanipulatie, we reeds een invloed vinden van 
kleurherhaling/afwisseling op conflict adaptatie. Conflict adaptatie werd 
waargenomen wanneer kleur, als contextkenmerk, zich herhaalde, maar niet 
wanneer de context wisselde. In een tweede en derde experiment werd daar 
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lage en hoge beloning aan toegevoegd. In de lijn met het patroon van Hickey 
en collegae (2010) vonden we dat na hoge beloning opnieuw conflict 
adaptatie werd waargenomen, maar enkel op context repetities. Terwijl na 
lage beloning er enkel een Gratton effect werd waargenomen op context 
alternaties. 
 
STUDIE 4: STRAF MODULEERT ADAPTATIES NA CONFLICT, 
AFHANKELIJK VAN STRAF GEVOELIGHEID 
In deze vierde studie was het de bedoeling om na te gaan of ook het 
straffen van te trage of foutieve antwoorden als leersignaal kon gelden om 
het Gratton effect te versterken. In een studie van Stürmer, Nigbur, Schacht, 
en Sommer (2011) werd dit reeds nagegaan. Zij vonden dat enkel na 
beloning, maar niet na straf, het Gratton effect groter was. Na straf 
vertraagden de proefpersonen enkel. Echter, geïnspireerd door de literatuur 
dat straf vaak prominenter is dan beloning, vermoeden we dat de 
strafsignalen in de studie van Stürmer en collegae (2011) de aandacht 
wegtrokken van de taak en daarom de reactietijden verhoogden. We hebben 
daarom de BIS scores als een maat van strafgevoeligheid mee in rekening 
genomen en voorspelden hierbij dat straf inderdaad gedrag zal doen 
vertragen, wanneer mensen zeer gevoelig zijn aan straf, maar dat voor 
normaal of laag strafgevoelige mensen straf zou moeten helpen om 
taakprestatie, in dit geval het Gratton effect, te verbeteren. Dit was ook 
precies wat we observeerden. Straf versterkte het Gratton effect voor de laag 
strafgevoelige mensen, maar vertraagde reactietijden voor hoog 
strafgevoelige mensen. 
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STUDIE 5: KAN HET CORRECT BEANTWOORDEN VAN CONFLICT 
BELONEND ZIJN? 
In de inleiding stelden we voor dat wanneer we een relatief lage 
verwachting hebben over onze accuraatheidscores op een incongruente beurt 
dit als negatief wordt ervaren bij het zien van die beurt, maar als positief (of 
op zijn minst relatief positiever dan na congruente beurten), wanneer we die 
correct beantwoorden. Om dit na te gaan maakten we gebruik van een 
affectief priming paradigma. In zo'n paradigma is het de bedoeling dat een 
bepaalde gebeurtenis of stimulus geldt als "prime" die dan het beoordelen 
van affectieve woorden zal beïnvloeden. Bijvoorbeeld, wanneer mensen zeer 
graag roken zal men na het zien van een prent van een sigaret sneller zijn om 
een positief woord als positief te classificeren, dan een negatief woord als 
negatief, terwijl we bij anti-rokers een omgekeerd patroon zouden 
verwachten. Dit is omdat de prent van een sigaret reeds een gevoel uitlokt 
dat het lezen/classificeren van woorden die datzelfde gevoel uitlokken kan 
versnellen, of met een ander gevoel vertragen. Dit zette onderzoekers 
Dreisbach en Fischer (2012) er toe aan om dit na te gaan na het zien van 
congruente of incongruente stimuli. Zij toonden daarbij overtuigend aan dat 
na incongruente stimuli, mensen relatief sneller zijn in het benoemen van de 
negatieve woorden, dan na congruente stimuli, wanneer ze relatief sneller 
zijn in het benoemen van positieve woorden. In een eerste experiment 
hebben we dit effect gerepliceerd. Echter, in een tweede en derde 
experiment, tonen we vervolgens aan, dat wanneer men ook correct diende 
te antwoorden op deze conflict stimuli, men relatief sneller was voor 
positieve woorden, dan voor negatieve woorden na incongruente beurten, 
ten opzichte van congruente beurten. In een vierde experiment, een controle-
experiment, tonen we ook aan dat dit effect niet voor alle vormen van 
taakmoeilijkheid geldt. 
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STUDIE 6: AFFECTIEVE MODULATIES VAN CONFLICT ADAPTATIE EN 
DE ROL VAN TAAK RELEVANTIE 
In deze zesde en laatste studie wilden we iets bijdragen aan het debat 
dat positieve emoties cognitieve flexibiliteit promoten en negatieve 
cognitieve stabiliteit. Daarvoor hanteerden we het Goschke effect als maat 
van conflictgeïnduceerde cognitieve stabiliteit en waren we vooral 
belangrijk hoe diens modulatie door affect zou bepaald worden door het al 
dan niet taakrelevant zijn van de affectieve stimuli. Daarom hebben we twee 
condities opgezet waar proefpersonen willekeurig konden aan toegewezen 
worden. In de ene conditie werd proefpersonen verteld dat de negatieve en 
positieve prenten die steeds tussen de beurten door gepresenteerd zouden 
worden totaal ongerelateerd waren aan hun taakgedrag. In een andere 
conditie, echter, werd de proefpersonen verteld, en dit was ook zo, dat 
positieve en negatieve prenten enkel op correcte antwoorden zouden volgen. 
Bovendien werd in beide condities meegegeven dat het zien van positieve 
prenten hen 10 dollarcent zou opleveren. Dit wil dus zeggen dat enkel in de 
taakgerelateerde conditie het foutief beantwoorden van een beurt kon leiden 
tot het uitblijven van een positieve prent, en dus 10 dollarcent. Onze 
resultaten toonden aan dat enkel in de taakgerelateerde conditie positieve 
prenten inderdaad ervoor zorgen dat het Goschke effect verdween, en zo 
cognitieve flexibiliteit en exploratie promoten, terwijl in de 
taakongerelateerde conditie dit effect eerder omkeerde. 
Bovendien werd in dit experiment ook beeldvorming van de hersenen 
afgenomen aan de hand van functionele MRI (Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging). Dit stond ons toe zowel een beeld te vormen van het Goschke 
effect, als een beeld van hoe affectieve prenten dit effect beïnvloeden, 
afhankelijk van de taakrelevantie-conditie. Hierbij merkten we op dat 
hoewel het Goschke effect vooral gereflecteerd werd in een verhoogde 
rekrutering van de dorso-laterale prefrontale cortex en het striatum, de 
affectieve modulatie van dit effect voor tot stand kwam door een modulatie 
van de ventro-mediale prefrontale cortex en de posterieur cingulate cortex. 
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Bovendien werd ook gekeken hoe het waarnemen van de affectiviteit van de 
prenten, beïnvloed kon zijn door de taakrelevantie van de conditie. Daarbij 
vonden we activatie terug in de rechter inferieur parietale lobule. 
 
BESLUIT 
Dit doctoraat was er toe opgezet om de rol van reinforcement learning 
bij cognitieve controle, meer specifiek conflict adaptaties na te gaan. We 
hebben daarbij aangetoond hoe, inderdaad, conflict adaptatie effector-, en 
contextspecifiek is. Bovendien hebben we bewezen hoe conflict adaptatie 
mede bepaald kan worden door straf- en beloningssignalen en hoe 
belonings- en strafgevoeligheid daarin een rol kunnen spelen. Vervolgens 
demonstreerden we hoe het succesvol beantwoorden van conflict op zich 
reeds een positief gevoel met zich mee kan brengen. Tenslotte toonden we 
aan dat affect conflict adaptatie beïnvloed, afhankelijk van wat affect over 
taakgedrag zegt, in zowel reactietijden als hersenactivaties. We zijn er van 
overtuigd dat deze resultaten er kunnen toe bijdragen om conflict adaptatie 
vanuit een andere invalshoek te interpreteren, en een inspiratie kunnen 
vormen voor verder onderzoek die cognitieve controle in termen van 
leermechanismen wil nagaan, eerder dan die aan een  homunculus te moeten 
toeschrijven. 
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